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Interpersonal influences in human visuospatial attention: from behaviour to EEG
by
Juan Camilo Avendaño Díaz
Abstract
Human evolution has shaped us into social animals, who are continually 
immersed in social interactions, constantly performing tasks with others and sharing 
our reality with them (Dunbar, 2003; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). 
For many of these interactions to be successful, it is necessary to pay attention to the 
same spatial locations with other individuals. Surprisingly however, this specific low-
level aspect of our social life (i.e., attending to the same spatial locations with others) is
not well understood. The present PhD work aims at contributing to this understanding 
by investigating whether paying attention towards the same spatial location with 
another person modulates one’s attention performance, along with its social, cognitive, 
and neural implications.
In this line, the classic visuospatial sustained attention paradigm (e.g., Eimer, 
1996; Mangun & Hillyard, 1988; Mangun & Buck, 1998) was adapted so it could be 
independently performed by two people (a dyad) sitting next to each other, to examine 
how visual attention performance (reaction times, RTs) is interpersonally modulated 
when an experiment partner is paying attention to the same or a different spatial 
location (aka., dual attention paradigm). In this paradigm (Experiment 1), participants 
performed a visual go/no-go task, responding to visual targets while attending to the 
same vs. different spatial location than the experiment partner. A typical attention effect 
was present in RTs (i.e., faster responses to targets appearing at the attended locations
compared with those at the unattended locations) when the dyad attended to different 
locations. This attention effect, however, was significantly reduced when the 
participants shared the attentional locus (aka., dual attention effect). This pattern was 
reversed when single participants performed the task in isolation (Experiment 2), 
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suggesting that the reduction in the attention benefit was socially driven between 
individuals (interpersonally). Additional experiments showed that the dual attention 
effect persisted under an increased perceptual load (Experiment 3), was not modulated
by the group membership status attributed to the task partner (i.e., social closeness; 
Experiment 4), and disappeared once the partner was performing the task from a 
separate room (i.e., physical closeness; Experiment 5).
Finally, an electroencephalography (EEG) study (Experiment 6) investigated the
neural underpinnings of the dual attention effect, focusing on the information 
processing stage(s) influenced by dual attention. The aim was to understand whether 
the dual attention effect took place at a sensory level vs. a cognitive control stage. 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) and neural oscillations suggested that the effect was 
driven by a cognitive control process, and also showed an enhancement in the early 
sensory level information processing in the brain. Both the N2b ERP component and 
mid-frontal theta oscillations pointed towards a stronger need for control when sharing 
the attentional locus with another person in the dual attention task, while the P1 
component yielded an enhancement in the attention effect in the attention sharing 
condition. The P1 effect may be top-down driven through alpha band long-range 
communication from prefrontal to posterior areas. Likely higher order processing 
related accounts were proposed for the current findings (e.g., linked to response 
inhibition, or mentalising/monitoring others). The current thesis made the first attempt 
to place dual attention as a bridge between the general shared attention perspective 
(Stheynberg 2015) and the overt behavioural interplay characterising joint attention and
joint action. In addition, the present results could have ubiquitous real-life implications, 
and may give us some clues about how to optimize daily performance in dual-attention-
like environments (e.g., classrooms/working spaces).
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 1 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Human evolution has shaped us into social animals, who are continually 
immersed in social interactions, regularly performing tasks with others and sharing our 
reality with them (Dunbar, 2003; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). For 
many of these interactions to be successful, it is necessary to pay attention to the same
spatial locations with other individuals. We do this since childhood, while trying to learn 
from our parents, and continue doing it throughout our lifetime. A group of students 
attending together to a lecture, or a couple of workers monitoring a product in an 
industrial assembly chain are only a few examples where this ubiquitous “phenomena” 
occurs. Surprisingly however, the social, cognitive, and neural implications of this 
specific low-level aspect of our social life (i.e., attending to the same spatial locations 
with others) are not well understood. The present PhD work aims at contributing to this 
understanding by investigating whether paying attention towards the same spatial 
location with another person modulates one’s attention performance.
Due to the limited processing capacity of the human brain, attention has 
evolved as a way to efficiently select relevant information from the environment 
(Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001), determining what merits to be processed by the 
brain. This core cognitive mechanism allows us to select what “matters” out of the vast 
amount of information surrounding us. This mechanism however, as human cognition 
in general, develops and materialises in a social context. Therefore, it should not be 
striking that several research outcomes have shown that humans are strongly 
influenced by other individuals during interpersonal interactions (Gobel, Kim, & 
Richardson, 2018; Hari, Henriksson, Malinen, & Parkkonen, 2015; Sebanz, Bekkering, 
& Knoblich, 2006), to the point that it has been suggested that social interactions may 
play a central role in human brain function (Hari et al., 2015; Hari & Kujala, 2009).
Considering that an important amount of the information around us is social in 
nature (e.g., other persons or somehow related to them), it would not be surprising that 
the mechanism we developed to decide what is processed by our brains (i.e., 
attention), and human cognition in general, could be shaped by social context and 
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socially relevant information, or influenced by other individuals in our environment. In 
this introductory section I will present some of the theories and empirical findings 
available to date regarding these interpersonal influences and the impact of social 
context on cognitive processes, particularly in the attention mechanism. I will show that 
although substantial evidence has been provided for interpersonal social influences on 
human cognition, little is known about the influence on basic attentional processes. 
This PhD thesis contributes to the latter by investigating how visual attention 
performance is changed by the knowledge that another person is paying attention 
towards the same spatial locations with us, in the absence of explicit interactions, while
providing insights about the factors modulating this influence, and the neural 
mechanisms behind it.
 In the remaining of this chapter, literature covering topics including visuospatial 
attention, joint performance, and joint/shared attention research will be introduced, as 
well as some insights from neuroimaging and neurophysiology, with a particular focus 
on electroencephalography (EEG) research relevant to the above-mentioned topics. 
Afterwards, the motivation and aims behind this PhD work will be presented along with 
an outline of the present Thesis.
1.1. Visuospatial attention
Our mind is constantly exposed to an enormous amount of information from the 
environment we are immersed in. Given that the cognitive and neural processing 
resources of our brain are limited, visual attention allows to prioritise what prevails out 
of all the visual information available, and selects what comes to be eventually 
processed by the brain (Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001). According to the 
currently prevalent notion (biased-competition hypothesis; see (Beck & Kastner, 2009; 
Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Kim & Kastner, 2019), visual stimuli (e.g., objects, events, 
spatial locations) compete for the limited available neural resources, and the visual 
system selectively filters relevant from irrelevant information by biasing the neural 
responses in favour of the attended stimuli. This means that neural populations with 
receptive fields at the attended location remain active or increase their activity, while 
the rest reduce their activity or become suppressed (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). By 
enhancing representations of relevant aspects of the visual environment and 
suppressing the irrelevant ones, visual attention allow us to get information that 
ultimately guide our brain processes and behaviour (Carrasco, 2011).   
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Visuospatial attention in particular, refers to the ability of shifting the focus of 
attention towards a specific location in space, or away from it (Posner, 1980). This 
orienting of visual attention allows the prioritisation and selection of information within 
the relevant (attended) visual field. Visuospatial attention can be oriented in two ways 
(for reviews see Carrasco, 2011; Chica, Martín-Arévalo, Botta, & Lupiáñez, 2014; 
Nobre, 2018). On the one hand, endogenous attention (aka., voluntary, sustained, 
goal-driven or top-down attention) refers to our ability to deploy visual attention at will 
towards a particular spatial location, according to a set of instructions or behavioural 
goals. Alternatively, exogenous attention (aka., involuntary, transient, stimulus-driven or
bottom-up attention) refers to the automatic/involuntary deployment of attention 
towards spatial locations where sudden/unexpected/salient events take place. The 
interplay between these two types of visuospatial attention allow us to select relevant 
information in our environment according to our current goals (e.g., focus on the street 
while riding a bike), and to process unexpected/salient changes within this environment
(e.g., a barking dog approaching our bike), allowing us to subsequently respond to 
them accordingly (e.g., avoiding the dog).  
Two “classic” experimental paradigms have been extensively used to study 
endogenous and exogenous spatial orienting of attention: the Posner spatial orienting 
task (Posner, 1980) and the sustained visuospatial attention paradigm (e.g., Eimer, 
1996; Mangun & Hillyard, 1988; Mangun & Buck, 1998). The former one can be 
employed to study both exogenous and endogenous orienting, while the later focuses 
on endogenous attention. In the basic form of the Posner task, a participant sat in front 
of a computer screen is asked to detect or discriminate a visual target stimulus while 
holding a central fixation (i.e., without moving her eyes; but see Chica, Klein, Rafal, & 
Hopfinger, 2010 for an example where eye movements were allowed). The target 
stimulus appears peripherally, at one of two locations in the screen. Before the 
appearance of the target though, a cueing stimulus is displayed. This cue is the key 
element guiding visual attention in the task. In endogenous attention manipulations, the
cue is typically an informative symbol (e.g., a central dot cueing a specific location 
according to its colour: red for the right side, blue for the left) presented centrally in the 
screen. This symbol predicts the location where the subsequent target is likely to be 
displayed (e.g., 75% of the times, also known as cue validity). Thus, the participant can
use this information to voluntarily shift her focus of attention to a particular spatial 
location accordingly. Under this experimental setting, participants tend to respond 
faster and more accurately to targets appearing at the previously cued location (i.e., 
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valid), than to the uncued one (i.e., invalid). This reaction times (RTs) difference 
between valid and invalid trials is known as attention effect (Posner, 1980), and it 
reflects the behavioural benefit of allocating attention towards a particular spatial 
location. Neutral (non-informative) cues, instead, do not encourage systematic 
attention shifts. However, by comparing the responses (RTs and accuracy) to valid vs. 
neutral trials one could obtain a cleaner quantification of the benefit of attention 
deployment towards the cued location. In a similar way, the costs of taking attention 
away from a spatial location can be estimated by comparing the performance to invalid 
vs. neutral trials. The facilitation effect of central cues is observed behaviourally 
~300ms after the cue is displayed, once the participant has had enough time to 
process the information conveyed by the cue and shifts the locus of attention 
correspondingly (Remington & Pierce, 1984), and can be sustained for several 
seconds (Posner, 1980). 
In exogenous attention manipulations (see Chica, Martín-Arévalo, Botta, & 
Lupiáñez, 2014), the cue is a transient, non-informative, peripheral stimulus appearing 
typically at one of two locations. This cue acts as a salient event that primes attention 
towards a specific spatial location (i.e., the location where the cue is displayed), 
enhancing the processing of the visual stimuli subsequently appearing at (or close to) 
that location, relative to those at the invalid side. As for the endogenous version of the 
task, after the cue presentation, the target is displayed either at the valid or invalid 
location, with similar implications in terms of RTs, accuracies, and the measurement of 
the cost and benefits of attention. This cueing effect however, is not always 
“facilitatory”. The facilitation effect observed with peripheral cues is early and transient 
(respect to the endogenous case). It can be obtained ~50ms after the cue presentation,
but fades quite fast, disappearing ~200 to 300 ms. After ~300ms, an inhibitory effect is 
obtained, with a performance impairment (i.e., slower RTs and/or lower accuracies) at 
the valid location, compared to the invalid one. This inhibitory mechanism keeping 
attention away from previously attended events/locations is known as Inhibition Of 
Return (IOR; Klein, 2000; Klein & Taylor, 1994; Lupiáñez, Klein, & Bartolomeo, 2006; 
Posner, Rafal, Choate, & Vaughan, 1985). Importantly, the time between the cue and 
target presentation (SOA, or Stimulus-Onset Asynchrony) is not the only relevant 
parameter modulating the outcome of the orienting task. There are many variables that 
need to be selected when designing this kind of experimental paradigm. Besides the 
SOA, parameters like the cue type (endogenous vs. exogenous), the cue validity, the 
cue and target durations, the cue and target physical characteristics, whether covert vs.
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overt attention shifts are allowed, and the type of task (e.g., discrimination vs. 
detection), among others, need to be defined. It is beyond the scope of this introduction
to provide a detailed explanation of these parameters and their implications in spatial 
orienting, but see Chica et al. (2014) for a review and tutorial on how to design and 
interpret visuospatial attention experiments. 
Finally, in the sustained visuospatial attention task (e.g., Eimer, 1996; Harter, 
Aine, & Schroeder, 1982; Hillyard & Münte, 1984; Mangun & Hillyard, 1988; Mangun & 
Buck, 1998), a participant sits in front of a computer monitor and is asked to pay covert 
attention to one of two locations (e.g., left or right) throughout an experimental block 
(i.e., sustain attention to the left or the right side of a computer’s screen) while keeping 
eye-gaze on a central fixation. She needs to respond to visual targets randomly 
appearing at the attended and unattended locations as quickly and accurately as 
possible. To ensure that the participant pays more attention towards the attended 
location, the distribution of target stimuli is manipulated, so that targets are more likely 
to appear at the attended location (e.g., 75% of all trials; valid condition) than at the 
unattended location (e.g., 25% of all trials; invalid condition). Reaction times (RTs) are 
typically faster in the valid than the invalid trials. The RT difference between valid and 
invalid targets indicates also in this case the attention effect, a measure of behaviour 
benefit from attention allocation to the attended spatial location. The sustained 
attention task was mainly advocated by EEG researchers in order to avoid interference 
from cue-evoked potentials (e.g., that would occur with the Posner orienting task) in the
target-relevant neural responses (e.g., Eimer, 1996; Harter, Aine, & Schroeder, 1982; 
Hillyard & Münte, 1984; Mangun & Hillyard, 1988; Mangun & Buck, 1998). 
The sustained visuospatial attention paradigm plays a central role in the current
thesis. As introduced above, the main aim of this PhD work was to investigate whether 
paying attention towards the same spatial location with another person modulates 
one’s attention performance. In order to address this question, a modified (two-
persons) version of the classic sustained attention paradigm was proposed (see the 
section “Dual attention paradigm” below for an introduction to the paradigm, and see 
Chapter 2 for detailed information about it). This dual attention paradigm was the core 
task employed along the current thesis. 
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1.2. Neural basis and electrophysiological correlates of visuospatial 
attention
This section overviews the literature regarding the neural basis and neural 
correlates of visuospatial attention. The role of the dorsal and ventral fronto-parietal 
attention networks in the control of endogenous and exogenous attention is described, 
as well as an overview of event-related potentials and brain oscillations research 
relevant to spatial attention orienting. 
 1.2.1 Dorsal and ventral fronto-parietal attention networks
Neuroimaging and neurophysiological research have robustly shown that 
visuospatial attention enhances neural activity in occipital and posterior parietal regions
in a retinotopic and hierarchically organized manner (e.g., Di Russo, 2003; Di Russo & 
Pitzalis, 2014; Martı́nez et al., 2001), where the neuron’s receptive field size (and 
complexity) widens progressively along the pathway towards higher-order visual areas 
(Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). However, although the neural expression of 
visuospatial attentional processing is related to the above-mentioned topographic 
modulations in occipital (and parieto-occipital) cortices, the implementation of the 
attention orienting mechanisms has been attributed to the interplay between two fronto-
parietal systems: the dorsal and the ventral fronto-parietal networks (Chica, 
Bartolomeo, & Lupiáñez, 2013; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Vossel, Geng, & Fink, 
2014). These networks have been associated with endogenous (voluntary or goal-
driven) and exogenous (bottom-up or stimulus-driven) visuospatial attention, 
respectively (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002).      
The dorsal and ventral fronto-parietal systems were first proposed and 
described in an influential review by Maurizio Corbetta and Gordon Shulman (Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002). The dorsal network is organised bilaterally and includes the 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS), the superior parietal lobe (SPL), the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) and frontal eye fields (FEF) in both hemispheres (Chica et al., 2013; Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002; van den Heuvel & Hulshoff Pol, 2010). Neuroimaging studies have 
shown that activity in this network is enhanced (e.g., stronger blood oxygenation level 
dependent responses) by the voluntary deployment of attention towards a spatial 
location where a target is expected. This enhanced activation occurs contralaterally to 
the attended visual hemifield (Chica et al., 2013; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Vossel et 
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al., 2014). For this reason, the dorsal network has been linked to 
top-down/endogenous control on visual processing and attentional orienting (Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002). Contrary to the dorsal network, the ventral network is not activated 
by endogenous expectations. Instead, stronger activations in the ventral network have 
been reported during exogenous reorienting of attention towards unexpected visual 
targets (e.g., elicited by invalid cueing), causing an interruption in endogenous control 
(Chica et al., 2013; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). The ventral fronto-parietal network is 
strongly right-lateralised, and comprises the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and the 
ventral frontal cortex (VFC), including parts of the anterior insula, the frontal operculum,
the middle frontal frontal gyrus (MFG) and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (Chica et al., 
2013; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; de Schotten et al., 2011; Vossel et al., 2014). 
Importantly, transcranial magnetic stimulation research (TMS) has provided valuable 
evidence in support of the causal role played by these fronto-parietal networks in 
endogenous (i.e., the dorsal network) and exogenous (i.e., the ventral network) 
visuospatial attention (e.g., Bourgeois, Chica, Valero-Cabré, & Bartolomeo, 2013; 
Capotosto, Babiloni, Romani, & Corbetta, 2012; Capotosto, Corbetta, Romani, & 
Babiloni, 2012).
A description of the fiber-tracts system thought to provide the structural 
connectivity underlying visuospatial attention has been provided as well. The superior 
longitudinal fascicle (SLF) has been suggested as the main structural system 
proportioning this connectivity (Chica et al., 2013; de Schotten et al., 2011). The SLF I 
projections overlap with the dorsal fronto-parietal network activations behind spatial 
orienting (e.g., IPS and FEF show strong connections along these fiber tracts). The 
SLF III on the other hand, overlaps with the ventral network activations in exogenous 
attention (e.g., connecting VFC and TPJ). In addition, the SLF II shows overlaps with 
the prefrontal part of the dorsal network and with the posterior section of the ventral 
network. Therefore, SLF II seems to provide the structural/anatomical means for 
communication between the two fronto-parietal networks. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that SLF II could interfere with the dorsal attention network, using 
information about salient events “spotted” by the SLF III to modulate or re-direct the 
goal-driven attention linked to SLF I (Chica et al., 2013; de Schotten et al., 2011).
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 1.2.2 Event-related potentials research
Event-related potentials (ERPs) research in visual attention has shown reliable 
modulations by attention in both sensory level components (e.g., P1 and N1), and in 
late higher-order event-related responses (e.g., N2b and P3). The P1 component is a 
positive deflection, typically picking around 100ms, and originated in the extrastriate 
cortex (Hillyard & Picton, 1987). The N1 on the other hand, is a negative deflection 
around 150-200ms, related to activity in the multiple neural structures (Clark, Fan, & 
Hillyard, 1994; Heinze, Luck, Mangun, & Hillyard, 1990). Both the P1 and N1 
amplitudes have been consistently shown to be modulated by the voluntary 
visuospatial orienting of attention (e.g., Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998; Van Vorhis & 
Hillyard 1977; Vogel & Luck, 2000). In particular, in sustained attention experiments, 
where participants are asked to fixate the centre of the screen while focusing their 
attention to one particular location, enhanced P1s and N1s are obtained for stimuli 
appearing at the attended locations compared to the unattended ones (e.g., Luck, 
Woodman, & Vogel, 2000; Mangun, Hillyard, & Luck, 1993). These components 
however, do reflect different aspects of early sensory processes. P1 has been linked to 
the processing of physical properties of stimuli (Hillyard & Picton, 1987), and to a 
suppression mechanism for non-attended locations (e.g., Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998;
Mangun & Hillyard, 1991), while the N1 has been associated with enhanced 
discrimination processing at the attended locations (Vogel & Luck, 2000; see also 
Mangun, 1995; Hillyard et al., 1998). These components are also modulated by the 
perceptual load level of the task at hand (i.e., enhanced amplitudes have been reported
to increased perceptual loads), but do not necessarily respond in the same manner to 
variations in load (i.e., depending on the load level P1 may change and N1 remain 
unaffected, or viceversa), suggesting that they reflect different processing capacity 
limits in the brain (Handy & Mangun, 2000; Handy et al., 2001). 
Another ERP component modulated by visual attention is the N2b (or anterior 
N2). Peaking around 200-350ms after the stimulus onset, and known to be originated 
in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), particularly in the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) (Crottaz-Herbette & Menon, 2006; Van Veen & Carter, 2002), the N2b 
component has been considered a marker of cognitive control (see Folstein & Van 
Petten, 2007 for a review; see also Vuillier, Bryce, Szücs, & Whitebread, 2016). In this 
line, this ERP component typically measured at fronto-central sites, is larger when 
inhibiting prepotent responses is required (i.e. response inhibition; see Folstein & Van 
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Petten, 2008). For instance, the larger N2bs are obtained for incompatible than 
compatible trials in cognitive control tasks (Folstein & Van Petten, 2007; Larson, 
Clayson, & Clawson, 2014; Van Veen & Carter, 2002), and enhanced N2bs have been 
found for no-go trials in go/nogo tasks (Jodo & Kayama, 1992; Pfefferbaum, Ford, 
Weller, & Kopell, 1985). This no-go N2 has been further shown to be enhanced when 
the no-go stimuli share target features, inducing a response that needs to be 
suppressed (e.g., Azizian, Freitas, Parvaz, & Squires, 2006). As for the P1 and N1 
components, larger N2b amplitudes are usually obtained in response to attended 
stimuli (e.g., Eimer, 1993; see also Wei, Rushby, & De Blasio, 2019). 
Attention related amplitude enhancements are also observed in P3 (or P3b) 
(Mangun, 1995; see also Luck, 2014), a positive deflection around 300-400ms. P3 
however, is a functionally very heterogeneous event-related potential, and despite the 
vast amount of experiments published in relation to this component, no consensus has 
been achieved regarding the cognitive/neural processes associated to it (Luck, 2014). 
P3 has been associated (among others) with perceptual interference and action-related
stimulus evaluation (Kok, 2001; Mangun, 1995; Polich & Kok, 1995; Zhou, Zhang, Tan, 
& Han, 2004; see Luck, 2014; Polich, 2012 for reviews), and has been considered as a 
measure of processing capacity and mental workload (e.g., Kok, 2001).
 1.2.3 Alpha band oscillations
Almost a century ago, Hans Berger first observed and defined the alpha rhythm 
(Berger, 1929), the first electrophysiological signal recorded in the human brain. The 
initial observations showed parieto-occipital oscillatory patterns that were attenuated by
opening the eyes, and reduced by attentive states (Adrian & Matthews, 1934a, 1934b; 
Berger, 1929). These observations were initially taken to suggest that alpha oscillations
represented an ‘idling’ rhythm of the brain (Adrian & Matthews, 1934b). More recent 
research however, has shown that alpha oscillations actively contribute to human brain 
function, as an inhibitory rhythm (see Lopes da Silva, 2013 for a review). According to 
this view, alpha oscillations are considered as a marker of cortical inhibition (Klimesch, 
Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 2007; Palva & Palva, 2007; Pfurtscheller, 2003; Ray & Cole, 
1985; Sauseng et al., 2005; Thut, 2006), and a decrease in their amplitude has been 
linked to increased cortical activation or cortical excitability (Palva & Palva, 2007; 
Pfurtscheller, 2001).
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Alpha oscillations have been widely studied in relation to visuospatial attention, 
and are known to covary with visual attentional changes (see Clayton, Yeung, & Cohen
Kadosh, 2018). In visual attention tasks, an alpha suppression (i.e., a reduction in the 
amplitude/power of the oscillatory activity) in parieto-occipital areas is obtained in 
response to visual targets (e.g., Bauer, Stenner, Friston, & Dolan, 2014; Fan et al., 
2007), or in the preparation period prior to their appearance (e.g., Kelly, Lalor, Reilly, & 
Foxe, 2006; Sauseng et al., 2005; Thut, 2006). This suppression is typically stronger in 
regions contralateral than ipsilateral to the attended visual hemifield (Sauseng et al., 
2005). Following the cortical inhibition framework, the reduced contralateral alpha is 
thought to reflect a release of the cortical inhibition (or enhanced cortical excitability) in 
visual areas that would actively process the attended spatial locations, facilitating the 
subsequent cortical handling of visual inputs (Sauseng et al., 2005). The increased 
alpha amplitude at ipsilateral locations on the other hand, has been associated to an 
enhanced inhibition of cortical regions processing task-irrelevant information present in 
the ipsilateral hemifield (Kelly et al., 2006; Worden, Foxe, Wang, & Simpson, 2000).
The debate is still open regarding the origins of these oscillations in the human 
brain. Although no final consensus has been achieved in relation to the generators of 
this rhythm, current views point towards both thalamic and cortical contributions 
(Halgren et al., 2019). The calcarine fissure, secondary visual areas, and the parietal 
cortex have been shown to be involved in the generation of posterior alpha oscillations 
related to visual attention (Chapman, Ilmoniemi, Barbanera, & Romani, 1984; Ciulla & 
Takeda, 1999; Thut, 2006). However, rhythms in the same frequency range have been 
identified in several cortical regions, and linked to multiple processes beyond the visual
domain (see Clayton et al., 2018 for a review; see also Sadaghiani & Kleinschmidt, 
2016). 
Furthermore, alpha band oscillations seem to support not only local attentional 
processing, but also information exchange across regions in the brain (Fries, 2015; 
Halgren et al., 2019; Patten, Rennie, Robinson, & Gong, 2012; von Stein & Sarnthein, 
2000). Indeed, these oscillations have been linked to top-down processing, deemed as 
a top-down rhythm (Benedek, Bergner, Könen, Fink, & Neubauer, 2011; Doesburg, 
Bedo, & Ward, 2016; Halgren et al., 2019; von Stein, Chiang, & Konig, 2000), and may 
be closely related to cognitive control networks in order to implement inhibitory control 
(e.g., through a widespread increase in alpha power), facilitate local information 
processing (e.g., through focal alpha desynchronisation), and regulate long-range 
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information exchange (e.g., by changing alpha band phase-locking between distant 
regions) (see Sadaghiani & Kleinschmidt, 2016). In the case of visuospatial attention 
research, it has been shown that the typically stronger alpha power reduction 
measured at posterior regions contralateral vs. ipsilateral (to the attended stimulus or 
hemifield) is usually accompanied by a stronger phase coupling between pre-frontal 
regions and the contralateral posterior sites than to the ipsilateral ones, suggesting a 
potential top-down influence from pre-frontal areas in the control of visual attention 
(e.g., Sauseng et al., 2005).
1.3. Joint performance
Research in the social cognition/neuroscience field has been developed 
employing two main approaches: studying either isolated or interacting minds (Chatel-
Goldman, Schwartz, Jutten, & Congedo, 2013). A large amount of research is based on
experiments involving participants performing tasks in isolation, as spectators in 
controlled environments, and responding to very well controlled stimuli. While these 
experiments have provided valuable knowledge about several social related processes 
(and their underlying neural correlates), it has been questioned whether these would 
actually represent how the human brain performs in complex, fast, dynamic, multi-
agent scenarios, as real-life social interactions (Hari, Henriksson, Malinen, & 
Parkkonen, 2015). This section overviews a middle-ground approach between these 
two, by introducing several research findings where “interacting minds” jointly 
performed well controlled lab-based tasks, and describing the insights by them 
provided on the understanding of interpersonal influences in cognitive processes. 
Before addressing the joint performance literature however, it is important to 
refer to early studies that analysed interpersonal influences under the paradigms of 
social facilitation (Allport, 1924) and social loafing (Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979). 
The initial results in the social facilitation literature indicated that when others are 
merely present, our performance could be either enhanced or impaired (e.g. Allport, 
1924; Hunt & Hillery, 1973; Tripilett, 1898). Zajonc (1965) explained these findings by 
arguing that the presence of others induces an increased drive or arousal that 
modulates performance depending on the task complexity. In particular, according to 
Zajonc, dominant well learned actions result facilitated while non-dominant complex 
ones would be impaired. Alternatively however, it has been argued that the social 
facilitation effect could be elicited by social comparison with others (e.g., driven by the 
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effort people make to present themselves as more competent, or by fear of evaluation 
and disapproval), or by fluctuations in cognitive capacity due to the presence of 
distracting others (e.g., distraction could create a stressful attention conflict eliciting the 
above-mentioned increase in drive/arousal) (see Guerin, 1993 for a review about social
facilitation theories; see also Aiello & Douthitt, 2001). Social-loafing instead, refers to 
the reduced effort put into achieving a goal when working with others than alone 
(Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979). Social-loafing effects are usually obtained in 
groups when one expects other participants in the group to put the effort necessary to 
complete (or perform better) the task at hand, or when one’s contribution cannot be 
tracked and identified by the rest (Karau & Williams, 1993). Both social facilitation and 
social-loafing provided the first insights (and a starting point) into examining socially 
driven modulations of human cognition. However, the idea that one’s performance is 
changed due to the mere presence of other individuals, and that one’s effort may be 
reduced when working with others, are still very basic in relation to the complex and 
dynamic nature of the social world.   
More recently, several paradigms have been adapted in order to study the 
interpersonal influence on jointly performing individuals (e.g., joint Flanker task:Atmaca,
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011; joint Spatial-numerical association response codes -
SNARC: Atmaca, Sebanz, Prinz, & Knoblich, 2008; joint Simon task: Sebanz, Knoblich,
& Prinz, 2003). Joint action is the most established research topic within the joint 
performance literature. Therefore, even though the current thesis did not examine joint 
action itself, relevant insights from this field will be here described. The Simon task 
(Simon & Rudell, 1967) in particular, has been intensively used in joint action research. 
In a standard Simon setting, participants respond to non-spatial stimulus features (e.g.,
the shape or colour of visual stimuli, or the auditory pitch of a tone) with actions that 
can be spatially compatible or incompatible to the spatial location of the stimuli (e.g., a 
left response for a stimulus presented on the left side or a left response for a stimulus 
on the right, respectively). Responses are faster in the compatible condition than in the 
incompatible condition (aka., Simon effect; Simon & Rudell, 1967). This is generally 
believed to reflect the conflict between spatial information processing and response 
selection in the spatial dimension (see Lu & Proctor, 1995 for an overview of different 
accounts).  According to the dimensional overlap model (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & 
Osman, 1990), there is an overlap between the irrelevant dimension of the stimulus 
location and the relevant response location. This overlap elicits an automatic activation 
of the response corresponding to the stimulus location. This leads to the faster RTs 
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when the activated response matches the actual one (see also De Jong, Liang, & 
Lauber, 1994). From a Theory of Event Coding perspective (TEC; Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001), the effect could be explained by the binding between 
stimulus-response features and the subsequent match/miss-match between spatial 
stimulus and response codes (e.g., Hommel, 1993; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, 
& Prinz, 2001). It has been also proposed that attentional shifts prime responses, 
facilitating the corresponding ones, but slowing the non-congruent counterparts (e.g., 
Nicoletti & Umiltà, 1994).
Although the Simon Effect (SE) is present when participants perform the 
standard Simon task (i.e., responding to both stimuli using two response buttons), it 
disappears when people only perform half of the task (i.e., responding to only one of 
the stimuli using only one response button). This turns a choice-response task to a go/
no-go task. In the go/no-go task, despite that the stimuli can be presented at a spatially
compatible or spatially incompatible location, no SE will be observed because no 
response selection is needed, thus no stimulus-response conflict in the spatial 
dimension will occur (Hommel, 1996).  However, the SE re-appears when the Simon 
task is shared between two participants. In this case, the participants (the co-actors) 
perform two slightly different go/no-go tasks, which are complementary halves of the 
standard Simon task (see Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003), and their performance is 
comparable to that when a single person carries out the standard Simon task. This 
social context of individuals performing jointly made researchers terming this effect joint
Simon effect (JSE) (or social Simon effect, SSE) (Sebanz et al., 2003). Following this 
outcome, it has been proposed that people represent a co-actor´s actions (Sebanz et 
al., 2003) or tasks (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005) as one´s own. This action or task 
co-representation in turn leads to an effect equivalent to the SE found in persons 
performing the standard Simon task alone (Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005). Moreover, this 
action/task co-representation is further considered to be a dedicated and automatic 
social process evidencing the social nature of perception and action (Knoblich & 
Sebanz, 2006; See Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009 for a review).
The social nature of the JSE however, has not gone unchallened (e.g., Dolk et 
al.,2013; Guagnano, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2010; Lien, Pedersen & Proctor, 2016). In a 
series of five experiments, Dolk et al.’s (2013) found that the JSE can occur when 
participants act alongside non-human objects (e.g., a Japanese waving cat).  Based on
this evidence, Dolk et al.’s (2013) proposed a referential coding hypothesis to explain 
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the JSE. This hypothesis makes use of the ideas expressed in the theory of event 
coding (TEC; Hommel et al., 2001), which aims to explain how events (i.e., perceived 
stimulus and generated responses/actions) are cognitively represented and how the 
interaction among these representations engenders perception and action (Hommel, 
2009). Particularly for the TEC, self-generated events and those generated by others 
(including social or non-social events produced by living things or objects) are 
represented by the same codes (Dolk et al., 2014; Hommel, 2011;). So, employing 
TEC’s ideas, the referential coding account proposes that the Joint Simon effect is 
generated by the need to solve a conflict generated by simultaneously active event 
representations; participants need to discriminate between task-relevant and task-
irrelevant activations by focusing on the features that make it easier to differentiate 
among the co-active representations. This feature in the Simon task is usually the 
horizontal response location. Then, participants tend to code their own responses as 
“left” or “right”, which generates the classical stimulus-response compatibility effect 
characterizing the SE (Dolk et al., 2011, 2013, 2014). Importantly, according to the 
referential coding account, any sufficiently active representation generated by an 
attended or salient event can create the described conflict (Dolk et al., 2013, 2014).
Even though the social nature in the Joint/Social Simon effect has been 
questioned (as introduced in the paragraph above; see Dolk et al., 2014 for a review), 
several findings have shown that the JSE is influenced by social factors. For instance, 
it is modulated by the type of relationship between co-actors (Hommel, Colzato, & van 
den Wildenberg, 2009), being present if co-acting with a friendly confederate, but 
absent if involved in a negative relationship with her. The primed social self-constructal 
has been shown to play a modulating role as well; a greater task co-representation was
obtained when priming participants into an interdependent self-concept than when 
priming them into an independent one (Colzato, de Bruijn, & Hommel, 2012a). 
Enhanced JSEs have been also obtained among Buddhist co-actors compared to 
atheist ones, suggesting an influence from religious orientation and self-other 
integration (Colzato et al., 2012b). Moreover, evidence indicating an influence from 
social categorization factors, such as group-membership (Muller et al., 2011b; 
McClung, Jentzsch, & Reicher, 2013) and social status (Aquino et al., 2015) have been
reported as well. In particular, the JSE has been obtained when co-acting with in-group 
members but not when paired with out-group co-actors (e.g., Muller et al., 2011b), 
independently on whether participants were involved in high or low competition 
conditions (McClung, Jentzsch, & Reicher, 2013), or when paired with a high-status in-
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group participant, but not when the co-actor was a low-status out-group member 
(Aquino et al., 2015). This social nature was also evidenced in a study showing that the
JSE was present when one believed to be acting with a human, but not when the 
person believed to be co-acting with a computer (Tsai et al., 2008). Similarly, the JSE 
was present when a person was co-acting with a virtual human hand but not with a 
virtual wooden hand (Tsai & Brass, 2007), unless the non-human actor was believed to 
be acting intentionally (Stenzel et al., 2012) or its perspective could be taken (Muller et 
al., 2011a). All these constitute clear examples of cognitive processes being shaped by 
social context in joint action settings.
1.4. Attention in dyads: joint attention and shared attention research
Even when people are not explicitly performing actions together, they 
continuously keep track of other’s attentional focus. Overt shifts in attention (i.e., eye 
movements and head turns) following another person’s gaze have been intensively 
investigated in infants (see Mundy & Newell, 2007). It has been shown that since the 
first year of life, humans are able to follow other’s gaze and to jointly attend to the same
physical objects with them (aka. joint attention; see Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; 
Mundy & Newell, 2007), which is considered to be one of the most important skills in 
human social cognition, since it allows us to share, coordinate and cooperate with 
others (Mundy & Newell, 2007; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). In the
lab, gaze-triggered attention shifts have been typically examined with a gaze-cuing 
paradigm (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). In this task, participants are presented with
a central picture or schematic drawing of a face that gazes to different locations (e.g., 
left or right). Participants are asked to detect or discriminate targets appearing either at 
the cued location or at the opposite one, echoing the standard attentional cueing task 
introduced earlier (e.g., Posner, 1980). When the targets appear at the previously 
gaze-cued location, responses are faster than when they appear at an uncued location.
This effect is consistently present, even when the gaze-cues do not predict (or are 
counter-predictive) of the target locations and are therefore non informative (or 
disadvantageous/harmful) for completing the task at hand (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 
1998; Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 2004). In other words, this effect occurs in an 
involuntary/automatic manner (see the section “visuospatial attention” above). Although
the reasons underlying these effect are still being debated (e.g., Kingstone, 
Kachkovski, Vasilyev, Kuk, & Welsh, 2019; Wiese, Wykowska, Zwickel, & Müller, 2012; 
see also Gobel, Tufft, & Richardson, 2018), the attention shifts elicited by gaze-cues 
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are quite reliable, and their robustness has not been questioned. Importantly for the 
present PhD work however, the investigation in the joint attention field has been mostly 
focused on its relation to cooperation, bonding, theory of mind, and social learning 
(Mundy & Newell, 2007; Siposova & Carpenter, 2019; Tomasello et al., 2005; 
Tomasello et al., 2012),  without consideration for the specific role of the attended 
spatial locations and its relation to attention performance.
Beyond the advantages of attention coordination provided by gaze following, it 
has been proposed that the human mind may give some preference to those stimuli in 
the environment that are attended together with others (i.e. Shared attention theory; 
Shteynberg, 2015), simply by the knowledge that they are being co-attended, even in 
the absence of interpersonal behavioural observation (i.e., without observing the 
other’s attentional focus or following their gaze). According to Shteynberg (2014, p.1), 
“mental processes can be inherently social, with sociality ‘baked into’ the architecture of
the cognitive mechanism”. In this line, it could be possible that the human mind, having 
a limited processing capability, would give some preference to those stimuli in the 
environment that are attended together with others (i.e. shared attention theory; 
Shteynberg, 2015). Indeed, Shteynberg and colleagues have suggested that sharing 
attention towards the same objects or tasks could cause more cognitive resources 
being allocated to these objects or tasks, resulting in better performance in general 
(Shteynberg, 2015). The gathered empirical evidence suggests that memory 
(Shteynberg, 2010), motivation (Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011), judgement (Shteynberg,
Hirsh, Galinsky, & Knight, 2014), emotion (Shteynberg, Hirsh, Apfelbaum, et al., 2014), 
and behavioural learning (Shteynberg & Apfelbaum, 2013) may be affected 
(Shteynberg, 2015). For instance, when presenting participants with a list of words 
believed to be co-attended with similar vs. different others,  recall was both faster and 
more accurate in the former scenario (Shteynberg, 2010). Thus, shared attention may 
make the jointly attended objects/events more cognitively accessible and easier to 
recall (Shteynberg, 2010). Similarly, it has been suggested that the “shared attention 
state”, would increase the influence of mood on evaluative judgements making them 
more extreme, induce more intense emotional reactions to the co-attended objects, 
boost individual goal pursuit for co-attended goals, and intensify imitation, favouring 
social learning.  Importantly, according to Stheynberg’s theory, this shared attention is a
psychological state that implies the activation of a collective perspective when 
experiencing the world with others (Shteynberg, 2015, 2018). Sharing attention with 
others under this definition activates a “we mode” in which one’s perspective is also the
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other person’s perspective, it becomes a collective one. This “we-mode” however, and 
the cognitive enhancement induced by it, would only occur if people believe that they 
are simultaneously co-attending with similar others (i.e. members of the same group)  
(Shteynberg, 2014, 2015). Importantly, as in joint attention-related research, the 
specific role of the attended spatial locations and its relation to attention performance 
has not been considered by the shared attention field.
At this point, it is necessary to make some clarifications regarding several 
definitions used in literature (and in this thesis) that could otherwise turn out quite 
confusing. I will refer particularly to the definitions of joint attention, social attention, and
shared attention. Joint attention for instance, has been a quite popular, but 
independent, area of research in both psychology and philosophy, and therefore, many 
definitions have been proposed (see Milward & Carpenter, 2018; Siposova & 
Carpenter, 2019 about the current joint attention definition debate). In a simple way, 
joint attention could be defined as  “looking where others are looking” (Butterworth, 
1995, p. 29). A more accepted version however, was proposed by Tomasello, 
Carpenter, Call, Behne, and Moll (2005). According to this definition, besides looking 
where others are looking, it is necessary that the individuals know that they are looking 
together to the same jointly attended object (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll,
2005 ; see also Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; Mundy & Newell, 2007). In a similar 
line, social attention has been defined as “the cognitive process that underlies gazing 
at or with another person” (Richardson & Gobel, 2015, p. 350). The overlap between 
the two definitions (i.e., social vs. joint attention) is evident. In this thesis I will treat 
them as analogue/equivalent, and I will use them to refer to gaze following/looking 
where others are looking. Shared attention on the other hand, has been proposed as a 
psychological state that implies the activation of a collective perspective when 
experiencing the world with others (Shteynberg, 2015, 2018). Sharing attention with 
others under this definition activates a “we mode” in which one’s perspective is also the
other person’s perspective, it becomes a collective one. If considered in the situation 
where we are looking/attending to the same object with another person, it may seem 
that the definitions of joint attention and shared attention are equivalent. They are 
however, essentially different. While joint attention has its roots on behavioural 
observation (i.e., observing other’s looking/gazing behaviour), shared attention is a 
psychological state (“we-mode”) that does not require observing others. In this 
psychological state, the other co-attendees are not social inputs, but part of the 
cognitive mechanism itself (Shteynberg, 2018). 
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Analogue to Stheynberg’s research, Richardson et al. (2012) examined the 
changes that could be elicited on participants attention to images, by the knowledge 
that others are encountering the same sort of stimuli simultaneously (aka. Joint 
Perception; Richardson et al., 2012). To this aim, Richardson et al. (Exp1), tracked 
participants’ eye gaze while they watched a set of images with different valence. 
Participants were told either that a person in the other side of the room was doing 
exactly the same thing, or that they were watching the images alone while the other 
person was looking at some symbols. There was no interaction between participants 
and they had no access to what or where the other person was actually looking at. 
Interestingly, under this social context, when participants thought their partner was 
looking at the same set of images, they looked significantly more at the images with 
negative valence. This belief seems to influence not only eye movements, but also 
memory processes (Exp 2). Importantly however, for this joint perception effect to take 
place, it is necessary not only to belief that the other is experiencing the same stimuli, 
but that he/she is doing the same task (Exp 3).  Richardson and colleagues considered
four different possible explanations to their findings. They considered possible (but 
unlikely) that the minimal social context provided by the experiment could have 
enhanced a pre-existing negativity bias (evolutionary driven to facilitate threat 
detection; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001) due to a greater feeling 
of threat during the experiment. Alternatively, it was argued that the minimal social 
context could have increased participant’s alertness, inducing social facilitation effects. 
Yet, as pointed out by the authors, there was no increase in the looking times towards 
the positive images, reducing the plausibility of this argument. Moreover, Richardson 
and colleagues considered the possibility that this joint perception context may have 
induced a feeling of cooperation that increased the emotional alignment towards the 
negative images, or that maybe participants simply looked for those images that would 
be more salient for their partners (i.e., in this case, the negative images, given the link 
between saliency and valence in their experiment). In any case, this minimal social 
context modulated participants attention behaviour, adding to the literature suggesting 
a pervading influence of social context on human cognition (Richardson et al., 2012).  
Although these results might seem similar to those obtained in Shteynberg´s 
(2010, 2015) studies, they differ importantly. As a reminder, the shared attention theory 
posits that the sole knowledge that other individuals are co-attending to the same 
objects/tasks could cause more cognitive resources to be allocated to these 
objects/tasks, resulting in better performance in general (Shteynberg, 2015, 2018). In 
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Richardson et al.’s (2012) experiments instead, the attention allocation was shifted to 
specific images by the belief of attending the same stimuli simultaneously with an 
experiment partner. This occurred without any knowledge in relation to the other 
person’s specific focus of attention (i.e., without knowing where exactly the other was 
looking at) (Richardson et al., 2012). This outcome could not be predicted based on the
shared attention framework, and suggest an interpersonal influence in cognitive 
processing that goes beyond Shteynberg’s proposals.  
A few studies have reported interpersonally driven modulations in performance 
when completing attention-related tasks in dyads (Böckler, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012; 
Gobel, Kim, & Richardson, 2015; Gobel et al., 2018; He, Lever, & Humphreys, 2011; 
He et al., 2014; Welsh et al., 2005, 2007). It has been shown for instance, that the 
spatial allocation of visual attention in a visual search display can be guided by the 
knowledge about the contents in a co-actor’s working memory (aka. interpersonal 
memory guidance of attention; He, Lever & Humphreys, 2011). Visual attention is 
known to be guided by stimuli held in working memory (WM) (Chelazzi et al. 1993), 
even when they are task-irrelevant. If participants perform a visual search task while 
keeping an item in WM, the visual search is altered if the memorized item re-appears in
the search display (e.g. Downing 2000). He, Lever, and Humphreys (2011) modified 
this paradigm, so it could be performed by two participants sitting alongside each other.
Each participant had to hold in WM an item from a specific category (three categories 
were available, one per participant and one that none of them had to memorize -the 
baseline) and then performed a visual search task (searching for shapes). The item 
held in WM could re-appear in the visual search, either in a valid (same as the target) 
or invalid location. There was not only an “own memory effect” on attention (faster RTs 
for the items in the own category re-appearing in valid locations on the subsequent 
visual search, than those appearing in invalid locations), but also an effect when the 
items re-appearing were those in the co-actor’s category. He and colleagues concluded
that when involved in the same task, participants may code/represent information in the
co-actors WM, and this information could guide visual attention interpersonally. This 
interaction between working memory and attention however, is specific for situations of 
attention deployment while maintaining memory contents, therefore may not be able to 
reveal an interpersonal influence utterly related to attentional mechanisms.
  A more specific view into attentional modulations in dyadic tasks was proposed
by Böckler, Knoblich and Sebanz (2012). In their study,  Böckler, Knoblich and Sebanz 
32
(2012) employed a dyadic version of the Navon task to study task co-representation in 
attentional settings. In the single person version of the Navon task (Navon, 1977), 
participants are presented with a large letter (global stimulus feature) formed by many 
small letters (local stimulus feature). Their task is to discriminate/identify one of the two 
(i.e., either the local or the global feature of the stimuli). Faster responses are usually 
performed to the global compared with the local stimulus features. Moreover, 
regardless of the focus of attention (local or global), responses are typically 
impaired/slowed down when these features are incongruent (e.g., attending to the 
global feature when the stimuli is a large letter H formed by small letters Ss), compared
to the congruent condition (e.g., attending to the global feature when the stimuli is a 
large letter H formed by small letters Hs). In the two-persons version of this task 
proposed by Böckler, Knoblich and Sebanz, participants still respond to the identity of 
the letters, but they are either focusing on the same (e.g., both people attending to the 
local stimulus features) or different (e.g., one person attending to the local feature, and 
the other person focusing on the global feature of the stimulus) aspects of the task. In 
this dyadic setting, participants were slower at responding when the co-actor had a 
different focus of attention, suggesting that the different attentional focus employed by 
(or instructed to) the co-actor interfered with ones own focus when performing the task 
(Böckler, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012). 
Although a co-actor with a different focus of attention impairs one’s performance
in the joint Navon task, it has been shown that the availability of information about a co-
actor’s task/actions and/or performance can be greatly advantageous when 
sharing/collaborating in visuospatial tasks. Brennan, Chen, Dickinson, Neider, and 
Zelinsky (2008) instructed pairs of participants to perform a collaborative visual search 
task (i.e., searching for an O-in-Qs), while allowing them to either talk to each other to 
communicate their search strategies (shared speech condition), or have access to the 
task partner’s gaze during the task as measured by an eyetracker (shared gaze 
condition), or both (shared gaze and speech condition). A better performance was 
always achieved for the collaborative conditions compared to a solo-version of the task.
The best performance however, was not achieved when both speech and gaze were 
shared, but when only information about the co-actor’s gaze behaviour was available 
(see also Wahn, Kingstone & König, 2017). This suggests that shared gaze is a very 
efficient way of mediating collaboration in visuospatial tasks, even beyond the 
advantages provided by direct communication through spoken words.
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Additional evidence suggest that even very basic and robust attention orienting 
mechanism may be modulated by social context. The Inhibition of return (IOR) is a 
slowing of responses to targets presented at previously attended locations resulting 
from an inhibitory mechanism keeping attention away from previously attended 
events/locations (Klein, 1990, 2000; Klein & Taylor, 1994; Lupiáñez, Klein, & 
Bartolomeo, 2006; Posner, Rafal, Choate, & Vaughan, 1985). It has been shown that 
this robust attention orienting effect is also present when responding to locations 
previously attended by another person (Gobel et al., 2018; Tufft, Gobel, & Richardson, 
2015; Welsh et al., 2005, 2007). Welsh et al. (2005, 2007), found evidence for this joint/
social IOR from dyads of participants sat opposite to each other performing reaching 
arm movements towards targets in a turn-taking manner. Participants were slower 
when reaching to locations previously touched by the task-partner (social / between-
person IOR), an effect that is typically obtained when reaching for one’s previously 
touched/attended locations (classic /within-person  IOR). The researchers proposed 
the mirror neuron system as a mediating mechanism. In this line, they suggested that 
the activation of the mirror neuron system when observing the co-actor’s actions may 
simulate their responses, generating the same kind of inhibitory mechanism behind the 
single person IOR (Welsh et al., 2007). An alternative account questioning the 
socialness of this effect suggests that the motion of the partner’s arm could cue/induce 
an attentional shift in the observer, as any other salient event would do, 
generating/producing the “social” IOR effect (Cole, Skarratt, & Billing, 2012). 
Nonetheless, additional evidence for a social account/origin of this effect came from a 
classical cued IOR / spatial orienting paradigm where the social relevance of the cues 
was manipulated (Gobel et al., 2018). In a series of two experiments, Gobel et al. 
(2018) manipulated participants’ beliefs regarding the origin of the cues during this 
classical IOR task. Participants were told that the cues were either randomly generated
by a computer (non-social condition), or that they indicated the gaze behaviour of a 
second person (social condition) sat back-to-back with the participant (Exp1). Although 
the cues were always randomly generated, when the participants believed that the 
cues reflected the gaze position of the other person, they showed larger IORs 
compared to the non-social condition. A second experiment extended this finding by 
showing that the effect is modulated by the social hierarchy attributed to the co-actor. 
The effect was stronger when the cue was believed to indicate the gaze of a higher 
social rank/status individual. This however, only occurred when the experiment partner 
was believed to be engaged in the same task (i.e., not when they were believed to be 
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performing an unrelated memory task), echoing previous findings related to the shared 
attention theory by Shteynberg (2015). 
Taken together, Gobel et al., experiments showed that not only the physical 
saliency of the cues, but also their social relevance (“whether the cue is connected to 
another person, who this person is, and what this person is doing”, as defined by Gobel
et al., 2018) matter in spatial orienting. This also represented the first reported 
evidence showing that basic cognitive processes can be interpersonally modulated by 
social context (see also Tufft, Gobel, & Richardson, 2015). However, this investigation 
was performed exclusively on the inhibition of return (IOR). Considering that different 
attentional processes are thought to be relatively independent or not interrelated in 
terms of the underlying mechanisms (e.g., Pan, Wu, & Zhang, 2017; Slessor et al., 
2019), further research is needed to examine the extent to which social context and 
interpersonal influences modulate other basic attentional processes apart from the 
IOR.  
1.5. Attention in dyads: Neural basis and electrophysiological 
correlates 
This section overviews the literature on the neural basis and neural correlates 
behind co-attending to the world with other individuals. Given the overwhelming 
contribution of joint attention research in this regard, this overview is mainly based on 
joint attention related findings, including neuroimaging, event-related potentials, and 
brain oscillations research. A brief introduction to hyperscanning research (i.e., the 
simultaneous/synchronised measurement of brain activity from multiple subjects; 
Montague, 2002) is also provided.
 1.5.1 Neural basis of joint/shared attention
Joint attention interactions involve one person directing another person’s 
attention towards an object, event or location (IJA, Initiating Joint Attention), and the 
other person following the first one (RJA, Responding to Joint Attention). It constitutes 
a complex process in which the interacting individuals need to detect and monitor the 
other’s gaze, encode the gaze/head direction, and (re-)orient visual attention 
accordingly, while considering self and other’s related information, and their relation to 
the environment (see Emery, 2000; Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; Langton, Watt, & 
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Bruce, 2000; Nummenmaa & Calder, 2009 for reviews). Therefore, it shouldn’t come to 
a surprise that this complex process is supported by widespread networks in the 
human brain (see Mundy, 2018 for a comprehensive review)
The Parallel and Distributed Processing Model of joint attention (PDPM; Mundy 
& Newell, 2007; Mundy, Sullivan, & Mastergeorge, 2009) has been the most influential 
model in the field. According to the PDPM, joint attention is an information processing 
system that processes (and integrates) in parallel internal information related to the self
and one’s visual attention, and external information related to other people and their 
visual attention (Mundy et al., 2009). This information processing system was proposed
to be implemented by an interplay between the distributed anterior and posterior 
attention networks previously described by Posner (e.g., Posner & Rothbart, 2007; see 
Mundy & Newell, 2007; Mundy et al., 2009), with the posterior network more closely 
associated to RJA, and the anterior network supporting mainly IJA (Mundy et al., 2009).
The posterior network includes the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), the 
precuneus, the occipital association cortex, the posterior parietal cortex, and the 
intraparietal sulcus, and has been implicated in the processing of spatial information, 
gaze/head perception, the discrimination of their orientation, and visual spatial orienting
(Mundy et al., 2009). The anterior network on the other hand, is thought to assist the 
goal-directed control of attention towards rewarding stimuli, the suppression of 
automatic gaze shifts, and the representation of the joint action partner’s perspective. 
This network comprises the medial prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, the 
frontal eye fields, the orbitofrontal cortex, as well as sections of the basal ganglia 
(Mundy et al., 2009). 
Despite the challenges of investigating the neural basis of joint attention using 
MRI scanners (mainly in terms of balancing experimental control and the ecological 
validity of the paradigms employed; Schilbach et al., 2013, 2010), a few neuroimaging 
studies have provided support for the PDPM (e.g., Caruana, Brock, & Woolgar, 2015; 
Redcay, Kleiner, & Saxe, 2012). For instance, Redcay, Kleiner, and Saxe (2015) 
investigated the neural basis of IJA and RJA in a fMRI experiment with a dual video 
set-up. Participants in this experiment either cued the experimenter to look at a target 
(IJA), or were cued by the experimenter (RJA). Neural responses were contrasted to a 
baseline in which the participant shifted attention towards the target, but the 
experimenter had the eyes closed. Relative to this baseline, recruitment of the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex was distinctively associated with RJA, and activity in the 
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the intra-parietal sulcus and middle frontal gyrus were related to IJA. Overlapping 
regions were also individuated. Indeed, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPC) and 
the right posterior temporal sulcus (pSTS) showed common activation patterns for both
IJA and RJA (Redcay, Kleiner, & Saxe, 2012). Similarly, by means of a cooperative 
virtual reality joint attention game, Caruana et al. (2015) showed that both IJA and RJA 
commonly activated frontoparietal networks comprising the middle and inferior frontal 
gyrus (MFG & IFG), the middle temporal gyrus (MTG), the posterior temporal sulcus 
(pSTS), the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and the precuneus. IJA on the other hand, 
specifically recruited the anterior and middle cingulate cortex, superior frontal gyrus, 
the thalamus and the cerebellum (Caruana, et al., 2015). These studies support the 
idea of a widespread but integrated system underlying the parallel processing required 
in joint attention.
Another influential study was provided by Schilbach and colleagues (Schilbach 
et al., 2010). Participants inside an MRI scanner engaged in joint attention with a virtual
character “controlled by another person outside the scanner” (in reality the character 
was controlled by a gaze-contingent algorithm). In this joint attention interaction both 
IJA and RJA were contrasted against a baseline consisting in an incongruent gaze 
shift. That is, the IJA trials were identical to the IJA baseline trials, except that in the IJA
baseline, the virtual character averted the gaze from the location attended by the 
participant. Similarly, the RJA baseline was created by instructing participants to make 
an incongruent gaze shift respect to the virtual character’s. Compared to the baseline, 
RJA showed activity in the mPFC, a region that has been also related to mentalising 
processes (i.e., making inferences about other’s beliefs or intentions) (Amodio & Frith, 
2006; see also Frith & Frith, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009; Williams et al., 2005). 
Moreover, IJA showed differential activations in reward-related areas (e.g., the ACC 
and the ventral striatum) (Schilbach et al., 2010; see also Gordon, et al., 2013; Pfeiffer 
et al., 2014 for additional studies showing a link between joint attention and reward’s 
processing networks). Since the contrast in this case was computed between joint (or 
congruent) and dis-joint (or incongruent) attention conditions, the relative findings have 
been interpreted as suggesting a link between the evaluation/accomplishment of joint 
attention, and mentalising/social-reward processing in the brain (Schilbach et al., 2010;
see also Mundy, 2018). 
In a recent review (Mundy, 2018), Peter Mundy comprehensively integrated the 
literature on the neuroscience of joint attention (e.g., Brunetti et al., 2014; Caruana, 
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Brock, et al., 2015; Gordon et al., 2013; Pfeiffer et al., 2014; Redcay et al., 2012; 
Schilbach et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2005). In this review, he identified a set of 
primary neural nodes comprising the joint attention system: the dorsal and medial 
frontal cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex and the insula, the anterior and posterior 
cingulate cortex, the superior temporal cortex, the precuneus and parietal cortex, and 
the amygdala and striatum. Hence, undoubtedly, joint attention has been shown to be a
complex process supported by widespread networks in the human brain (see Mundy, 
2018  for more details).
 1.5.2 ERPs and brain oscillations
Early studies employing traditional gaze-cueing paradigms reported enhanced 
P1 and N1 event-related responses for valid (i.e., trials were the gaze shift predicted 
the target location), compared to invalid trials (i.e., trials were the target appeared at 
the opposite location indicated by the cue) (Schuller & Rossion, 2005; Schuller & 
Rossion, 2001, 2004; Tipper, Handy, Giesbrecht, & Kingstone, 2008), echoing typical 
findings in the visuospatial attentional orienting literature (described in the section 
“visuospatial attention” above). More recently, event-related responses have been 
examined using more elaborated social manipulations in relation to joint attention (e.g., 
(e.g., Böckler & Sebanz, 2012; Caruana, de Lissa, & McArthur, 2015, 2017; Caruana & 
McArthur, 2019; Wykowska, Wiese, Prosser, & Müller, 2014). In Wykowska, Wiese, 
Prosser, and Müller (2014), participants completed a typical gaze-cueing task with a 
centrally presented face of a humanoid robot. In this task, the robot was either gazing 
towards the location where a subsequent target would appear (valid trial), or the 
opposite (invalid trial). Participants were either told that the robot’s gaze was controlled 
by a human or by a computer. Under these conditions, participants ERP responses 
time-locked to the target onset were examined, revealing a stronger P1 amplitude for 
valid than invalid trials (and no effect in N1), but only when the robot’s gaze was 
believed to be controlled by a human. This was interpreted by the author’s as 
potentially suggesting that adopting (or not) an intentional stance towards the robot 
(i.e., assuming that it has a mind) top-down modulated the attentional control over the 
early sensory processes measured by P1 (i.e., sensory gain) (Wykowska et al., 2014). 
Caruana and colleagues (Caruana, de Lissa, et al., 2015; Caruana et al., 2017; 
Caruana & McArthur, 2019) investigated the neural correlates of IJA. In their task, 
participants initiated joint attention to direct a virtual character’s gaze towards a target. 
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This character was believed to be controlled by a human in another room (Caruana, de
Lissa, et al., 2015). The character followed the participant’s joint attention bids 50% of 
the times (congruent condition), while ignoring it (averting gaze) for the rest of the trials 
(incongruent condition). Stronger centro-parietal P350 ERPs were obtained to 
incongruent gaze shifts, respect to the congruent ones (Caruana et al., 2015, 2017; 
Caruana & McArthur, 2019).The opposite effect was found in centro-parietal P250 (i.e., 
larger amplitudes for the congruent responses) (Caruana & McArthur, 2019). These 
modulation in P250 and P350 however, dissapeared when the virtual character’s gaze 
was believed to be computer-controlled (Caruana et al., 2017; Caruana & McArthur, 
2019). The authors suggested P250 and P350 reflected discrimination processing 
regarding the outcome of a joint attention bid (i.e., the success or evasion of joint 
attention), and that this process was only recruited when believes about human agency
in relation to the “co-attending” virtual character were adopted (Caruana, de Lissa, & 
McArthur, 2017; Caruana & McArthur, 2019). 
Moreover, when performing together responding to the identity of letters in a 
two-choice Navon task, with participants focusing either on the same or different 
aspects of the task (i.e., local vs. global features), Böckler and Sebanz, (2012b) 
obtained evidence showing a significant reduction in P1 and P3 amplitudes when the 
co-actor had a different focus of attention. They suggested this could be explained by a
greater difficulty in selecting one’s focus of attention when the co-actor’s one differs, 
impairing early allocation of attention and increasing response monitoring. Additionally, 
an enhanced anterior N2 (or N2b) was found when the co-actor attended to the local 
vs. global features of the task, suggesting that the co-representation of the other’s task 
could include details about his/her specific attentional focus (Böckler & Sebanz, 
2012b). 
The joint attention literature has also provided evidence for alpha band power 
modulations when comparing joint versus dis-joint attention conditions in spatial cueing
like-paradigms (e.g., Hoehl et al., 2014; Michel et al., 2015; Rayson et al., 2019). For 
instance, research with infants has shown a greater suppression of alpha band activity 
when an adult (a picture of an adult’s face) turned her gaze towards the attended 
object than when her gaze looked towards a different object (Rayson et al., 2019), or 
when looking to an object attended by another person compared to an averted gaze 
(i.e., they used a picture of a person gazing towards an object in the screen or averting 
gaze from the object) (Michel et al., 2015). Similarly, in Hoehl et al. (2014) babies 
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showed a widespread alpha reduction when looking at the same object in the screen 
simultaneously with an adult (this time a real one) positioned next to the screen, but 
only when eye contact with the adult preceded joint attention. These findings posit 
alpha oscillations as a promising avenue to understand attention variations in social 
settings. 
Although these studies have provided an initial insight into the neural 
underpinnings of human performance and cognition in social settings, further research 
is needed to understand the way cognitive processes are informed and modulated by 
social context. A shift towards studying two or more interacting individuals and 
measuring/examining their brain activities simultaneously has been encouraged in the 
last decade (see Hari et al., 2015; Hari & Kujala, 2009; Schilbach et al., 2013), 
promising to bring a revolution in the neuroscience field (Hasson et al., 2012). In this 
line, the following section introduces relevant research evidence and the derived 
insights that studying multiple brains simultaneously has brought to the understanding 
of joint/shared attention (see the “Hyperscanning research” section below). 
 1.5.3 Hyperscanning research
Hyperscanning refers to the simultaneous/synchronised measurement of brain 
activity from multiple subjects (Montague, 2002). The first multi-subject recordings were
reported by Duane and Behrendt (1965) in an attempt to study extrasensory induction 
between identical twins using EEG. More recently the technique was “re-introduced” by
Montague (2002), who demonstrated its feasibility using two inter-connected fMRI 
scanners. In the EEG community, the first studies (after Duanes and Behrendt’s) were 
carried out by Fabio Babiloni and Laura Astolfi’s group, investigating 
cooperation/competition in multiple subjects involved in game theory related tasks 
(Astolfi et al., 2011; Babiloni et al., 2006; see also Barraza et al., 2019 for a tutorial on 
EEG hyperscanning setups). Since then, the hyperscanning technique gained 
popularity and multiple studies have been reported employing synchronised EEG, 
MEG, fMRI and fNIRS measurements (aka. dual EEG/MEG/fMRI/fNIRS) to study 
different facets of social cognition (e.g., interpersonal coordination, social/joint/shared 
attention, coordinated movement, speech coordination, mental coordination, 
coordinated activities in social and ecological contexts, interactive decision-making, 
affective communication, etc (see Koike, Tanabe, & Sadato, 2015; Liu et al., 2018; Mu, 
Cerritos, & Khan, 2018; Wang et al., 2018; Zhang, 2018 for recent reviews).
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In joint/shared attention research, the EEG hyperscanning technique has been 
employed to study multiple subjects simultaneously both in the lab and in more 
naturalistic scenarios (e.g., a classroom), providing some initial insights regarding 
potential oscillatory intra and inter-brain correlates of attending to the world with others.
For instance, Lachat, Hugueville, Lemaréchal, Conty, and George, (2012) investigated 
the neural correlates of joint attention using an online joint attention paradigm, where 
participants (dyads) were either looking to the same or different LED lights placed in 
front of them, while simultaneous EEG was recorded. Joint attention was contrasted for
both social (i.e., instructed driver vs. follower gaze behaviour)  and externally driven 
conditions (i.e., participants instructed to follow a specific LED colour, either looking to 
the same or different one). Under this setting, oscillations in the 11-13Hz range over 
parieto-occipital (i.e., alpha rhythm) and centro-parietal (i.e., mu rhythm) areas were 
modulated by joint attention.  In particular, a decrease in alpha and mu rhythms was 
obtained for the joint attention condition for both social and externally driven attention. 
The authors suggested mu-rhythm-related attention mirroring and alpha-rhythm-related
arousal and visual attention mechanisms as the potential sources of these effects. 
More recently, Szymanski et al. (2017) examined dyads performing a joint visual 
search task while dual-EEG was recorded. In this task, participants had to indicate the 
number of targets present in a visual search display, while performing either individually
or in teams. In the individual condition they completed the task from separate 
computers. In the joint condition, they shared the same visual search display and were 
allowed to use any strategy they could devise to complete the task as a team (they 
could talk, gesture, interact, etc., minimizing movements). The researchers found that 
both intra and inter-brain synchrony in the delta (2Hz) and alpha (8Hz) bands were 
significantly higher when the dyads completed the task jointly than when they 
performed individually, and that this synchrony positively correlated with team 
performance. The findings were interpreted as neural substrates of social facilitation 
(Szymanski et al., 2017). Furthermore, taking advantage of the portability of the EEG 
systems, Dikker et al. (2017) followed 12 students along 11 high school biology 
lessons, while simultaneously recording their brain activities using EEG headsets. They
found that the students inter-brain synchrony not only predicted the students’ 
engagement levels, but was also related to social dynamics (e.g., correlated with the 
teacher likeability and the pairwise students closeness). The authors proposed a joint 
attention account for these effects. In this account, the students’ neural oscillations 
entrainment to the external stimuli is modulated by the stimuli themselves (e.g., the 
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teacher or classroom videos) and the attention levels (Dikker et al., 2017). The 
entrainment would not occur (or would be quite low) under “low attention” states, 
reflected in low brain-to-brain synchrony. However, when in a high “shared attention” 
level/state, alpha oscillations would decrease (this was corroborated in their data) and 
become entrained or “tuned” to the the environment (i.e., to the temporal structure of 
the surroundings), increasing the synchrony between brains (Dikker et al., 2017). 
Leong et al. (2017) tested infant-adult dyads instead. In this study, infants looked at 
singing adults while the adult’s gaze-behaviour was manipulated (direct vs. indirect). 
EEG was recorded simultaneously from the dyad, and partial directed coherence 
(Baccalá & Sameshima, 2001) was employed to assess the dyad’s inter-brain 
connectivity. This connectivity measure allows conclusions regarding the direction of 
the connectivity estimates. The study showed that direct gaze enhanced the adult-
infant brain-connectivity in both directions (i.e., adult to infant and viceversa). In 
addition, infants vocalized more during the direct gaze condition, and those who 
vocalized more also induced a stronger inter-brain synchrony in the dyad. The 
researchers suggested that the exchange of social signals (i.e., gaze and speech) 
might produce a phase reset in neural oscillations that temporally aligns the interacting 
brains, as reflected by the reported enhancement in their inter-brain connectivity.  
Even though the new insights provided by the hyperscanning technique are 
certainly promising, it is important to mention that the physiological and psychological 
interpretation of the findings is not clear at the current stage, nor the origins of inter-
brain synchronicity, or the factors influencing/modulating it (Burgess, 2013; Hari, 
Henriksson, Malinen, & Parkkonen, 2015). In addition, in order to get the most out of 
the hyperscanning technique/data, more real-life-like experimental paradigms need to 
be devised, and further developments are required from the analysis methods side 
(Burgess, 2013; Hari, Henriksson, Malinen, & Parkkonen, 2015).
1.6. The present PhD project
The previously reviewed theories and empirical findings suggest a pervasive 
influence from social context on human cognitive processes, including attention. 
According to these evidence, our (human) behaviour and performance is changed 
when others are around (social facilitation: Allport, 1924). Moreover, we might make 
representations of the others’ tasks/actions that could interfere or facilitate our own 
actions/tasks when co-acting with them, even if their actions/tasks are irrelevant for us 
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(joint action co-representation: Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). In addition, we constantly 
keep track of other's gaze to understand them and coordinate behaviourally (joint 
attention: Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007), and our looking behaviour is altered just 
by knowing that we perceive the same stimuli with another person (joint perception: 
Richardson et al., 2012). Even more, it has been shown that the knowledge of the 
contents in a co-actor’s working memory can interpersonally guide the spatial allocation
of visual attention (interpersonal memory guidance of attention; He, Lever & 
Humphreys, 2011), and it has been proposed that our general cognitive performance 
may be enhanced just by knowing that we are attending the same objects or tasks with 
similar others (in-group members) (shared attention: Stheynberg., 2015). Although it 
becomes hard to question an influence from other humans around us (including their 
actions/tasks and the context of our interactions) on our cognitive processes, additional
research is needed to understand how “deep” can this interpersonal influence affect 
our cognition, which factors modulate it, and the underlying brain processes. In this 
line, the purpose of the current PhD work was to investigate whether this interpersonal 
influence on cognition could permeate even basic attentional mechanisms. Gobel et al. 
(2015, 2018) provided evidence in this direction by showing that the social relevance 
attributed to visual cues can modulate spatial orienting. Even though this represented 
the first evidence for basic attentional mechanisms being modulated by social context, 
the evidence provided comes exclusively from examining the inhibition of return (IOR). 
Further research is needed to understand whether social context and interpersonal 
influences modulate additional attentional processes.  
Accordingly, the present PhD research project aimed at contributing to the 
understanding of how interpersonal social influences and social context inform and 
shape human visual sustained attention in dyadic settings. Specifically, the work 
described in the following chapters attempts to answer the following questions: 
•  Does human visual attention act differently (i.e., attention performance is 
changed) when another person pays attention to the same location with us, in the 
absence of direct communication or explicit interactions (i.e.., without gaze 
following/coordination or a speech exchange), just by knowing that the locus of 
attention is shared, even if this knowledge is irrelevant/trivial for one’s 
task/goals/performance? 
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• If so, which task components and/or social factors modulate this interpersonal 
influence? 
•  Finally, what are the neural correlates characterizing this interpersonal 
influence over human attention in dyadic settings?  
Undoubtedly, obtaining evidence pointing towards interpersonal influences on 
attentional mechanisms, especially when attending to the same spatial locations with 
others, could have ubiquitous real-life implications. Imagine for example, a group of 
students attending together to a lecture, or a couple of workers monitoring a product in 
an industrial assembly chain. Improving our understanding about how their attention is 
shaped by sharing their reality with others may for instance, give us some clues about 
how to optimize these environments correspondingly. In addition, in the long run, this 
knowledge could also allow to develop strategies aimed at better understanding and 
treating related clinical conditions (e.g., ADHD, Neglect syndrome). With this in mind, 
answering the above mentioned questions acquires tremendous relevance.
 1.6.1 Dual attention paradigm
To target the central aim of this PhD thesis/work (i.e. to examine whether visual 
attention performance is interpersonally modulated by the task setting of an experiment
partner), this Thesis proposed a modified (two-persons) version of the classic 
sustained visuospatial attention task (e.g., Eimer, 1996; Mangun & Hillyard, 1988; 
Mangun & Buck, 1998). In the typical (single person) sustained attention paradigm, a 
participant sits in front of a computer monitor and is asked to pay covert attention to 
one of two locations (e.g., left or right) throughout an experimental block (i.e., sustained
attention to the left or the right side of a computer’s screen) while keeping eye-gaze on 
a central fixation. They need to respond to visual targets randomly appearing at the 
attended and unattended locations as quickly as he/she can. To ensure that the 
participant pays more attention toward the attended location, the targets are more likely
to appear at the attended location  (75% of all trials; valid condition) than at the 
unattended location (25% of all trials; invalid condition). Reaction times (RTs) are 
typically faster in the valid than the invalid trials. The RT difference between valid and 
invalid targets indicates the attention effect,  a measure of the behavioural benefit from 
allocating attention to the attended spatial location (Posner, 1980). The sustained 
attention paradigm was adapted so it could be independently performed by two people 
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(a dyad) sat next to each other. In this “dual attention paradigm” (see Figure 1), the 
participants perform a visual go/no-go task based on a target shape (large vs. small), 
responding to visual targets while attending to the same spatial location or to different 
locations than the experiment partner.  To anticipate the core finding of this thesis, in 
this dual attention setting, the data showed that a typical attention effect was present in
reaction times (faster responses to targets appearing at attended locations compared 
to those at unattended sites) when the dyad attended to different locations, but was 
significantly reduced when the participants shared the attentional locus. In the following
chapters of this Thesis work, this effect was investigated from cognitive, social and 
neuroscientific perspectives. Along this document, the name “dual attention paradigm” 
will be used to refer to the proposed two-persons version of the sustained visuospatial 
attention paradigm, and the term “dual attention effect” will refer to the reduction in the 
attention effect obtained when sharing the attended locations with a another person. 
Both the dual attention paradigm, and the dual attention effect are core elements of this
thesis work and will be discussed in each of the following chapters.
Before progressing into the following chapters, it is worth reminding the different
(and potentially confusing) definitions used in this Thesis regarding joint attention, 
social attention, shared attention and dual attention. As introduced above (see the 
section “Attention in dyads: joint attention and shared attention research”), this thesis 
will treat the definitions of joint attention (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 
2005 ; see also Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; Mundy & Newell, 2007) and social 
attention (Richardson & Gobel, 2015) as equivalent, and will use them to refer to gaze 
following/looking where others are looking. Shared attention on the other hand, is a 
psychological state that implies the activation of a collective perspective when 
experiencing the world with others (Shteynberg, 2015, 2018). While joint attention 
relies on behavioural observation (i.e., observing other’s looking/gazing behaviour), 
shared attention is a psychological state (“we-mode”) that does not require observing 
others. In this psychological state, the other co-attendees are not social inputs, but part
of the cognitive mechanism itself (Shteynberg, 2018). Finally, as described in the 
previous paragraph, this thesis proposes a new concept: the “dual attention effect”. It 
refers to the reduction in attention performance (i.e., the reduced attention effect) 
obtained when sharing the attended locations with a another person in the “dual 
attention task” (i.e., the two-persons version of the sustained visuospatial attention 
paradigm here proposed).
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Figure 1. Classic visuospatial sustained attention task vs. the proposed dual 
attention task. A) Visuospatial sustained attention paradigm. A single participant 
sits in front of a computer monitor and is asked to pay covert attention to one of two 
locations (e.g., left or right) throughout an experimental block (i.e., sustain attention to 
the left or the right side of a computer’s screen) while keeping eye-gaze on a central 
fixation. The participant responds to visual targets randomly appearing at the attended 
(valid trials; 75% target probability) and unattended locations (invalid trials; 25% target 
probability). Reaction times are typically faster in the valid than the invalid trials, and 
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the RT difference between these two conditions is known as attention effect, a measure
of behavioural benefit from attention allocation to the attended spatial location (Posner, 
1980). B) Dual attention paradigm. Participants in a dyad sit in front of a computer 
monitor and pay covert sustained attention to one of two locations in the screen (e.g., 
left or right) throughout an experimental block. This attended location could be shared 
by the dyad (attention shared condition) or not (attention not shared). Participants 
perform a go/no-go task (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 in Chapter 2 for more details about 
the paradigm), responding to visual targets randomly appearing either at the attended 
(valid trials; 75% target probability) or unattended locations (invalid trials; 25% target 
probability). As discussed along this thesis, in this dyadic setting, participants showed a
reduced attention effect when sharing the attended locations with the task partner, 
respect to the attention not shared condition. This effect was termed “dual attention 
effect”.
This Thesis was divided in five chapters. Chapter 2 introduced the dual 
attention paradigm (Exp1) and discussed the striking attention effect reduction (named 
“dual attention effect”) obtained when performing the task (as anticipated above). 
Subsequently, the social context of the paradigm (i.e., the co-actor) was removed, and 
attention performance was examined when a participant completed the same task 
alone (Exp2). The effect of perceptual load as a modulatory factor on the dual attention
effect was also investigated (Exp3). Both a statistical difference between the 
performance in the solo and dyadic versions of the dual attention task, and the 
persistence of the dual attention effect under an increased perceptual load, provided 
support for a social account of the attention effect reduction obtained in Exp1. Chapter 
3 addressed some boundary conditions by varying the social context of the task in 
terms of social and physical “closeness”. In particular, Chapter 3 examined the effect of
group membership (i.e., social “closeness”) on the interpersonal influence on attention 
previously described (Exp4), and tested whether the this influence was still present 
when the co-actor did not shared one’s peripersonal space (i.e., physical “closeness”), 
but performed the task from separate room (Exp5). Chapter 4 investigated the neural 
underpinnings of this attention reduction effect using electroencephalography (EEG) 
(Exp6). ERPs were employed to study whether the effect was the outcome of sensory 
processing or top-down driven. These analysis were followed up using time-frequency 
representations and connectivity analysis to investigate the role of alpha and theta 
band oscillations. Taken together these findings suggested a cognitive control driven 
attention reduction in dyads sharing the locus of attention. Finally, Chapter 5 comprised
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a summary and discussion of the outcomes of the present PhD work, and described 
potential future lines of research and further considerations.
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 2 
DUAL ATTENTION EFFECT:
WHEN SHARING ATTENTION DOES NOT HELP
Human evolution has shaped us into social animals, who are continually 
immersed in social interactions, regularly performing tasks with others and sharing our 
reality with them (Dunbar, 2003; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). For 
many of these interactions to be successful, it is necessary to pay attention to the same
spatial locations with other individuals. We do this since childhood, while trying to learn 
from our parents, and continue doing it throughout our lifetime. A group of students 
attending together to a lecture, or a couple of workers monitoring a product in an 
industrial assembly chain are only a few examples where this ubiquitous “phenomena” 
occurs. Surprisingly however, the social and cognitive implications of this specific low-
level aspect of our social life (i.e., attending to the same spatial locations with others) 
are not well understood. This chapter aims at contributing to the understanding of the 
latter (i.e., the cognitive implications) by investigating whether paying attention towards 
the same spatial location with another person changes/affects one’s attention 
performance.
Since the first year of life, we are able to follow other’s gaze and to jointly attend
to the same physical objects with them (aka. joint attention; see Frischen, Bayliss, & 
Tipper, 2007; Mundy & Newell, 2007), a skill that facilitates sharing, coordinating and 
cooperating in the social world (Mundy & Newell, 2007; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, 
Behne, & Moll, 2005). Gaze-triggered attention shifts have been extensively studied in 
the lab using a gaze-cuing paradigm (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). Participants in 
this task are presented with a central picture or schematic drawing of a face that gazes 
to different locations (e.g., left or right). They respond to targets appearing either at the 
cued location or at the opposite one, with typically faster responses to the cued side. 
This effect is consistently present even when following the cues does not help (or even 
harm) task performance (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 
2004). The reasons underlying these effect are still being debated (e.g., Kingstone, 
Kachkovski, Vasilyev, Kuk, & Welsh, 2019; Wiese, Wykowska, Zwickel, & Müller, 2012; 
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see also Gobel, Tufft, & Richardson, 2018), but the attention shifts elicited by gaze-
cues are quite reliable, and robust. Importantly for the current research, although joint 
attention has been intensively studied from both psychological and philosophical 
perspectives (Siposova & Carpenter, 2019), this investigation has been mostly focused 
on its relation to cooperation, bonding, theory of mind, and social learning (Mundy & 
Newell, 2007; Siposova & Carpenter, 2019; Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello et al., 
2012),  without consideration for the specific role of the attended spatial locations and 
its relation to attention performance.
Even when we are not observing others’ attentional focus or following their 
gaze, the sole knowledge that other individuals are co-attending the same objects or 
tasks with us, could cause more cognitive resources to be allocated to these objects or 
tasks, resulting in better performance in general (Shared attention theory; Shteynberg, 
2015, 2018).  For instance, when presenting participants with a list of words believed to
be co-attended with similar vs. different others, recall was both faster and more 
accurate in the former scenario (Shteynberg, 2010). Thus, shared attention may make 
the jointly attended objects/events more cognitively accessible and easier to recall 
(Shteynberg, 2010). Similarly, it has been suggested that this “shared attention state” 
would increase the influence of mood on evaluative judgements making them more 
extreme (Shteynberg, Hirsh, Galinsky, & Knight, 2014), induce more intense emotional 
reactions to the co-attended objects (Shteynberg, Hirsh, Apfelbaum, et al., 2014), boost
individual goal pursuit for co-attended goals (Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011), and 
intensify imitation, favouring social learning  (Shteynberg & Apfelbaum, 2013). 
According to Stheynberg’s theory, shared attention activates a psychological state (“we 
mode”) in which one’s perspective becomes collective (i.e., is also the other person’s 
perspective) (Shteynberg, 2015, 2018). This state however, and it’s cognitive 
implications (i.e., more elaborate processing of the co-attended objects/tasks), would 
only occur if people believe they are simultaneously co-attending (to the objects or 
tasks) with similar others (i.e. members of the same group)  (Shteynberg, 2014, 2015). 
As in joint attention-related research, the specific role of the attended spatial locations 
and its relation to attention performance has not been considered by the shared 
attention field.
A few studies have reported interpersonally driven modulations in performance 
when completing attention-related tasks in dyads (Böckler, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012; 
Gobel, Kim, & Richardson, 2015; Gobel et al., 2018; He, Lever, & Humphreys, 2011; 
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He et al., 2014; Welsh et al., 2005, 2007). He, Lever, and Humphreys (2011), for 
instance, found that the knowledge about the contents in a co-actor’s working memory 
can guide the spatial allocation of visual attention in a visual search task (aka. 
interpersonal memory guidance of attention), suggesting that memory information 
could be used to guide attention interpersonally. This, however, is specific for situations
of attention deployment while maintaining memory contents, therefore may not be able 
to reveal an interpersonal influence utterly related to attentional mechanisms.  A more 
specific view into attentional modulations in dyadic tasks was proposed by Böckler, 
Knoblich and Sebanz (2012). In their study,  Böckler, Knoblich and Sebanz (2012) 
modified the Navon task (Navon, 1977), so it could be performed by co-acting 
individuals. In the original (solo version) of the task, a large letter (global stimulus 
feature) formed by many small letters (local stimulus feature) is displayed. Participants 
needed to discriminate/identify either the local or the global feature of the stimuli. 
Faster responses are usually performed to the global compared with the local stimulus 
features. Moreover, regardless of the focus of attention (local or global), responses are 
typically impaired/slowed down when these features are incongruent (e.g., attending to 
the global feature when the stimuli is a large letter H formed by small letters Ss), 
compared to the congruent condition (e.g., attending to the global feature when the 
stimuli is a large letter H formed by small letters Hs). When performing the two-persons
version of the task (Böckler, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012), a dyad were either focusing on
the same (e.g., both people attending to the local stimulus features) or different (e.g., 
one person attending to the local feature, and the other person focusing on the global 
feature of the stimulus) aspects of the task. Responses under this setting were slower 
when the co-actor had a different focus of attention, suggesting that the different 
attentional focus employed by (or instructed to) the co-actor interfered with one’s own 
focus when performing the task (Böckler, Knoblich, & Sebanz (2012); but see Brennan,
Chen, Dickinson, Neider, & Zelinsky (2008), and Wahn, Kingstone, & König, 2017, for 
evidence suggesting that the availability of information about a co-actor’s task/actions 
and/or performance can be greatly advantageous in dyadic visuo-spatial tasks where 
collaboration is requested).
Further evidence suggested that even very basic and robust attention orienting 
mechanism may be modulated by social contexts. inhibition of return (IOR) is a slowing
of responses to targets presented at previously attended locations resulting from an 
inhibitory mechanism keeping attention away from previously attended events/locations
(Klein, 2000). It has been shown that this robust attention orienting effect is also 
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present when responding to locations previously attended by another person (Gobel et 
al., 2018; Tufft, Gobel, & Richardson, 2015; Welsh et al., 2005, 2007). Although initial 
evidence for this came from arm-reaching tasks in dyads (Welsh et al., 2005, 2007), I 
will focus here on more recent evidence employing a classical spatial orienting 
paradigm where the social relevance of the cues was manipulated (Gobel et al., 2018).
Gobel, Tufft, and Richardson (2018) used the classical cued version of the IOR 
task (see Klein, 2000 ), and manipulated the participant’s beliefs regarding the origin of 
the cues. Participants sat back-to-back with another individual (Exp1), and were told 
that the cues in the task were either randomly generated by a computer (non-social 
condition), or that they indicated the gaze behaviour of a second person (social 
condition). Although the cues were always randomly generated, when the participants 
believed that the cues reflected the gaze position of the other person, they showed 
larger IORs compared to the non-social condition. A second experiment extended this 
finding by showing that the effect is modulated by the social hierarchy attributed to the 
co-actor. The effect was stronger when the cue was believed to indicate the gaze of a 
higher social rank/status individual. This however, only occurred when the experiment 
partner was believed to be engaged in the same task, echoing previous findings related
to the shared attention theory by Shteynberg (2015).
Taken together, Gobel et al.’s experiments showed that not only the physical 
saliency of the cues, but also their social relevance matters in spatial orienting. This 
also was the first reported evidence showing that basic attentional processes can be 
interpersonally modulated by social context (see also Tufft, Gobel, & Richardson, 
2015). However, this investigation was performed exclusively on the inhibition of return 
(IOR).  Considering that different attentional processes are thought to be relatively 
independent or not interrelated in terms of the underlying mechanisms (e.g., Pan, Wu, 
& Zhang, 2017; Slessor et al., 2019), further research is needed to examine the extent 
to which social context and interpersonal influences modulate other basic attentional 
processes apart from the IOR.  
As introduced above, the present chapter aims at extending the current 
understanding regarding interpersonal influences in basic human attention by 
investigating to whether attention towards the same spatial location with another 
person changes/affects attention performance. In particular, this Chapter asked 
whether human visual attention acts differently (i.e., attention performance is changed) 
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when another person pays attention to the same location with us, in the absence of 
direct communication or explicit interactions (i.e.., without gaze following/coordination 
or a speech exchange), just by knowing that the locus of attention is shared, even if 
this knowledge is irrelevant/trivial for one’s task/goals/performance. Answering this 
question goes beyond the two main lines of research reported in literature to date: joint 
attention (e.g., Mundy & Newell, 2007) and shared attention (e.g., Shteynberg, 2015). 
By excluding gaze following, this question extends traditional research in the joint 
attention field (e.g., Frischen et al., 2007; Mundy & Newell, 2007), which has aimed at 
studying attention coordination based on behavioural observation of other person’s 
attentional focus. By focusing on the attended spatial locations, this research 
complements research in the shared attention field (e.g., Shteynberg, 2014, 2015, 
2018), which examines the cognitive, affective and behavioural consequences of 
knowing that we share attention towards the same objects/ tasks with other individuals,
without considering the specific role the attended locations may play.
  In order to address this question, a modified (two-persons) version of the 
classic sustained visuospatial attention paradigm (e.g., Eimer, 1996; Mangun & 
Hillyard, 1988; Mangun & Buck, 1998) was employed. In a typical (single person) 
sustained attention paradigm, a participant sits in front of a computer monitor and is 
asked to pay covert attention to one of two locations (e.g., left or right) throughout an 
experimental block (i.e., sustain attention to the left or the right side of a computer’s 
screen) while keeping eye-gaze on a central fixation. They need to respond to visual 
targets randomly appearing at the attended and unattended locations as quickly as he/
she can. To ensure that the participant pays more attention toward the attended 
location, the targets are more likely to appear at the attended location  (75% of all trials;
valid condition) than at the unattended location (25% of all trials; invalid condition). 
Reaction times (RTs) are typically faster in the valid than the invalid trials. The RT 
difference between valid and invalid targets indicates the attention effect,  a measure of
behaviour benefit from attention allocated to the attended spatial location (Posner, 
1980). The sustained attention paradigm was adapted so it could be independently 
performed by two people (a dyad) sat next to each other. In this “dual attention 
paradigm” (see Figure 2), participants perform a visual go/no-go task, responding to 
visual targets while attending to the same spatial location as or to a different location 
that an experiment partner attends to.
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Figure 2. The Dual attention task. Participants sit in front of a computer monitor and 
pay covert sustained attention to one of two locations in the screen (e.g., left or right) 
throughout an experimental block while keeping eye-gaze on a central fixation. This 
attended location could be shared by the dyad (attention shared condition) or not 
(attention not shared). Participants respond to visual targets (i.e., circles or squares, 
large or small) randomly appearing either at the attended (valid trials; 75% target 
probability) or unattended locations (invalid trials; 25% target probability)(see Figure 3. 
for more details about the distribution of stimuli in the task). They perform a go/no-go 
task, responding to the large target shapes while ignoring the small ones.  A) 
Experiment 1. Dual attention task with an easy size discrimination. In this example, 
participants sustained covert attention to different visual fields, as indicated by the 
arrows. In this case, Participant 1 (P1) responded to circles, and Participant 2 (P2) 
responded to squares. They both performed a go/no-go task, responding to the large 
shapes while ignoring the small ones. Non-target stimuli were about 30% of the size of 
the targets. B) Experiment 2. Solo version of the dual attention task. The paradigm 
was the same as in Experiment 1. The only change was that a single participant 
(instead of a dyad) performs the task. The stimuli for the “second” participant (non-
existent in this case) were kept like in Experiment 1, but they should be ignored. In this 
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example, the participant payed sustained covert attention to the left side of the screen, 
as indicated by the arrow. C) Experiment 3. Dual attention task (two-person version) 
with an increased task load. The higher load was achieved by increasing the similarity 
between the sizes of target and non-target stimuli, making the discrimination task more 
difficult to perform. Size-wise, the non-target stimuli in Experiment 3 were about 75% of
the target ones. The size of the target stimuli remained the same as in E1.
As discussed above, the shared attention theory posits that when co-attending 
towards the same objects or tasks with other individuals, enhanced general 
performance is achieved. The relevance of the attended spatial locations however, has 
not been examined by this theory. In the current paradigm, participants performed a go/
no-go task while sharing or not the attended spatial locations on a computer screen. If 
the shared attention theory proposal/findings translate directly into the paradigm here 
proposed (i.e., the dual attention paradigm), an enhanced performance in the dual 
attention task when the attended locations are shared by the dyad would be expected. 
This enhanced performance would be reflected by a larger attention effect (i.e., a 
greater RTs difference between valid and invalid trials), for the attention shared 
condition, relative to the condition in which the attentional locus was not shared by the 
two individuals. 
It has also been suggested that, while performing together with another person, 
one might represent the co-actor’s task parameters/features as one’s own, even if 
irrelevant for one’s performance (co-representation account; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; 
Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). An extreme scenario 
applicable to the dual attention task would be that, due to co-representation, each 
individual in the dyad mentally represents the whole task set, including both one’s and 
the partner’s task parameters (e.g., attended locations and target stimuli). If this is the 
case, due to the co-representation of the target shapes, the task would turn into a 
typical sustained attention paradigm with 75% probability of valid trials (i.e., targets 
appearing at the attended side, considering both one’s and the partner’s targets) for the
attention shared condition, and 50% probability for attention not shared case. The 
result would be a typical attention effect (i.e., faster RTs for valid trials) for the attention 
shared condition, and a null effect for the attention not-shared scenario. According to 
this reasoning, also in this case (see the shared attention theory related reasoning 
above), a stronger attention effect would be expected for the attention shared scenario.
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Co-representing the attended locations echoes the case of the joint Navon task 
(Böckler et al., 2012), even though the specific role of the attended spatial locations 
was not considered therein. As presented above, in the joint Navon task, participants 
respond to the identity of letters in a two-choice Navon task, while focusing either on 
the same or different aspects of the task (local or global features). In this case, 
responding when the co-actor had a different focus of attention interfered negatively on
task performance (Böckler et al., 2012), potentially due to a conflict induced by mental 
representations of the co-actor’s divergent focus in the task (Böckler & Sebanz, 2012). 
This finding, if translated into the dual attention task/context, could be taken to suggest 
a reduced performance when individuals in the dyad pay covert attention towards 
different spatial locations in the screen. Therefore, considering either the full co-
representation account or the evidence from the distinct attentional focus in the joint 
Navon, a larger attention effect would be expected when the dyad shares the attended 
spatial locations in the dual attention task (or, in other words, reduced for the not 
shared condition).
In the current Chapter, three experiments are presented. Experiment 1 
introduces the dual attention paradigm and discusses the variation in attention 
performance when sharing or not the attended locations with another person. 
Anticipating the outcome, a striking reduction in attention performance (i.e., a reduced 
attention effect) was obtained when the dyad shared the attended spatial locations in 
the dual attention task. In Experiment 2, the social context of the paradigm (i.e., the 
task partner) was removed, and the outcome of a participant completing the same task 
alone was investigated. Finally, Experiment 3 investigated the dual attention effect 
when increasing the difficulty (perceptual load) of the original task.
2.1. Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined whether visual attention performance is interpersonally 
modulated when an experiment partner is either sharing or not one’s attended spatial 
locations in a dyadic sustained attention a task (aka., dual attention paradigm; see 
Figure 2, and the introductory section above).
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 2.1.1 Method
 2.1.1.1 Participants
Forty-eight volunteers (24 dyads) participated in Experiment 1 (39 females; 40 
right handed; Mage= 20.79, SDage= 2.85). They reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. All participants provided written informed consent to take part in the study, and 
were given either one (1) course credit or eight pounds (£8) for their participation. 
Participants in the same dyad reported not having a close relationship. All the 
experiments in this Thesis received ethical approval from the Bournemouth University 
Ethics Committee.   
 2.1.1.2 Design
The current experiment employed a 2x2 factorial design, where Attention 
(attended vs. unattended location) and Sharing (attention shared vs. notshared) were 
manipulated within-subjects. The dependent variables were the participant’s reaction 
times (RTs) and accuracies (percentage of correct responses) to the target stimulus. Of
particular interest was the interaction between these two factors (Attention x Sharing),  
representing the interpersonal influence in the task (i.e., the changes in attention 
performance when sharing or not the attended spatial locations with the task partner). 
 2.1.1.3 Materials and procedure
E-prime 2.0 was used to program the experiment, control the experimental flow 
and record the responses. Participants in a dyad sat side by side next to each other in 
front of a computer monitor (viewing distance: 70 cm to screen centre) and 
independently completed a sustained visual attention task. During each trial, 
participants were instructed to fixate on a white cross displayed at the centre of the 
computer’s screen, while focusing their attention to one side of the visual field (i.e., left 
or right) for an entire experimental block. The task partner’s visual attention was either 
focused on the same side (attention shared) or different sides (attention not shared) of 
the visual field. Circles or squares, large or small, were randomly displayed at the left 
or right side of the screen, one per trial. Participants performed a go/no-go task. Each 
person in the dyad was assigned a stimulus shape (e.g. Participant 1 responding to 
squares, Participant 2 responding to circles; counterbalanced across participants) and 
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had to quickly respond exclusively to the large version of the stimuli with their assigned 
shape (e.g. Participant 1 responds only to large squares, Participant 2 to large circles), 
regardless of the side of the screen it was displayed at. Responses had to be withheld 
to non-targets (i.e. the small stimuli) and the shape not assigned to the participant. The 
size of the large stimuli was set to 4.57° x 4.57°. The size of the small stimuli was 2.38°
x 2.38°. Stimuli were presented in white against a black background. 75% of the target 
stimuli appeared on the attended side of the screen (valid trials), while 25% of them 
appeared at the opposite location (invalid trials). The overall stimulus distribution was 
balanced, so that an equal number of stimuli were displayed for the shared and not 
shared conditions (see Figure 3). Responses were made with a left-mouse-click for the 
participant sat on the right, and with a “space bar” key press for the person sat on the 
left. Each experimental session had eight blocks, varying the instructed focus of 
attention to the left or right side of the visual field (e.g., along a specific block, the 
attended side for each participant could be as follows: P1:left / P2:left, or P1:left / 
P2:right, or P1:right / P2:left, or P1:right / P2:right; P1=Participant 1, P2=Participant 2). 
Therefore, visual attention across blocks was either focused on the same side 
(attention shared) or different sides (attention not shared) of the visual field. These task
instructions changed every two blocks. The stimuli were displayed for 150ms, with an 
inter-trial-interval (ITI) of 1350ms. The experiment included a total of 1280 trials. From 
these, 640 were go-trials that required responses from the participants (i.e., 320 for 
each subject in a dyad). Short breaks were allowed each 160 trials. Each participant 
was informed about the experiment partner’s instructions at the beginning of each 
experimental block. They had to acknowledge reading the instructions regarding the 
experiment partner’s task. However, they were told explicitly not to monitor the 
partner’s task.
Participants also responded to several questionnaires. Before the computer-
based trials, they completed the Individualism-Collectivism scale (IND-COL; Singelis, 
Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995) to measure the degree to which participants saw 
their selves as members of a collective/social group (i.e., collectivism) or as 
independent selves (i.e., individualism). The IND-COL scale can be divided into four 
subscales measuring horizontal collectivism (HC), vertical collectivism (VC), horizontal 
individualism (HI), and vertical individualism (VI). The horizontal dimension reflects the 
degree to which individuals in a group are considered similar to each other, while the 
vertical dimension shows whether hierarchies/inequalities are accepted. In this line, HC
people merge themselves into groups where all the parts are considered as equal. VC 
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individuals accept hierarchies, while still acting as a collective, and are willing to 
sacrifice themselves in pro of the group benefit. HI people are more independent, while
considered as equals in relation to the rest of the group. Finally, VI individuals are very 
independent and competitive, and accept marked hierarchies/inequalities between 
people (He, Sebanz, Sui, & Humphreys, 2014; Singelis et al., 1995). Given that the VC 
and HC scores have been shown to be highly correlated (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; 
Triandis, 1995), they are typically merged into a Combined Collectivism score (e.g., He 
et al., 2014). Here I followed this suggestion and summed their scores to create a 
single Collectivism measure.
After completing the computer-based section of the experiment, participants 
filled in the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). For each of the 
50 items in this questionnaire, participants had to choose one out of four scale-points 
from “definitely disagree” to “definitely agree”. These items measure autistic-like traits 
across the general population (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Subsequently, participants 
completed the 40 items of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 2012), 
employed to assess trait and state anxiety. In this inventory, 20 items assessed how 
anxious the participants felt at the moment of answering the questionnaire (state 
anxiety; Form Y1), while 20 items examined how participants generally felt and their 
anxiety-proneness (trait anxiety; Form Y2).
Figure 3. Stimuli distributions in the dual attention task. 75% of the target stimuli 
appeared at the attended side of the screen (valid trials), while 25% of them appeared 
at the opposite location (invalid trials)(i.e., 3:1 ratio, valid targets:invalid targets). To 
compensate for the intrinsic imbalance in the target distributions, the distribution of 
non-target stimuli was also modified. 75% of the non-target shapes appeared at the 
unattended side, while 25% were displayed at the attended location(i.e., 1:3 ratio, valid 
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Target
P2
Non-Target
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Target
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Non-Target
P1
Stimuli:
Stimuli
Ratio:
      3   :   1       1   :   3
Target     :   Non-target Target     :   Non-target
non-targets:invalid non-targets). In this way, the probability of having a stimulus 
appearing at either side of the screen was matched across experimental block. This 
also means that the overall stimulus distribution was balanced, so that an equal 
number of stimuli were displayed for the shared and not shared conditions.
 2.1.1.4 Statistical Analyses
All analyses were performed using R (version ‘1.1.456’) and RStudio (RStudio 
Team, 2016). Eight participants were excluded from statistical analysis due to 
accuracies below 75%  in any design cell. The remaining 40 participants (32 females; 
32 right handed; Mage= 21.12, SDage= 3.01) were considered for further analysis.
Measures of central tendency - Accuracies and Reaction times (RTs) data were 
analysed using both classic ANOVAs on means, and robust methods on 20% trimmed 
means. Robust methods are designed to work well both in the presence and absence 
of violations in the statistical assumptions, and can help increasing statistical power 
(Erceg-Hurn, Wilcox, & Keselman, 2013; Field & Wilcox, 2017; Wilcox, 2012; Wilcox & 
Rousselet, 2018). As part of this literature, it has been shown that tests on trimmed 
means tend to provide a better and more robust description of the central tendency of a
distribution than their arithmetic counterpart (i.e., arithmetic mean) (Erceg-Hurn et al., 
2013; Field & Wilcox, 2017; Wilcox, 2012; Wilcox & Keselman, 2003; Wilcox & 
Rousselet, 2018). In this thesis, on the relevant statistical contrasts, I employed the 
percentile bootstrap method on 20% trimmed means (see Rousselet, Pernet, & Wilcox,
2019b, 2019a, for some recent tutorials) to follow up the classic ANOVA results. In this 
way, I assessed their robustness to outliers and to violations in statistical assumption. 
For the robust method (i.e., the percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means), the 
results are presented including the difference between trimmed means ψ^  (psihat) for 
the relevant contrasts, as well as the associated bootstrap confidence interval and the 
respective p-value (at α =0.05). The R packages ‘ez’ (Lawrence, 2016) and ‘WRS’ 
(Wilcox & Schönbrodt, 2014) were employed to compute classic ANOVAs and Robust 
Statistics respectively. From the ‘WRS’ package, the functions ‘bwwmcppb’, 
‘wwwmcppb’, ‘bwmcppb’, and ‘wwmcppb’, were employed. These functions implement 
the percentile bootstrap method on trimmed means according to the experimental 
design (i.e., ‘bwwmcppb’ for a between-by-within-by-within design; ‘wwwmcppb’ for a 
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within-by-within-by-within design; ‘bwmcppb’ for a between-by-within design; 
‘wwmcppb’ for a within-by-within design). These functions and methods are described 
in detail in (Wilcox, 2012).
Bayes Factors (BF) – For the relevant statistical interactions, Bayes Factors 
were computed using the ‘BayesFactor’ R package (Morey & Rouder, 2015), with the 
default prior (Jeffreys-Zellner-Siow, JZS; Jeffreys-beta for correlation analysis) . This 
choice (i.e., the use of the default prior) has been suggested when no prior information 
about the effects of interest is available (e.g., Rouder et al., 2012, 2009; Wagenmakers 
et al., 2018), like was here the case. Bayes Factors were reported expressing the 
probability of the data given the alternative hypothesis, relative to the null (BF10), or 
the probability of the null relative to the alternative hypothesis (BF01). Following 
Wagenmakers et al. (2018), BFs from 1-3 were considered as representing “anecdotal”
evidence, BFs from 3-10 as “moderate” evidence, and so on.  
Correlation Analysis – The scores from the Individualism-Collectivism (IND-
COL) subscales, the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ), and the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI), were correlated to the dual attention effect obtained in the dyadic 
sustained attention task. The dual attention effect was calculated by subtracting the 
typical attention effect (MAttEffect = MRTs,unattended – MRTs,attended) for the attention shared 
condition from attention effect for the unshared condition (i.e., MdualAttEffect = MAttEffect, 
unshared – MAttEffect, shared). I employed Spearman’s correlations in all cases. These are 
reported alongside Bayes Factors, obtained after running Bayesian correlations with 
the Jeffreys-beta prior (Ly, Verhagen, & Wagenmakers, 2016).
 2.1.2 Results              
 2.1.2.1 Accuracies
Participants’ overall performance was high (MACC, Exp1 = 97.1 %, 95% CI [95.74, 
98.54]). Mean accuracies (see Table 1), were submitted to a 2x2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA with Attention (attended vs. unattended) and Sharing (shared vs. unshared) as 
within-subjects factors. No statistically significant effect was obtained, nor when 
employing the within-within robust ANOVA on 20% trimmed means with the percentile 
bootstrap method.
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Table 1. Mean accuracies (with SD) for Experiment 1. Mean accuracies are here 
presented as percentage of correct responses. 
Experimental Condition
Notshared Shared
Attended Unattended Attended Unattended
97.5(4.15) 96.3(5.63) 97.3(5.05) 97.5(4.30)
 2.1.2.2 RTs
Go-trials were analysed. From these, only trials with correct responses were 
considered (97.1%). Following Leys et al.´s (2013) suggestion, outliers were 
determined and removed using a threshold of 2.5 times the Median Absolute Deviation 
(MAD) per design cell. This eliminated 4.5% of the remaining data.
Mean RTs data (see Figure 4, and Table 2) were submitted to a 2x2 repeated-
measures-ANOVA with Attention (attended vs. unattended) and Sharing (shared vs. 
unshared) as within-subjects factors. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
Attention, F(1, 39) = 70.45, p < .001, ηG2 =0.068, due to shorter RTs for the attended 
stimuli (M = 411 ms, 95% CI [396.08, 426.43]) than for the unattended ones (M = 438 
ms, 95% CI [422.38, 453.82]). The main effect of Sharing was not significant, F(1, 39) =
0.99, p = .325. More importantly, the attention effect varied across sharing conditions, 
as indicated by the significant  interaction Attention x Sharing, F(1, 39) = 9.10, p = .004,
ηG
2 =0.004. The attention effect was smaller when attention was shared by the dyad (M 
= 21 ms, 95% CI [13.68, 27.58]), F(1, 39) = 36.06 , p < .001, ηG2 = 0.04, than when it 
was not shared (M = 33 ms, 95% CI [24.68, 41.43]), F(1, 39) =63.76 , p < .001, ηG2 = 
0.10.
These results were in line with those obtained when computing within-within 
design percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means. The main effect of attention was 
significant, ψ^  = -53 [-66, -40.8], p = 0, the main effect of Sharing was not significant, ψ^  
= -8 [-21.7, 5.01], p =.223, and there was a significant interaction Attention x Sharing, ψ^
= -12 [-20.9, -3.06], p =.006.
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For the Bayes Factors Analysis, the attention effect was calculated (i.e., 
subtracting the RTs for the attended condition from the RTs for the unattended 
condition). The attention effect was compared across Sharing conditions, yielding a 
BF10 = 2.267, representing “anecdotal” support for the model with the Sharing effect, 
relative to the null model, provided the data. In other words, BFs remained insensitive 
(Wagenmakers et al., 2018).  
Post-hoc simple main effects analysis examined the effect of Sharing separately
for the each of the Attention conditions. Both the ANOVA and the percentile bootstrap 
method on 20% trimmed means yielded a significant difference between the 
participants RTs to attended locations across Sharing conditions, F(1, 39) = 6.33 , p 
= .016, ηG
2 = 0.01; ψ^  = -8.86 [-15.6, -2.79], p = .004, due to slower RTs when dyads 
shared the locus of attention, than when this locus was notshared (see Table 2). 
Response times to unattended locations were not statistically different across Sharing 
conditions, F(1, 39) = 0.20 , p = .653; ψ^  = 1.18 [-7.89, 10.2], p = .726.
 2.1.2.3 Correlation Analysis
The correlation between the AQ and the dual attention effect was statistically 
significant, rs =  0.340, p = .034, BF10 = 3.7. No other correlation was significant (see 
Table 3).
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Figure 4. Results Experiment 1. A) Mean RTs as a function of attention (attended, 
unattended), and sharing (shared, not shared) conditions. The group mean for each 
condition is displayed with 95% confidence intervals (CIs). B) Mean attention effect 
across sharing (shared, not shared) conditions. The attention effect is calculated as the
difference between the mean RTs for the unattended condition and the mean RTs for 
the attended condition (i.e., MAttEffect = Munattended – Mattended). Means are displayed with 
95% CIs. A reduction in the attention effect was obtained when the dyad shared the 
attended spatial locations (shared condition). This was termed dual attention effect. C) 
Stripchart showing the attention effect for each participant across sharing conditions. 
Lines were drawn to join paired observations. Out of the 40 participants analysed, 27 
(~ 67.5% of the group) showed an effect in the same direction than the group mean 
(i.e. a reduction of the attention effect for the attention shared condition).
Table 2. Mean RTs in ms (with SD) for Experiment 1.
Experimental Condition
Notshared Shared
Attended Unattended Attended Unattended
406(47) 439(52) 416(51) 437(51)
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Table 3. Correlations in Experiment 1. The scores from the Individualism-Collectivism 
(IND-COL) subscales, the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ), and the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI), were correlated to the dual attention effect (MdualAttEffect = MAttEffect, 
unshared – MAttEffect, shared). Spearman’s correlations and Bayes Factors are reported in all 
cases.
Individualism-Collectivism (IND-COL) (N=40) -
Combined Collectivism (HC+VC) rs =  0.152, p = .349, BF10 = 0.529
Horizontal Individualism (HI) rs =  0.130, p = .423, BF10 = 0.652
Vertical Individualism (VI) rs =  0.116, p = .477, BF10 = 0.356
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (N=39) rs = -0.039, p = .814, BF10 = 0.420
State Anxiety (Y1) rs = -0.127, p = .440, BF10 = 0.360
Trait Anxiety (Y2) rs =  0.061, p = .706, BF10 = 0.505
Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ) (N=39) rs =  0.340, p = .034, BF10 = 3.700
 2.1.3 Discussion
Strikingly, when performing the dual attention task, participants in Experiment 1 
showed a reduced attention performance (i.e., a smaller attention effect) when sharing 
the attended spatial locations with the task partner, than when their locus of attention 
differed. This reduction in attention performance when sharing the locus of attention 
was termed dual attention effect. The current finding (i.e., the dual attention effect) 
adds to the emerging body of evidence suggesting that social context and interpersonal
influences from other individuals in our environment influence even basic human 
cognitive processes (e.g., Gobel et al., 2018; Tufft et al., 2015), in this case, visual 
attention performance.
However, the direction of the effect here obtained is the opposite to what was 
anticipated given related findings reported in literature (e.g., Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; 
Shteynberg, 2015). For instance, a co-representation account of these results may be 
more complicated than previously thought. It has been suggested that, when 
performing together with another individual, people mentally represent the partner’s 
actions/tasks as their own (aka. task co-representation; Sebanz et al., 2003). Here, an 
extreme case of co-representation would imply individuals co-representing the full task 
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set assigned to the dyad, including attended locations and target stimuli. Co-
representation of the stimuli (i.e.,  similarly representing one’s stimuli and those 
assigned to the task partner) would turn the task into a classic visuospatial sustained 
attention paradigm. In this case, given the unbalanced distribution of targets (see 
Figure 3), 75% of the target shapes (considering both one’s and the partner’s) would 
appear at the attended side when the dyad attended to the same spatial locations 
(attention shared condition), while 50% of the targets would be displayed at the 
attended side in the situation in which the dyad did not share the locus of attention 
(attention not shared condition). These probabilities would elicit a typical attention effect
(i.e., faster RTs for valid trials) for the attention shared condition, and a null attention 
effect for the attention not-shared scenario1. This was clearly not the result here 
obtained. Instead, the pattern here presented pointed towards the opposite direction: a 
smaller attention effect for the shared condition. Similarly, co-representing the (same 
vs. different) attended locations in the current task would seem analogue to co-
representing the (same vs. different) focus of attention in a joint Navon task (Böckler et 
al., 2012). In the case of the joint Navon, responding when the co-actor had a different 
focus of attention reduced performance in the task (Böckler et al., 2012), potentially 
due to a conflict induced by mental representations of the co-actor’s divergent focus 
(Böckler & Sebanz, 2012). Contrary to this, in the dual attention task, the reduced 
performance was found when participants in the dyad shared the attended spatial 
locations. Therefore, the evidence here reported suggests that focusing on the same 
vs. different aspects, and focusing on the same vs. different spatial locations, may 
affect performance in different ways. In addition, the current result cannot be accounted
for by participants fully co-representing the stimuli/task set assigned to the dyad along 
the task. 
Although an extreme case of co-representation seems unlikely to explain the 
current findings, a co-representation-driven response inhibition could be related to the 
dual attention effect. It may be the case that due to co-representation of the (task) 
partner’s stimuli, the partner’s targets could prime one’s own target-relevant response, 
with a subsequent need to inhibit this primed response given one’s instructions set (i.e.,
1 The thesis does not include an experiment with a single isolated participant performing both 
parts of the task (i.e., a single participant responding to both large circles and large squares) 
since this would be equivalent to a classic sustained attention paradigm with two different valid 
trials probabilities (i.e., 75% vs. 50% probability of valid trials).
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to withhold responses for one’s non-targets). Following the above-mentioned 
unbalanced distribution of target stimuli in the task (see Figure 3), the attention-shared 
condition was characterised by a higher probability of target stimuli (considering both 
one’s and the partner’s) appearing at the attended location, compared to the attention-
notshared scenario. This unbalanced distribution would provoke a stronger need to 
inhibit primed responses (by the partner’s targets) in the attended-shared condition, 
potentially eliciting the attention performance reduction measured by the dual attention 
effect.
Wolf, Launay and Dunbar (2016) showed that jointly attending towards the 
same spatial location with another person increases the reported/perceived levels of 
affiliation/bonding/closeness in relation to the co-attending person. Wolf et al. (2016) 
argued that this enhanced perception of closeness could be due to a minimal-group 
like categorisation elicited by joint attention. In this line, a person sharing the attended 
location would be categorised as an in-group member, while a person attending to a 
different location would be perceived as an out-group. Task co-representation in joint 
action settings has been found to be enhanced (or present exclusively) when 
performing with in-group members (Aquino et al., 2015; Hommel, Colzato, & van den 
Wildenberg, 2009; McClung, Jentzsch, & Reicher, 2013; but see  He et al., 2011). 
Therefore, in relation to the (potential) intergroup categorisation induced by sharing (or 
not) the locus of attention, and considering the role of group membership in co-
representation, it could happen that when completing the dual attention task, people 
take into account the co-actor’s task more seriously (or make stronger representations 
of it) when the attentional locus is shared. This could depict an increased interference 
with one’s performance (e.g., more attention directed to the others shape), resulting in 
the attention reduction when the dyad shared the attended spatial locations. 
Accordingly, although (as described above) co-representing the full task set 
corresponding to the dyad cannot account for the effect here obtained, it could happen 
that some aspects of the partner’s task (e.g., the partner’s stimuli or her target shapes) 
matter to some extent, and may interfere with one’s performance with a different 
strength depending on the dyad’s attentional locus (with a stronger interference for the 
shared condition). Importantly however, this could be a circular argument. It may well 
be that taking into account more closely the other person and his/her task could have 
led to an increased bonding reported by Wolf et al. (2016). Yet, this last argument has 
not been tested, thus it is just speculation at the current stage.
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Indeed, among the candidate explanations behind the above-mentioned 
augmented bonding/affiliation/closeness (when sharing the attentional locus), Wolf and 
colleagues also argued that the knowledge of being sharing the attended spatial 
location with another person may elicit extra higher order processing like mentalising, 
opening the possibility of attributing social behaviours to the co-attending person, 
enhancing the perceived closeness. Indeed, it would not be surprising that merely 
knowing that the other person shares one’s locus of attention could be analogue to 
obtaining this information (about the other’s attentional locus) through gaze following, 
subsequently activating the series of higher order processes supporting joint attention 
and facilitating coordination in the social world (e.g., monitoring others, mentalising; 
see Mundy & Newell, 2007; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). If 
sharing the attentional locus with another individual induces extra higher order 
processes (e.g., mentalising about or monitoring the other individual), this extra 
processing may consume additional attentional resources respect to the condition in 
which the dyad did not share the attended locations. The additional resources deployed
to a “secondary” task (like mentalising/monitoring) in the former scenario (attention 
shared) could explain the associated attention performance drop.
In a similar vein, recent evidence has suggested that the presence of others, 
depending on the context (see below), could exhaust an important part of executive 
attention (Belletier, Normand, & Huguet, 2019). An increased impairment of executive 
attention or cognitive control has been found when the co-present individuals are 
consider a threat that needs to be monitored (Huguet, et al., 2014), or when they 
represent an evaluative potential (Belletier et al., 2015). In the context of the dual 
attention task, a task partner deploying covert attention towards the same spatial 
location one is focusing on could feel more threatening or could imply a higher 
evaluative potential than a partner attending to a different location. This would direct 
more executive resources towards monitoring the co-attending task partner, reducing 
the attention capacity (that would be otherwise used for other activities like the task at 
hand) in respect to the condition in which this task partner does not share the locus of 
attention. The reduction in the attention capacity for the attention shared condition 
could potentially explain the dual attention effect. Investigating how the information 
processing stages in the brain (e.g., event-related potentials) are influenced by sharing 
or not the attended spatial locations with another individual could shed more light in this
regard. This could for instance, show whether the dual attention effect is the result of 
reduced sensory processing, or top-down driven.
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The shared attention literature (see Shteynberg, 2015, 2018 for a review) has 
provided evidence showing that sharing attention towards the same objects or tasks 
with other individuals might elicit a more elaborate processing of the co-attended 
objects/tasks, enhancing general performance. Although the shared attention literature 
has not tested the specific role the attended spatial locations may play on shared 
attention, given their evidence/proposals one would be inclined to predict a 
performance increase when co-attending to a spatial location with another person in 
the dual attention task. However, this was not the case, and instead, the attention 
performance dropped when the attentional locus was shared by the dyad (compared to
the attention not shared condition). Shteynberg (2015) proposed tasks may not always 
be the object of shared attention. He suggested that under some circumstances (e.g., if
the other person is not working on the task, but just watching one’s performance), this 
focus could shift from one’s task to one’s performance, leading to increased resources 
deployed to monitor one’s performance, potentially driving an increase in 
arousal/anxiety (e.g., Geen, 1991). However, as discussed by Shteynberg (2015), and 
in consonance with the classic social facilitation literature (e.g., Zajonc, 1965), an 
increased drive or arousal would lead to enhanced performance for easy tasks, like the
one here performed, which was not the case. 
Alternatively, it could be suggested that sharing the attended side of the screen 
could have induced a social-loafing-like effect (Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979), with
participants putting less effort in the task, compared to the attention not shared 
condition. However, social-loafing effects are usually obtained in groups when one 
expects other participants in the group to put the effort necessary to complete (or 
perform better) the task at hand, or when one’s contribution cannot be 
tracked/identified by the rest (Karau & Williams, 1993). In the case of the dual attention 
paradigm, participants were performing independent go/no-go tasks, responding to 
different shapes. One participant responded to the large circles, and the other 
participant responded to the large squares. Therefore, given the independent nature of 
the task, reducing one’s endeavour owing to others’ extra effort potential was not an 
option. Moreover, sharing the attended side of the screen could increase the probability
of having one’s performance/effort monitored by the task partner, making it less likely 
for loafing to appear, if compared to the not shared condition. Considering these 
arguments, a social loafing account for the current results becomes unlikely.
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The positive correlation between AQ scores and the dual attention effect is 
rather surprising. Higher autistic traits are generally associated to deficits in social 
information processing (Frith, 2001; Frith & Frith, 2010), and individuals with autism 
exhibit severe impairments in the ability to spontaneously represent other’s minds 
(Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). In this line, and of high relevance for the 
current research, it has been shown that the collective perspective induced by shared 
attention, and the associated general performance enhancement, are not present in 
individuals with high autistic traits (Skorich, Gash, Stalker, Zheng, & Haslam, 2017; 
Shteynberg, 2018; but see Sebanz, Knoblich, Stumpf, & Prinz, 2005, for evidence for 
unaltered co-representation abilities in individuals with autism). Therefore, considering 
the above-mentioned research, and in opposition to the current finding, a negative (or 
null) correlation between AQ and the dual attention effect would have been expected 
(i.e., the higher the participant’s autistic traits, the more the interpersonal influence in 
the task is reduced). Nonetheless, anticipating the outcome of follow-up experiments 
reported in this thesis, the present correlation was not further replicated (see 
Experiment 3). Thus, it is possible that this positive correlation actually represented a 
spurious finding. 
It is important to mention that controlling eye-movements is always 
recommended in attention-related experiments to avoid any possible confound from 
foveal processing of the stimuli, which is faster and more precise than the peripheral 
non-foveal counterpart (Chica, Martín-Arévalo, Botta, & Lupiáñez, 2014). In the current 
experiment, even if participants were instructed to keep a constant central fixation, eye 
movements were not monitored and therefore the central fixation could not be taken for
granted. Given that the attention/trial validity employed (e.g., 75% of the target stimuli 
appearing at the attended side of the screen) biases attention towards the instructed 
attended hemifield, even if participants performed systematic eye movements towards 
the locations were the stimuli were displayed, this would only be reflected in overall 
changes in the reaction times distributions, but would not affect the attention effect 
modulations here reported. Alternatively, if participants instead looked directly at the 
attended location, RT to valid trials would be much faster, and RT to invalid trials much 
slower, respect to a central fixation scenario, leading to a larger attention effect . This 
attention effect could only be stronger for the shared condition (i.e., when the two 
persons’ tasks were inducing gaze shifting in the same direction) than for the notshared
condition. In this case, gaze shifting would induce a larger attention effect for the 
shared condition, a prediction contradicting the current results. Following these 
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arguments, even if eye-movements were not monitored, it seems unlikely for eye-
movements to explain the dual attention effect. 
Finally, it could be argued that the dual attention effect was not interpersonally 
driven, but instead elicited by intrinsic properties of the task at hand (e.g., the 
unbalanced target distribution between shared and not shared conditions). Participants 
were instructed to sustain their attention covertly towards one side of the screen for a 
whole experimental block. To encourage these attentional shifts, the distributions of 
valid and invalid trials was biased (i.e., 75% valid trials vs. 25% invalid). Although the 
overall stimuli distribution was balanced in the task (i.e., the probability of having an 
stimulus at any side of the screen was matched for every condition) (see Figure 3), the 
distribution of target stimuli was not. For the attention shared condition 75% of the 
targets for both participants appeared at the same location (i.e., 75% of the large 
circles and 75% of the large squares), the one co-attended by the dyad. For the 
attention unshared condition instead, one location (e.g., left) displayed 75% of the 
targets for one participant (e.g., large circles), while the other location (e.g., right) 
showed 75% of the targets for the remaining participant (e.g., large squares). This is a 
necessary feature of a sustained attention task, essential to maintain the sustained 
attention behaviour. However, it could be the case that when performing the two-person
version of the task, the unbalanced target distribution induced an unwanted bias in 
attention, responsible for the reported effect (i.e., the reported reduction in the attention
effect for the attention shared condition). To explore whether the bias in the distribution 
of targets elicited the dual attention effect, Experiment 22 was conducted.
2.2. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 examined whether the attention performance reduction in 
Experiment 1 was merely driven by the unbalanced distribution of the target shapes. In 
Experiment 2, participants completed a solo version of the dual attention paradigm. 
The only change from Experiment 1 is that participants performed the task alone. The 
notation used for the levels of the attention sharing factor was kept as in Experiment 1 
(i.e., attention “shared” and “notshared”) to facilitate comparisons. However, given that 
the individuals were performing in isolation, these levels do not refer to actual sharing 
(or not) of the attended spatial locations.
2 I would like to thank Steven Tipper for his valuable comments and suggestions in this regard
while we discussed the current work at the BACN 2017 annual scientific meeting.
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If the effect obtained in Experiment 1 was elicited by the intrinsic difference in 
the distribution of targets across attention sharing conditions (i.e. probability 
properties), we would expect Experiment 2 to replicate this effect. If instead, the 
difference in the attention effect across sharing conditions varies from Experiment 1 
(two-persons) to Experiment 2 (single-person), we could argue that this difference is 
indeed interpersonally driven or elicited by the social context of the task. This difference
across experiments, however, could come in one of two forms. On one hand, it could 
be possible that when performing the solo version of the task, the unbalanced 
distribution of targets (large circles/squares) causes an even smaller attention effect for
the attention “shared” condition (i.e., the condition with a 75% probability of targets 
displayed at the attended location) than in the “unshared” one, compared to the dyadic 
setting. This would suggest that sharing the attended locations with another individual 
actually enhanced the attention performance measured when completing the task in 
isolation. On the other hand, it could happen that when comparing the two 
experiments, Experiment 2 shows a weaker reduction in the attention effect for the 
“shared” vs “notshared” condition than Experiment 1. This scenario would provide 
additional evidence to suggest that the attention reduction in dyads sharing the locus of
attention (reported in Experiment 1) was indeed a social effect interpersonally driven.
 2.2.1 Method
 2.2.1.1 Participants
Forty-three students participated in Experiment 2 (25 females; 34 right-handed; 
Mage= 22.51, SDage= 4.45). They reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All 
participants provided written informed consent to take part in the study, and were given 
either one (1) course credit or eight pounds (£8) for their participation. 
 2.2.1.2 Design
The current experiment employed the same 2X2 factorial design than 
Experiment 1, where Attention (attended vs. unattended location) and “Sharing” 
(“attention shared” vs. “notshared”) were manipulated within-subjects. Here however, 
participants performed the task in isolation. Therefore, the “Sharing” factor did not 
reflect “attention sharing conditions” in relation to a task partner. Instead, this factor 
reflected the unbalance distribution of target shapes across these attention sharing 
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conditions in the original dual attention paradigm (see the introductory section above). 
To allow for comparisons across experiments, Experiment Type (Solo vs. Dyad) was 
subsequently included as between-subjects factor.
 2.2.1.3 Materials and procedure
The experimental set-up was identical to that of Experiment 1, except that 
participants performed the task individually (instead of as dyads) sitting centrally to the 
monitor. The trials that belonged to a task partner in Experiment 1 did not require any 
responses. As in Experiment 1, a total of 1280 were presented. From these, 320 
required a response from the participant (i.e., go-trials). No questionnaires were 
employed given that this was not a social task.
 2.2.2 Results
Five participants were excluded from statistical analysis due to accuracies 
below 75%  per design cell. The remaining 38 participants (23 females; 30 right 
handed; Mage= 23.05, SDage= 4.22) were analysed. The analyses were the same as 
those being employed in Experiment 1.
 2.2.2.1 Accuracies
Participants showed a high performance in the task (MACC, Exp2 = 97.38 %, 95% 
CI [96.04, 98.73]). Mean accuracies (see Table 4) were analysed as in Experiment 1. 
No statistically significant effect was obtained with the ANOVA, while the percentile 
bootstrap method on 20% trimmed means revealed a significant interaction Attention x 
Sharing, ψ^  = -1.08 [-1.91, -0.31], p = .006, and no significant main effects.
Table 4. Mean accuracies (with SD) for Experiment 2. Mean accuracies are here 
presented as percentage of correct responses. 
Experimental Condition
Notshared Shared
Attended Unattended Attended Unattended
97.06(4.92) 97.76(4.53) 97.61(4.52) 97.11(4.04)
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 2.2.2.2 RTs
RTs for go-trials were analysed. Only trials with correct responses (97.4%) were
considered. The same criterion of 2.5-MAD for outlier removal was applied, leading to 
rejection of 5.1% of the remaining data.
Mean RTs (see Figure 5 and Table 5) were analysed the same way as in 
Experiment 1. The condition names were kept identical to those in Experiment 1 to 
allow comparisons. The 2-way-within-subjects ANOVA yielded a significant interaction 
of Attention x Sharing, F(1, 37) = 33.74, p < .001, ηG2 =0.025. This interaction, however, 
shows the opposite pattern to that of Experiment 1. The attention effect was significant 
for the attention shared condition (M = 33 ms, 95% CI [25.78, 41.12]), F(1, 37) = 
78.05 , p < .001, ηG2 =0.082, and was not significant for the unshared condition (M = -1 
ms, 95% CI [-8.3, 6.29]), F(1, 37) = 0.07 , p = .780. The main effect of Attention was 
also significant (Mattended = 441 ms, 95% CI [423.28, 458.37]; Munattended = 457 ms, 95% 
CI [439.67, 474.42]), F(1, 37) = 54.20, p < .001, ηG2 =0.022, while the main effect of  
Sharing  was not, F(1, 37) = 0.30, p = .585.
Consistent with these,  the percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means showed
a significant interaction Attention x Sharing,  ψ^  = -31 [-42.14, -22.01], p = 0, a 
significant main effect of attention,  ψ^  = 29 [16.83, 42.74], p = 0, and a not significant 
main effect of Sharing,  ψ^  = -6 [-17.12, 6.68], p = .354. In addition, after computing the 
attention effect, the attention effect compared across Sharing conditions yielded a 
BF10 = 1651410, representing “extreme” evidence for model with the effect of Sharing 
(equivalent to the interaction Attention x Sharing before the attention effect was 
calculated), relative to the model without it, given the data.
As in Experiment 1, post-hoc simple main effects analysis examined the effect 
of “Sharing” separately for the each of the Attention conditions. Both the ANOVA and 
the percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means yielded a significant difference 
between the participants RTs to attended locations across Sharing conditions, F(1, 37) 
= 15.51 , p = < .001; ψ^  = 14.34 [7.62, 20.11], p = 0. Participants responded faster to 
stimuli displayed at the attended locations in the “shared” condition (compared to the 
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“unshared” scenario) (see Table 5). In addition, RTs to unattended locations were 
slower for the “shared” condition than for the “unshared” one, F(1, 37) = 18.73 , p = 
< .001, ηG
2 = 0.03;  ψ^  = -16.79 [-26.97, -6.95], p = 0.
Table 5. Mean RTs in ms (with SD) for Experiment 2.
Experimental Condition
Notshared Shared
Attended Unattended Attended Unattended
449(55) 448(50) 433(54) 466(58)
Figure 5. Results Experiment 2. A) Mean RTs as a function of attention (attended, 
unattended), and sharing (shared, not shared) conditions. The group means for each 
condition are displayed with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) B) Mean attention effect 
across sharing (shared, not shared) conditions. The attention effect is calculated as the
difference between the mean RTs for the unattended condition and the mean RTs for 
the attended condition (i.e., MAttEffect = Munattended – Mattended). Means are displayed with 
95% CIs. Contraty to the result in Experiment 1, here, a reduction in the attention effect
was obtained when the dyad did not shared the attended spatial locations (i.e., a 
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negative dual attention effect). C) Stripchart showing the attention effect for each 
participant across sharing conditions. Lines were drawn to join paired observations. 
Out of the 38 participants analysed, 32 (~ 84.2% of the group) showed an effect in the 
same direction than the group mean (i.e. a reduction of the attention effect for the 
attention not shared condition).
 2.2.3 Comparing Experiments 1 and 2
 2.2.3.1 Accuracies 
Due to high performance obtained in both experiments (MACC, Exp1 = 97.1 %, 
95% CI [95.74, 98.54]; MACC, Exp2 = 97.38 %, 95% CI [96.04, 98.73]), accuracies were 
not further analysed.
 2.2.3.2 RTs
Mean RTs (see Figure 6) from Experiments 1 and 2 were submitted to a 3-way 
mixed ANOVA, with an added factor Experiment Type (Solo vs. Dyad) as between-
subject factor. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Experiment Type, F(1, 
76) = 4.59, p = .035, ηG2 =0.052, due to slower responses in Experiment 2 (M = 449 ms ,
95% CI [431.62, 466.25]) than in Experiment 1 (M = 425 ms, 95% CI [409.57, 439.78]). 
The main effect of Attention was also significant, F(1, 76) = 120.56, p < .001, ηG2 =0.041,
reflecting a typical attention effect. Mean RTs were faster for the attended condition (M 
= 423 ms, 95% CI [412.32, 434.01]), than for the unattended one (M = 444 ms, 95% CI 
[433, 455.76]). The two-way interactions Attention x Sharing (F(1, 76) = 9.47, p = .003,
ηG
2 =0.003) and Attention x Type (F(1, 76) = 7.33, p = .008, ηG2 =0.003) were also 
significant (but see the results with the robust test). More importantly, a significant 
three-way interaction was obtained, F(1, 76) = 42.87, p < .001, ηG2 =0.013, suggesting 
that the modulation in the attention effect (calculated as: MAttEffect = MUnattended – Mattended)
across attention sharing conditions (i.e. the dual attention effect; MdualAttEffect = 
MAttEffect,Unshared – MAttEffect,Shared) varies between experiments (i.e., depending on 
whether the participants performed the two-person version of the paradigm, 
MdualAttEffect,Exp1 = 12 ms,  95% CI [4.09, 20.75], or the solo version MdualAttEffect, Exp2 = -34 
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ms,  95% CI [-46.47, -22.44]). Indeed, these showed opposite patterns across 
experiments. No other main effect nor interaction were significant.  
 
Figure 6. Experiment 2 (Solo) vs. Experiment 1 (Dyad). A) Mean attention effect 
across sharing conditions (shared, not shared) and Experiment Type (Exp2: Solo, 
Exp1: Dyad). The attention effect is calculated as the difference between the mean RTs
for the unattended condition and the mean RTs for the attended condition (i.e., MAttEffect 
= Munattended – Mattended). Group means are displayed with 95% confidence intervals 
(CIs). B) Mean dual attention effect as a function of Experiment Type (Exp2: Solo, 
Exp1: Dyad). The dual attention effect is calculated as the difference between the 
mean attention effect for the notshared condition and the mean attention effect for the 
notshared condition (i.e., MdualAttEffect = MAttEffect, unshared – MAttEffect, shared). Group means 
are displayed with 95% confidence intervals (CIs). Experiments 1 and 2 showed dual 
attention effects in opposite directions. Positive in Experiment 1, negative in 
Experiment 2.
The between-within-within percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means yielded 
a significant main effect of Experiment Type,  ψ^  = 108 [22.9, 197], p = .014, a 
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significant main effect of Attention,  ψ^  = -86 [-105, -68.1], p = 0, a significant interaction 
Attention x Sharing,  ψ^  = 25 [9.21, 43], p = .001, and a significant interaction Type x 
Attention x Sharing,  ψ^  = 46 [31.3, 64.6], p = 0. With this method, the interaction 
Attention x Type was not significant,  ψ^  = 18 [-0.681, 35.3], p = .059.  After computing 
the attention effect and submitting it to the Bayes factors analysis, the 2-way interaction
Type x Sharing yielded BF10 = 2056690, suggesting “extreme” support for the model 
with the interaction, relative to the model without it, provided the data.
 2.2.4 Discussion
The modulation of the attention effect across attention sharing conditions varied
between Experiment 1 (two-persons) and Experiment 2 (single-person), showing a 
completely opposite pattern across experiments. The attention effect was enhanced for
the “shared” condition in the solo version, and reduced for the (actual) Shared condition
in the two-person task, relative to the “not shared” situation. As a reminder, the notation
used for the levels of the attention sharing factor was kept as in Experiment 1 (i.e., 
attention “shared” and “notshared”) to facilitate comparisons, but participants in 
Experiment 2 actually performed in isolation (not in dyads). Given that the social 
context of the task (i.e., the presence of the task partner and his/her task) was the only 
difference across experiments, Experiment 1 and 2 together provide strong evidence 
suggesting that the attention performance reduction in dyads sharing the locus of 
attention previously obtained (Experiment 1) was indeed interpersonally driven.
Overall responses were faster when performing in dyads (Experiment 1: M = 
425 ms, 95% CI [409.57, 439.78])) than when performing alone (Experiment 2: M = 
449 ms , 95% CI [431.62, 466.25]). This is an expected result considering the presence
of a second participant in Experiment 1. It has been shown that the mere presence of 
other individuals influences one’s performance, facilitating easy tasks, like the one here
performed (i.e., social facilitation; Zajonc, 1965). Facilitation in this case was reflected 
as faster responses for the dyadic version of the task, compared to the solo version. 
The current finding could also be examined/elucidated from the perspective of the 
Shared attention theory (Shteynberg, 2015). According to this theory, an enhanced 
general performance is achieved when co-attending to the same tasks with other 
individuals. Following this, improved performance would be expected when sharing 
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attention to the task with the task partner, which was indeed the case here given the 
shorter reaction times observed in the two-persons setting, compared to the responses 
in isolation. However, as argued when discussing the results of Experiment 1, the 
shared attention theory cannot account for the dual attention effect obtained in the 
dyadic setting.
In opposition to the pattern obtained in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 the 
attention effect was present for the attention “shared” condition, and disappeared for 
the “notshared” case.  One key difference  between the dual attention paradigm (in this 
case the, the solo-version of the task) and the classic sustained attention paradigm is 
that the dual attention task compensates for the intrinsic imbalance in the distribution of
target shapes (see Figure 3) by modifying the distribution of non-target stimuli. 75% of 
the non-target shapes appeared at the unattended side, while 25% were displayed at 
the attended location (i.e., 1:3 ratio, valid non-targets:invalid non-targets). In this way,  
the probability of having a stimulus appearing at either side of the screen (valid or 
invalid) was matched across experimental block (this also meant that the overall 
stimulus distribution across attention sharing conditions was balanced, avoiding 
confounding the results in the dyadic task -but this is less important for the current 
argument). This however,  is not part of the typical sustained attention paradigm (in 
which, the attended side would contain more stimuli overall), and would greatly reduce 
the attention bias towards the attended side. The go/no-go task requires participants to 
actively process each stimulus and decide whether they should respond. If visual  
processing is needed for both the attended and unattended locations (with the same 
probability), attention will not be effectively allocated in benefit of the attended location. 
This would suggest a null attention effect and no difference across attention sharing 
conditions, which was not the pattern here obtained. 
Nonetheless, regardless of this modification, Experiment 2 inherited the 
unbalanced distribution of target stimuli employed in Experiment 1. If a participant in 
Experiment 2 was assigned a target shape (e.g., the large circles),  this meant that in 
the “shared” condition the large circles had a 75% probability of appearing at the 
attended location, and 25% probability of appearing at the unattended one. Since the 
remaining large shapes (i.e., the large squares) were the targets for the second 
participant in Experiment 1 (the second participant  was absent in the current 
experiment), they shared these probabilities (i.e., the large squares also had a 75% 
probability of being displayed at the valid side, and 25% for the invalid one). This 
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unbalanced distribution of large stimuli could explain the obtained results if the 
possibility of a goal-directed/contingent bias in the task (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 
1992) is considered. Participants were instructed to respond to the “large” stimuli with 
their assigned shape (e.g., respond to the large circles). This means that “large” was 
one of the relevant target features. Therefore, participants were constantly looking for 
large shapes when completing the task. Given the unbalanced probability of shapes 
with this target feature (i.e., large) across conditions, performance could be boosted (or
not) by following/attending to these probabilities (i.e., the bias present in the 
distributions of large stimuli). A 75% probability of large shapes at the attended side 
helped performance and biased attention towards this side, generating a typical 
attention effect. Instead, a 50% probability did not help in completing the task, and did 
not induce a bias in attention, resulting in a null attention effect. This outcome mirrors 
the pattern obtained in the current Experiment. 
Interestingly, the same pattern would be observed if participants performing in 
isolation were in charge of the full dual attention task (i.e., if they had to respond to 
both large circles and large squares), or if participants co-represented the full task set 
in the two-person version (as in Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). In both cases, the task 
would become a classic single person visuospatial sustained attention paradigm, with a
75% probability of valid trials for the “shared” contidion, and 50% probability of valid 
trials for the “notshared” one. The outcome would be, once more, a typical attention 
effect for the “shared” condition, and a null effect for the “notshared” scenario. The fact 
that this pattern was already present in Experiment 2 (solo version), but not in 
Experiment 1 (two-person version), discards a full co-representation account as the 
underlying cause behind the dual attention effect observed in the dyadic setting. That 
is, the dual attention effect in Experiment 1 cannot be explained by individuals mentally
representing the full task set, including both their own task and the one assigned to the 
task partner. Still, given that the only difference between Experiments 1 and 2 was the 
presence of the task partner and his/her task, the opposite patterns across experiments
suggest that the dual attention effect was induced by this difference. In other words, the
effect was interpersonally driven by the task partner. Therefore, the potential 
explanations discussed around the social-cognitive origin of the dual attention effect (in
Experiment 1) still hold after considering the outcome of Experiment 2. Experiment 2 
however, adds to the understanding of the dual attention effect by ruling out the 
unbalanced distribution of target stimuli in the task as the reason behind this effect. 
Finally, the findings here presented showed the “baseline” performance in the dual 
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attention task when no social factor is involved (i.e., solely driven by the statistical 
properties of the stimuli), suggesting that the social effect is thus (if taken together with 
Exp1’s results), inhibitory in nature.
2.3. Experiment 3
Collectively, the previous findings reported in this Chapter suggest the 
contribution of two different processes in the dual attention task. A stimulus driven 
contribution (Exp 2), related to the statistical properties inherent to the behavioural task
(i.e., the unbalanced distribution of target shapes across attention sharing conditions), 
and a social component (Exps 1), related to the interpersonal influence observed when 
performing the task in dyads, measured as a reduction in attention performance (i.e., a 
smaller attention effect) when sharing the attended locations with the task partner (i.e., 
the dual attention effect). Given that attention has evolved, in response to the limited 
processing capacity of the human brain, as a way to select relevant information from an
information-rich environment (Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001), it becomes crucial 
to understand whether the contribution of the above-mentioned social process is 
affected by loading attentional resources (e.g., in this case, increasing the perceptual 
load) to one’s own task (the non-social  effect). This idea will be addressed in the 
current experiment, and, as will be argued in the following paragraphs, would provide 
important insights on whether there is a stand-alone social mechanism underlying dual 
attention.
It has been proposed that early attention selection is modulated by perceptual 
load (i.e., by the attentional resources demanded by a task at perceptual-level 
processing stages), and that in consequence, successfully ignoring distractors (i.e., 
irrelevant information) depends on the processing demands of the task at hand (Load 
theory; Lavie, 1995, 2005, 2010; Lavie & Tsal, 1994; see also Murphy, Groeger, & 
Greene, 2016). Evidence for this came originally from distractor interference 
paradigms, like the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). In this kind of tasks, in order
to respond to the target stimuli (e.g., responding to the identity of a letter out of two 
possibilities), irrelevant stimuli need to be inhibited (e.g., additional letters surrounding 
the target), and the degree of processing linked to the task-irrelevant distractor(s) is 
measured by the interference it/they provoke when responding to the task-relevant 
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information. This interference is measured behaviourally in terms of RTs and 
accuracies changes depending on the congruency of the information provided by the 
interfering stimuli (e.g., Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Lavie & de Fockert, 2003). In support 
for the load theory, it has been shown that increasing the perceptual load (e.g., by 
increasing the number of items surrounding the target) reduces the processing of the 
irrelevant items and their interference in the task (e.g., Lavie & de Fockert, 2003; see 
also Benoni, 2018; Murphy et al., 2016 ). Similarly, in the context of visuospatial 
attention, it has been shown that increasing the perceptual load to foveal targets in 
spatial cueing paradigms derives in a decreased early-sensory-processing neural 
response to parafoveally presented task-irrelevant stimuli (i.e., as reflected by the P1 
event-related component), respect to a low-perceptual-load condition (Handy et al., 
2001). In line with the load theory, this outcome has been taken to suggest that an 
increased load for target stimuli reduces the residual attentional capacity available to 
process task-irrelevant information, and that the effect of load on attentional selection 
occurs at early visual/sensory processing stages in the brain (Handy & Mangun, 2000; 
Handy et al., 2001). The lack of modulation by perceptual load instead (i.e., if the 
interference, process or effect under investigation remains unaffected under an 
increased perceptual load), has been taken to suggests that the interfering information 
employs resources from a separate process/capacity (Benoni, 2018; Murphy et al., 
2016). 
An important question would then be whether the social modulation of attention,
measured by the dual attention effect, is also sensitive to perceptual load. This 
question was examined in the current experiment. Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that 
the dual attention effect (i.e., the reduced attention effect when the dyad shared the 
attended spatial locations in the dual attention task, compared to the condition in which 
their locus of attention differed) is driven by interference in relation to the task partner 
and his/her task (even if the specific cause of this interference is not yet well 
understood). According to the load theory (Lavie, 2005, 2010; see also Benoni, 2018; 
Murphy et al., 2016) the perceptual load associated to the performed task (here the 
sustained attention task with a size discrimination) determines to which extent 
distracting information is processed (here social information related to the task partner 
and her task). An increased perceptual load should exhaust attentional resources, 
reducing or hindering the interference from the distractor. Applied to the current 
context, the load theory would predict that the increased task/perceptual load employed
in the current manipulation would reduce the interpersonal influence measured in the 
82
dual attention task (i.e., should reduce the size of the dual attention effect). This 
outcome would also suggest that the socially-driven inhibition effect is happening at the
same time with the sensory-level attention (or the dual attention effect is taking place 
via the sensory attention itself) (Handy & Mangun, 2000; Handy, Soltani, & Mangun, 
2001). If instead, the dual attention effect persists (i.e., remains unaffected) under high 
perceptual load, this would suggest the existence of separate processes associated 
with the results from Experiment 2 (i.e., non-social, stimulus driven), and the results of 
Experiment 1 (i.e., the social effect). In this line, it could be the case that, in the context 
of dual attention, the distractor (i.e., the other person and his/her task) receives 
resources from a different process (e.g., top-down control), or from a special/separate 
attentional capacity. This idea seems plausible considering that a special module 
dedicated to the processing of social information separate from perceptual input has 
been previously suggested (Emery, 2000; Ristic et al., 2005; Wei, Rushby, & De Blasio,
2019). Moreover, considering that higher level processes are less likely to be affected 
by an increased perceptual load (Handy & Mangun, 2000), this result (i.e., the 
persistence of the dual attention effect under an increased perceptual load) could be 
also taken to suggest that the dual attention effect takes place at a higher level 
information processing stage in the brain.
Visual perceptual load is typically manipulated in one of three ways: by 
modifying the number of items simultaneously displayed during the task (aka. set-size 
manipulation), by varying the task to be performed, or by manipulating the similarity 
between target and non-target items (Murphy et al., 2016). The present experiment 
opted for the third method to avoid any potential low-level visual interaction among 
concurrently displayed stimuli (e.g., in set-size manipulations it has been argued that 
the effect of perceptual load could be also accounted for by competition between the 
distractor and the simultaneously presented stimuli, or dilution of the distractor by the 
presence of the additional items; Benoni, 2018). Hence, in the current experiment, 
perceptual load was heightened by increasing the similarity between target and non-
target shapes in the dual attention task, making the size discrimination task more 
difficult to perform (see Handy & Mangun, 2000, for a similar manipulation).
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 2.3.1 Method
 2.3.1.1 Participants
Forty-eight students (24 dyads) participated in Experiment 3 (34 females; 44 
right handed; Mage= 23.27, SDage= 5.12). They reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. All participants provided written informed consent to take part in the study, and 
were given either one (1) course credit or eight pounds (£8) for their participation. 
Participants in the same dyad reported not having a close relationship. 
 2.3.1.2 Design
The present experiment employed the same 2X2 factorial design than 
Experiment 1, where Attention (attended vs. unattended location) and Sharing 
(attention shared vs. notshared) were manipulated within-subjects, and the participant’s
reaction times (RTs) and accuracies (percentage of correct responses) to the target 
stimulus were the dependent variables. In the current experiment however, the 
perceptual load was increased respect to the original paradigm presented in 
Experiment 1, making the task harder to perform. To allow for comparisons across 
experiments, Experiment Type (Exp1:Easy vs. Exp3:Hard) was subsequently included 
as between-subjects factor.
 2.3.1.3 Materials and procedure
The experimental set-up, task, and trial sequence were as in Experiment 1. The
only difference was the increased similarity between the size of the target and non-
target shapes. The size of the large (target) stimuli was set to 4.57° x 4.57°, while the 
small (non-target) stimuli size was 3.97° x 3.97°. Therefore, non-targets in Experiment 
3 were about 75% of the size of the target shapes, while non-targets in Experiment 1 
were about 30% of the size of the targets.
As in Experiment 1, participants responded to several questionnaires. Before 
the computer-based trials, participants completed the IND-COL scale (Singelis, 
Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995). After completing the computer-based section of 
the experiment, they filled in the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), and the STAI 
(Spielberger, 2012).
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 2.3.2 Results
Three participants were excluded from statistical analysis due to accuracies 
below 50% per design cell. This new threshold was set to guarantee that participants 
had an appropriate number of trials per condition to be analysed given the increased 
difficulty of the task (respect to Exp1). The data from the remaining 45 participants (33 
females; 41 right handed; Mage= 23.47, SDage= 5.22) were analysed. The data were 
analysed as in Experiment 1, including the correlations between the questionnaires 
scores (I.e.., the scores from the Individualism-Collectivism subscales, the Autism-
spectrum Quotient, and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory) and the dual attention effect 
(i.e., MdualAttEffect = MAttEffect, unshared – MAttEffect, shared).
 2.3.2.1 Accuracies
Mean accuracies (MACC = 83.41%, 95%CI [80.71, 86.11]) were lower than in 
Experiment 1 (see the section “Comparing Experiments 1 and 3”), and were analysed 
as in the previous experiments. That is, mean accuracies (see Table 6), were submitted
to a 2x2 repeated-measures ANOVA with Attention (attended vs. unattended) and 
Sharing (shared vs. unshared) as within-subjects factors. The ANOVA revealed a 
significant interaction Attention x Sharing, F(1, 44) = 10.52, p = .002 (Mdiff_shared = 1.35 
%, 95% CI [-0.88, 3.58]; Mdiff_unshared = -3.2 %, 95% CI [-5.51, -0.89]; Mdiff = Munattended – 
Mattended). The same significant interaction was obtained using the within-within robust 
ANOVA on 20% trimmed means with the percentile bootstrap method,  ψ^  = 4.63 [1.57, 
7.65], p = .003. The main effects of Attention and Sharing were not significant.
Table 6. Mean accuracies (with SD) for Experiment 3. Mean accuracies are here 
presented as percentage of correct responses. 
Experimental Condition
Notshared Shared
Attended Unattended Attended Unattended
84.93(9.77) 81.72(12.42) 82.81(9.42) 84.17(11.17)
 2.3.2.2 RTs
The data for the go-trials from the remaining 45 participants  were kept for 
further analysis. Trials with correct responses were analysed (83.4%). Outliers were 
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removed using a threshold of 2.5 times the Median Absolute Deviation (MAD). This 
eliminated 5.0% of the remaining data.
Experiment 3 replicated the effects obtained in Experiment 1 (see Figure 7 and 
Table 7). The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of Attention (Mattended = 479 ms, 
95% CI [464.56, 494.36]; Munattended = 504 ms, 95%5 CI [488.02, 519.35]), F(1, 44) = 
89.20, p < .001, ηG2 =0.048, and a significant interaction Attention x Sharing, F(1, 44) = 
10.58, p = 0.002, ηG2 =0.005. As in Experiment 1, there was a reduction in the attention 
effect for the attention shared condition (M = 17 ms, 95% CI [9.85, 23.28]), F(1, 44) = 
24.70 , p < .001, ηG2 =0.027, compared to the unshared condition (M = 32 ms, 95% CI 
[24.58, 39.2]), F(1, 44) = 77.28, p < .001, ηG2 =0.070. The main effect of  Sharing  was 
not significant, F(1, 44) = 3.63, p > .063.
The within-within robust ANOVA with bootstraping on 20% trimmed means 
showed a significant main effect of attention, ψ^  = -45 [-57.26, -34.92], p = 0, a not 
significant main effect of Sharing,  ψ^  = 13 [-1.71, 30.61], p = .079, and a significant 
interaction Attention x Sharing,  ψ^  = -17 [-24.95, -7.75], p < .001.
Moreover, for the Bayes Factors Analysis the attention effect was calculated 
and compared across Sharing conditions, yielding a BF10 = 13.76. This represents 
“strong” evidence for the model with the Sharing effect (or the  Attention x Sharing 
interaction, before computing the attention effect), relative to the model without it, given
the data.
Post-hoc simple main effects analysis examined the effect of Sharing separately
for the each of the Attention conditions. RTs to attended locations were not statistically 
different across sharing conditions, F(1, 44) = 0.20, p =  .654 (ANOVA); ψ^  = -3.41 [-
12.75, 7.39], p = .536 (percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means). In contrast, RTs 
to unattended locations were significantly faster when dyads shared the locus of 
attention in the task, than when the attentional locus was notshared, F(1, 44) = 8.56 , p 
= .005, ηG
2 = 0.03; ψ^  = 15.13 [5.29, 26.18], p = .001.
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 2.3.2.3 Correlation Analysis
None of the correlations between the questionnaires scores and the dual 
attention effect was significant (see Table 8). 
Table 7. Mean RTs in ms (with SD) for Experiment 3.
Experimental Condition
Notshared Shared
Attended Unattended Attended Unattended
481(57) 513(60) 478(48) 495(51)
Table 8. Correlations in Experiment 3. The scores from the Individualism-Collectivism 
(IND-COL) subscales, the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ), and the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI), were correlated to the dual attention effect (MdualAttEffect = MAttEffect, 
unshared – MAttEffect, shared). Spearman’s correlations and Bayes Factors are reported in all 
cases.
Individualism-Collectivism (IND-COL) (N=44) -
Combined Collectivism (HC+VC) rs =  0.153, p = .320, BF10 = 0.503
Horizontal Individualism (HI) rs =  0.096, p = .536, BF10 = 0.441
Vertical Individualism (VI) rs =  0.106, p = .494, BF10 = 0.444
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (N=34) rs = -0.085, p = .631, BF10 = 0.440
State Anxiety (Y1) rs = -0.106, p = .533, BF10 = 0.463
Trait Anxiety (Y2) rs = -0.105, p = .531, BF10 = 0.479
Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ) (N=42) rs =  0.030, p = .849, BF10 = 0.345
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Figure 7. Results Experiment 3. A) Mean RTs as a function of attention (attended, 
unattended), and sharing (shared, not shared) conditions. The group means for each 
condition are displayed with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) B) Mean attention effect 
across sharing (shared, not shared) conditions. The attention effect is calculated as the
difference between the mean RTs for the unattended condition and the mean RTs for 
the attended condition (i.e., MAttEffect = Munattended – Mattended). Means are displayed with 
95% CIs. The dual attention effect introduced in Experiment 1 (i.e., the reduction in the 
attention effect when the dyad shared the attended spatial locations) was replicated in 
Experiment 3. C) Stripchart showing the attention effect for each participant across 
sharing conditions. Lines were drawn to join paired observations. Out of the 45 
participants analysed, 33 (~ 73.3% of the group) showed an effect in the same direction
than the group mean (i.e. a reduction of the attention effect for the attention shared 
condition).
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 2.3.3 Comparing Experiments 1 and 3
 2.3.3.1 Accuracies
To compare Experiment 1 and Experiment 3, mean accuracies were submitted 
to a 3-way Mixed ANOVA, adding Experiment Type (Exp1:Easy vs. Exp3:Hard) as 
between-subject factor. This yielded a significant main effect of Experiment Type, F(1, 
83) = 77.00, p < .001, ηG2 =0.399, given that participants performed better in Experiment
1 (M = 97.14 %, 95%CI [95.74, 98.54]) than in Experiment 3 (M = 83.41 %, 95%CI 
[80.71, 86.11]). The robust test (‘bwwmcppb’ function; Wilcox, 2012) supported this 
result, ψ^  = 56.2 [43.3, 68.2], p = 0. In addition, the classic 3-way ANOVA also yielded a 
significant interaction Attention x Sharing, F(1, 83) = 13.25, p < .001, ηG2 =0.002, but this
was not the case for the robust test,  ψ^  = 8.78 [-0.34, 12.9], p = .060.  Regarding this 
disparity, it should be mentioned that robust methods are generally preferred (and their 
results trusted more) over classic statistical tests, especially when addressing 
accuracies data, known to violate the normality assumption associated to the latter 
(Field & Wilcox, 2017).  
 2.3.3.2 RTs
As for the accuracies data, mean RTs in Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 (see 
Figure 8) were submitted to a 3-way Mixed ANOVA, adding Experiment Type 
(Exp1:Easy vs. Exp3:Hard) as between-subject factor. A significant main effect of 
Experiment Type, F(1, 83) = 39.78, p < .001, ηG2 =0.290, was obtained due to shorter 
RTs for Experiment 1 (M = 425 ms, 95% CI [409.57, 439.78]) than for Experiment 3(M 
= 492 ms, 95% CI [476.5, 506.63]). The typical main effect of Attention was significant 
(Mattended = 446 ms, 95% CI [433.98, 457.85]; Munattended = 470 ms, 95% CI [458, 
482.94]), F(1, 83) = 158.168, p < .001, ηG2 =0.057, as well as the interaction Attention x 
Sharing (MAttEffect, shared = 17 ms, 95% CI [10.8, 22.46]; MAttEffect, unshared = 32 ms, 95% CI 
[26.58, 39.39]), F(1, 83) = 19.22, p < .001, ηG2 =0.004. The interaction Type x Sharing 
was also significant (but see the results with the robust test), F(1, 83) = 4.33, p = .041,
ηG
2 =0.004. The 3-way interaction Type x Attention x Sharing was not significant 
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(MdualAttEffect, Exp1 = 12 ms, 95% CI [4.09, 20.75]; MdualAttEffect, Exp3 = 15.33, 95% CI [5.83, 
24.83]), F(1, 83) = 0.21, p > .65, nor any of the remaining effects.
The between-within-within percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means showed
a significant main effect of Experiment Type,  ψ^  = -284 [-355, -205], p = 0, a significant 
main effect of Attention,  ψ^  = -101 [-121, -83.2], p = 0, and a significant interaction 
Attention x Sharing,  ψ^  = -24 [-39.5, -9.33], p = .001. The interaction Type x Sharing 
was not significant (unlike the result yielded by the parametric test), ψ^  = -24 [-49.2, 
0.78], p = .057, nor the interaction Type x Attention x Sharing,  ψ^  = 2.5 [-12.6, 18.3], p =
.734. Indeed, for this interaction (Type x Sharing, after computing the attention effect), 
Bayes factors, BF10 = 0.243 suggested “moderate” support for the model without the 
interaction, which is 4.11 times more likely than the model with it, given the data.
 2.3.3.3 Correlation Analysis
Given their “statistical equivalence”, the data from Experiments 1 and 3 were 
combined into a single dataset, and correlations between the questionnaires scores 
(I.e., the scores from the IND-COL subscales, the AQ, and the STAI) and the dual 
attention effect (i.e., MdualAttEffect = MAttEffect, unshared – MAttEffect, shared) were run on the 
pooled data. However, none of the performed correlations was significant (see Table 
9). Importantly, the correlation between AQ and the dual attention effect obtained in 
Experiment 1 was not replicated in the current Experiment, nor when combining the 
data from Experiments 1 and 3, and is therefore, no further discussed. 
 2.3.4 Discussion
A clear effect of load on task performance was obtained, both in terms of 
accuracy and RTs. Participants in the current experiment (Exp 3) showed a reduced 
accuracy, and slower responses respect to the low-load/easy version of the task 
(Exp1). Large effect sizes were obtained in both cases. More importantly, the dual 
attention effect (Exp1) was replicated here, adding important confidence regarding the 
robustness and consistency of this effect, and this interpersonal influence measured in 
the dual attention task was not modulated by an evidently more difficult size 
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discrimination between target and non-target stimuli in the task. In other words, the 
dual attention effect remained unaffected under an increased perceptual load. 
      
Figure 8. Experiment 1 (Easy) vs. Experiment 3 (Hard). A) Mean attention effect 
across sharing conditions (shared, not shared) and Experiment Type (Exp1: Easy, 
Exp3: Hard). The attention effect is calculated as the difference between the mean RTs 
for the unattended condition and the mean RTs for the attended condition (i.e., MAttEffect 
= Munattended – Mattended). Group means are displayed with 95% confidence intervals 
(Cis). B) Mean dual attention effect as a function of Experiment Type (Exp1: Easy, 
Exp3: Hard). The dual attention effect is calculated as the difference between the mean
attention effect for the notshared condition and the mean attention effect for the 
notshared condition (i.e., MdualAttEffect = MAttEffect, unshared – MAttEffect, shared). Group means 
are displayed with 95% confidence intervals (CIs). Increasing the task load in 
Experiments 3 did not modulate the attention effect. This persistence of the effect 
under high load, suggest it is automatic, at least in one dimension: efficiency.
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Table 9. Correlations in Experiment 1&3 (Combined). The scores from the 
Individualism-Collectivism (IND-COL) subscales, the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ), 
and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), were correlated to the dual attention effect
(MdualAttEffect = MAttEffect, unshared – MAttEffect, shared). Spearman’s correlations and Bayes 
Factors are reported in all cases.
Individualism-Collectivism (IND-COL) (N=84) -
Combined Collectivism (HC+VC) rs =  0.132, p = .230, BF10 = 0.498
Horizontal Individualism (HI) rs =  0.107, p = .332, BF10 = 0.535
Vertical Individualism (VI) rs =  0.059, p = .592, BF10 = 0.308
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (N=73) rs = -0.022, p = .852, BF10 = 0.271
State Anxiety (Y1) rs = -0.056, p = .630, BF10 = 0.299
Trait Anxiety (Y2) rs =  0.002, p = .985, BF10 = 0.266
Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ) (N=81) rs =  0.154, p = .169, BF10 = 0.469
The fact that the dual attention effect persisted under an increased perceptual, 
suggests that the related behavioural attention performance reduction measured in 
dual attention, may not be taking place via a sensory-level attentional process, but that 
instead, the interfering inhibitory process (likely social, and related to the task partner) 
employs resources from a separate capacity, or is processed at a different stage 
(Handy & Mangun, 2000; Handy, Soltani, & Mangun, 2001). As introduced above, this 
may be plausible considering that a special module dedicated to the processing of 
social information separate from perceptual input has been previously suggested 
(Emery, 2000; Ristic et al., 2005; Wei, Rushby, & De Blasio, 2019). However, additional
research is needed to investigate if separate processing module/capacity is indeed 
behind the dual attention effect. In addition, considering that higher level processes are
less likely to be affected by an increased perceptual load (Handy & Mangun, 2000), the
previous result could also suggest that the dual attention effect takes place at a higher 
level information processing stage in the brain. These conclusions however, cannot be 
confirmed based exclusively on the aforementioned behavioural data. Additional 
research is needed to investigate if separate processing modules are indeed behind 
the dual attention effect. Electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings could be employed
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for this purpose (see Lopes da Silva, 2013, for a review), and were indeed investigated 
in Chapter 4.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the presence of the dual attention effect in 
the high load condition is actually the result of an ineffective perceptual load 
manipulation. The load theory literature has not yet defined/agreed a clear way to 
operationalise perceptual load (Benoni, 2018; Murphy et al., 2016), making it hard to 
solve with full certainty the circularity implied in this case (i.e., whether the load 
manipulation was unsuccessful or whether separate processes contribute to dual 
attention) (Benoni, 2018; Murphy et al., 2016). However, a failed manipulation is 
unlikely in the current experiment given the large effect sizes obtained for both 
accuracies and reaction times (described above). Moreover, the perceptual load 
manipulation was mainly employed to engage more resources within the task. Thus, 
the accuracy itself (even if it was high) would not indicate that the manipulation failed 
(i.e., participants could still have completed the task with a lot more effort). In addition, 
it could be argued that the sustained attention paradigm has a ceiling/floor effect, 
making it impossible for RTs at attended locations to be faster, or those at unattended 
locations to be slowed down more. This would impede testing the modulation by task 
load. However, there is evidence suggesting that they both (i.e., RTs for attended and 
unattended locations) can be further changed, at least in the cued version of the task 
(e.g., Lee, Lee, & Boyle, 2009). Considering this evidence, it seems unlikely that ceiling
and/or floor effects could have accounted for the current results. Furthermore, following
the load theory, the impaired distractor processing elicited by the perceptual load 
manipulation would be expected to derive in a reduction in the dual attention effect. 
Thus, a smaller dual attention effect would have been here obtained (hypothesised 
above), respect to the original task presented in Experiment 1. Yet, the opposite pattern
was present. The dual attention effect was qualitatively (i.e., non statistically different) 
stronger for the high (Exp3) vs. low (Exp1) perceptual load version of the task. This 
pattern provides additional confidence towards the absence of a perceptual load effect 
in the current experiment.    
Individual differences have been shown to modulate the effects of load (Murphy 
et al., 2016). In the current experiment individual differences were not assessed. 
Therefore, it could be the case that the perceptual load manipulation did not affect 
every participant in exactly the same way. A potential way of fitting the task to each 
participant could be to use a stair-case-like procedure (Dixon & Mood, 1948; see also 
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Read, 2015), adapting the task load according to a specific individual performance 
threshold. After obtaining the individual load parameters (in this case the similarity 
between targets and non-targets) for the respective thresholds, the task load could be 
decided for the dyad accordingly (e.g., using the average load for the pair, using the 
lowest one, or using different load settings for the two participants in each pair; see 
also Handy & Mangun, 2000, who set the accuracy to be always 75% for each 
participant by changing the stimuli online). This would reduce the inter-subject 
variability in the perceptual load manipulation, and may provide more accurate insights 
about the role of perceptual load in the dual attention effect, if any.  
Considering the efficiency dimension of automaticity3 (Murphy et al., 2016), and 
in line with the load theory (Lavie, 2005, 2010), the obtained indifference of the dual 
attention effect to the presence of perceptual load could also suggests that, at least for 
this dimension (i.e., efficiency), the dual attention effect can be considered automatic. 
According to the automaticity framework, the presence of interference from distractors 
in the high-load scenario indicates that the interfering process does not require 
attentional resources to be deployed and is therefore efficient/automatic (Lavie, 2005, 
2010). In this line, the current findings may also add to the body of literature suggesting
automaticity as a core/pervasive feature of social-cognitive processes (Bargh et al., 
2012; Bargh & Williams, 2006). Stereotyping (Bargh & Williams, 2006), implicit theory 
of mind (Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 2012), imitative behaviours (Ramsey, Darda, 
3 Traditionally, psychology has followed a two-process theory of information processing 
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Emphasizing a distinction between processes said to be 
“automatic” (or occurring without attention), and those considered exactly the opposite, also 
known as “controlled” (i.e., requiring attention to be performed) (Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018; 
Moors, 2016; Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Following this view, if a 
process is said to be “automatic”, it is also considered efficient, unintentional, uncontrollable, 
and unconscious, all together. In a similar way, if a process is said to be “controlled”, it is also 
assumed to be inefficient, intentional, and conscious. In the two-process theory, these features 
are used as synonyms, without distinction, keeping a two-sided view of automaticity in relation 
to information processing. This binary view however, has been extended, and automaticity 
nowadays is considered as (or encouraged to be studied as) a multi-component/multi-
dimensional construct (Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018; Moors & De Houwer, 2006), or as an umbrella 
term comprising at least the above-mentioned features. Given that these features do not 
actually align, they should ideally be studied independently (Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018). In this 
line, a process or behaviour could be considered automatic in terms of intentionality if it is not 
dependent on a goal or previous instruction (aka., unintentional). It can be considered automatic
in terms of consciousness if it occurs subliminally, without conscious awareness (aka., 
unconscious). It can be considered automatic in terms of controllability if it can not be stopped 
or top-down modulated after being triggered (aka., uncontrollable). Or it could be considered 
automatic in terms of efficiency if it persist under perceptual/cognitive load (aka., efficient)
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& Downing, 2019), and gaze-induced joint attention (Frischen et al., 2007), are 
processes said to be deployed in an automatic manner. The former two (i.e., 
stereotyping and implicit theory of mind) have been shown to occur unintentionally 
(although inefficiently) (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Schneider et al., 2012), while the later 
two (i.e., imitative behaviours and gaze-triggered attention shifts) are both unintentional
and efficient behaviours (Frischen et al., 2007; Ramsey et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2011). It 
is important to note that both gaze-induced joint attention and the dual attention effect 
have been shown to be resistant to load. Perhaps these evidence together may 
indicate that efficiency is a characteristic of the information processing involved in co-
attending to the world with other individuals. Investigating the remaining dimensions of 
automaticity in relation to the dual attention effect (i.e., whether the dual attention effect
is occurs also in an unintentional, uncontrollable, and unconscious manner)  could be 
an interesting avenue for future experiments. 
2.4. Chapter summary
Chapter 2 investigated whether paying attention towards the same spatial 
location with another person modulates one’s attention performance. To address this 
question, Experiment 1 proposed the dual attention paradigm. In this paradigm, two 
participants (i.e., a dyad sat side by side next to each other in front of a computer) 
performed independent visuospatial sustained attention tasks while sharing or not their 
attentional locus (i.e., the attended spatial locations). Contrary to the expectation, 
under this settings, attention performance (measured by the difference in RTs between 
attended vs. unattended conditions, aka., the attention effect) was reduced when the 
dyad deployed attention towards the same spatial locations, than when their locus of 
attention differed (aka. dual attention effect). This pattern was reversed when single 
participants performed the task in isolation (Experiment 2), suggesting that the 
reduction in the attention benefit was socially driven between individuals 
(interpersonally). This reversed pattern also suggested the existence of a stimulus 
driven (non-social) component in dual attention, related to the unbalanced distribution 
of target shapes across attention sharing conditions in the dual attention task. 
Experiment 3 provided two additional contributions. First, a replication of the dual 
attention effect, that increases the confidence on the robustness of the effect. Second, 
it showed that the dual attention effect remains unaffected under an increased 
perceptual load, suggesting that the related behavioural attention performance 
reduction may not be taking place via a sensory-level attentional process, but that 
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instead, the interfering inhibitory process (likely social, and related to the task partner) 
may employ resources from a separate capacity, or is processed at a different stage 
(Handy & Mangun, 2000; Handy, Soltani, & Mangun, 2001). This idea however, needs 
to be followed up in future experiments (Chapter 4 addresses it by means of  
Electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings). Potential accounts for the dual attention 
effect were proposed, based on co-representing aspects of the partner’s task (but a full
co-representation account was discarded), or related to additional higher-order 
processing resources devoted to mentalising/monitoring individuals sharing one’s 
visuospatial attentional locus.
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 3 
DUAL ATTENTION EFFECT: 
WITH WHOM? INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF GROUP
MEMBERSHIP AND REMOTE PRESENCE 
The previous experiments investigated whether one’s attention performance is 
modulated by paying attention towards the same spatial locations with another 
individual. The evidence there presented suggested a reduction in attention 
performance when a dyad shared their locus of attention in a dual attention task. This 
effect was termed dual attention effect. It is unclear though, under which circumstances
would this interpersonal influence in attention performance occur. When exactly would 
a “co-attending” task partner affect one’s attention performance? Would this effect differ
depending on the social or physical closeness to the task partner? In a series of two 
experiments, the present chapter addressed the role of the social/physical closeness 
(in relation to the task partner) in dual attention. Specifically, Experiment 4 investigated 
the influence of the group membership attributed to the co-attending individual (in-
group vs. out-group) (i.e., social closeness), while Experiment 5 examined the dual 
attention effect when the individuals in the dyad performed the dual attention task from 
remote locations (i.e., separate rooms), instead of sitting side by side physically next to 
each other (i.e., physical closeness).
3.1. Experiment 4 
Recognizing strangers as belonging to one’s social group may be a way to 
create a connection with them (Plötner, Over, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2015; 
Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, & Herrmann, 2012). Indeed, group membership has 
been shown to modulate the way we perceive others . A favouritism towards in-group 
members has been reported in literature  (e.g., Brewer, 2007), with out-group members
being, for instance, evaluated more negatively (Doise et al., 1972) or even 
dehumanized (Leyens et al., 2001) when compared to the in-group counterparts. 
Interestingly, this in-group favouritism has been shown even when groups are created 
based on minimal arbitrary criteria (minimal group paradigm; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & 
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Flament, 1971), like the participants’ subjective colour preference (e.g., Shteynberg, 
2009, 2010), their ability to estimate the number of dots presented on a screen (e.g., 
Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006) or by simply making them wear coloured t-
shirts (e.g., MacDonald, Schug, Chase, & Barth, 2013). Importantly, manipulating these
minimal arbitrary cues was not only sufficient to elicit intergroup discrimination, but 
achieved this while excluding any influence from stereotypes, status, communication, 
or any history between the individuals involved (Dunham, 2018).
Categorising a task partner as belonging to one’s group (or to a different one) 
has been shown to play an important role in joint performance. For instance, 
Shteynberg (2014, 2015) showed that sharing attention towards the same objects or 
tasks could enhance general performance, only if people believed they were 
simultaneously co-attending with similar others (i.e., in-group members). Similarly, the 
joint Simon Effect (JSE), a marker of task co-representation in dyads (Knoblich & 
Sebanz, 2006), was reduced, or even absent, when participants were performing with 
out-group individuals (e.g., McClung, Jentzsch, & Reicher, 2013; Müller et al., 2011) or 
when involved in a negative relationship with the co-actor (Hommel, Colzato, & van den
Wildenberg, 2009). On the other hand, the interpersonal memory guidance of attention 
effect (i.e., the guidance of the spatial allocation of visual attention by the knowledge 
about the contents in a co-actor’s working memory), was found to be reduced when 
performing with an in-group task partner (He, Lever, & Humphreys, 2011). Taken 
together these findings suggest that the social closeness to one’s task partner (at least 
in terms of group membership) clearly affects the interpersonal influence occurring in 
joint performance. In this line, the present experiment examined whether social 
closeness, more specifically, the group membership status attributed to the task 
partner, also plays a modulating role in the interpersonal influence in attention 
performance measured by the dual attention effect. To avoid any influence from the 
history among individuals in the same dyad, stereotypes, status/hierarchies, or 
communication, a minimal group manipulation was implemented for this purpose.
The shared attention literature (see Shteynberg, 2015 for a review) has 
consistently employed a minimal group manipulation based on subjective colour 
preference (e.g., Shteynberg, 2010; Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011; Shteynberg, Hirsh, 
Galinsky, & Knight, 2014; Shteynberg et al., 2014). In these studies, participants 
typically arrived in groups of three at the laboratory and performed relevant tasks on 
computers located in separate rooms. As part of the procedure, at the beginning of the 
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experiment, they were instructed to pick one coloured avatar out of five possible 
choices displayed on the computer screen. In the following displays, together with the 
subsequent task’s instructions, they saw either that the remaining participants chose 
the same coloured avatar they picked (in-group condition), or that they all chose 
different colours (out-group condition). This choice, however, was actually computer 
handled. Subsequently, they completed the remaining parts of the experiment that led 
to the main proposal of the Shared attention theory: Sharing attention with other 
individuals induces a “we-mode” that elicits a more elaborate processing of the co-
attended objects or tasks. This “we-mode” state however, only holded when co-
attending with individuals who, in these experiments, “picked” (or were believed to have
picked) the same coloured avatar when commencing the experiment (i.e., similar 
others, or in-group members).
In the case of the joint action literature, to my knowledge, only two studies have 
addressed the role of group membership in joint performance by means of a minimal 
group manipulation. These were performed in the context of the joint Simon Effect (Iani,
Anelli, Nicoletti, Arcuri, & Rubichi, 2011; McClung et al., 2013). Iani et al. (2011) 
employed a minimal group manipulation based on the results “derived from” a cognitive
style test (actually computer handled). Participants were categorised as belonging to 
the “same” or a “different” cognitive style group, and then completed the typical joint 
Simon task (Iani et al., 2011). This manipulation however, did not yield an effect of 
group membership on joint performance (although an additional experiment showed an
effect when manipulating competition). McClung et al. (2013) considered the 
weaknesses of Iani et al.’s (2011) study and followed up proposing a more 
robust/stronger minimal group manipulation. The categorisation induced by this 
manipulation successfully modulated task co-representation in the joint Simon Effect. 
The key improvements were the use of a cover story for the study (i.e., investigating 
the relationship between cognitive style and reaction times) and the use of badges that 
were given to the participants to be wore during the experiment. These badges 
reminded them about their group membership along the task.
The present experiment used a minimal group manipulation based on 
participants’ subjective colour preference. Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants 
in a dyad were presented with two coloured bibs, one red and one blue (see Figure 9). 
They were asked to pick their favourite coloured bib and to wear it during the 
experiment. Participants sharing the subjective colour preference were expected to 
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have a greater sense of connection with their experiment partner (i.e. same-group 
condition), while those choosing different bibs were expected to treat their partner as 
an out-group member (i.e. different-group condition). This manipulation was performed 
between-subjects. It is important to highlight that the manipulation here devised shares 
the key improvements proposed in McClung et al. (2013). Here, participants believed 
the study actually aimed at examining the influence of colour preference on attention 
performance (cover story), and they were given bibs to wear during the experiment 
(similar to the badges proposed by McClung et al. (2013). Therefore, these 
manipulations should elicit an intergroup categorisation effect of similar strength. 
Predicting the influence of this manipulation on the interpersonal influence measured 
by the dual attention task however, is not straightforward. 
 
Figure 9. Dual attention task with a minimal group manipulation. A) Coloured bibs 
used for the minimal group manipulation. B) Stimuli employed. The task and stimuli in 
the current experiment are the same as in Experiment 1 (P1: Participant 1; P2: 
Participant 2). C) Participants in a dyad were asked to pick their favourite coloured bib 
and to wear it during the experiment. The subjective colour preference was considered 
as the minimal cue inducing an in-group (same colour preference) vs. out-group 
(different colour preference) membership status. Once the minimal group manipulation 
was completed, participants carried out the dual attention task described in Experiment
1. In the depicted example trial, both participants sustain attention towards the left side 
of the screen (attention shared condition), as indicated by the arrows.
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As presented above, the Shared Attention theory (Shteynberg, 2015) posits that
a more elaborate processing of co-attended objects/tasks holds only when these are 
co-attended with an in-group member. In addition, task co-representation, as measured
by the joint Simon Effect (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003) 
is reduced or absent when the co-actor is categorised as out-group (e.g., Aquino et al., 
2015; McClung et al., 2013; Müller et al., 2011). The later result has been taken to 
suggest that performing with an out-group member could be equivalent to be 
performing in isolation (even if physically next to the task partner) (McClung et al., 
2013). Taken together these previous findings could led to hypothesising that the dual 
attention effect would be enhanced (i.e., a stronger interaction Attention x Sharing) 
when completing the dual attention task with an in-group member (compared to the 
out-group scenario). This could be explained, for instance, by the greater competitive 
feeling  experienced with out-group members (e.g., Kramer & Brewer, 1984; but note 
that He et al., 2014 did not show an effect of competition), which would lead to an 
increased focus in one’s own task (e.g., de Bruijn, Miedl, & Bekkering, 2008), making 
participants use any relevant co-actor’s task parameter only when considered as 
belonging to the same group. However, an alternative prediction is also plausible. The 
interpersonal memory guidance of attention is reduced among in-group dyads (He et 
al., 2011). Following this result, it could be possible to consider that also in dual 
attention settings, the interpersonal influence would be reduced among in-group 
members (i.e., a smaller interaction Attention x Sharing for the in-group condition). This
could be explained for instance, by the higher levels of trust are experienced with in-
group members (e.g., Brewer & Yuki, 2007). With higher levels of confidence/trust on 
the co-actor’s performance, one would spend less cognitive resources tracking any 
relevant part of the partner’s task/performance. 
In the present study, interpersonal social influences (i.e., group membership 
effects) in attention performance (i.e., in dual attention) are investigated. This makes 
the current experiment closer to He et al. (2011) than to the joint performance research 
previously described (i.e., Aquino et al., 2015; McClung et al., 2013; Müller et al., 
2011). Moreover, the fact that the dual attention effect was already present when 
participants performed the dual attention task with strangers (e.g., Experiments 1 and 
3, described in Chapter 2) may be taken to suggest that dual attention and shared 
attention differ at least in the way they are modulated by social context (remember that 
the shared attention effect only holds when performing with in-group individuals; 
Shteynberg 2015, 2018). Considering these ideas, the current experiment was 
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expected to follow He et al.’s  (2011) results. That is, a reduced dual attention effect 
was predicted when performing with members of one’s own group (i.e., a smaller 
interaction Attention x Sharing for the in-group condition).   
 3.1.1 Method
 3.1.1.1 Participants
Ninety students (45 dyads) participated in this study (Experiment 4). All of them 
had normal (or corrected-to-normal) vision and normal colour vision. All participants 
provided written informed consent to take part in the study, and were given either one 
(1) course credit or eight pounds (£8) for their participation. Importantly, considering 
previous evidence suggesting that the interpersonal influence could be modulated by 
the nature of the relationship between individuals (e.g., He, Lever, & Humphreys, 
2011), I decided to exclude those dyads reporting having a close relationship (i.e., 
friends and close friends). Eighteen participants (9 dyads) were not further considered 
for this reason. Therefore, the data from the remaining 72 participants4 is presented 
below (63 females; 56 right handed; Mage= 20.34, SDage= 2.96). From these, 44 
participants picked the same coloured bib (in-group condition), and 28 chose different 
colours (out-group condition).
 3.1.1.2 Design
The present study employed a 2x2x2 mixed-factor design, where Group 
membership (in-group vs. out-group) was manipulated between-subjects, and Attention
(attended vs. unattended) and Sharing (attention shared vs. notshared) were 
manipulated within-subjects. The dependent variables were the participant’s reaction 
times and accuracies (percentage of correct responses) to the target stimulus. The 
interpersonal influence in the dual attention task is reflected by a smaller attention 
effect (i.e., the RTs difference between valid and invalid trials) when a dyad shares the 
attended spatial locations in the task, compared with the situation in which their locus 
of attention differs (aka., dual attention effect). This effect is represented by a two-way 
interaction between the Attention and Sharing conditions. In the present study, this dual
attention effect (i.e., in the interaction Attention x Sharing) was expected to differ 
4 The conclusions here presented do not change if the full sample (90 participants) is 
considered/analysed.
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depending on whether the task partner is categorised as an in-group or out-group 
member. Therefore, after adding group membership as a factor, the contrast of interest 
here was the (3-way) interaction Attention x Sharing x Group (in-group vs. out-group). 
 3.1.1.3 Materials and procedure
Upon arriving to the laboratory, the minimal group manipulation was performed. 
Participants in a dyad were presented with two coloured bibs, one red and one blue 
(see Figure 9). They were asked to pick their favourite coloured bib and to wear it 
during the experiment. Participants sharing the subjective colour preference were 
expected to have a greater sense of connection with their experiment partner (i.e. 
same-group condition), while those choosing different bibs were expected to treat their 
partner as an out-group member (i.e. different-group condition). This manipulation was 
performed between-subjects. The original purpose of the study was masked, making 
participants believe that examining subjective colour preference and its influence on 
attention was the main goal of the experiment. In fact, in line with this objective, the 
study was advertised with the title “Colour preference and attention performance in 
dyads”. 
Once the minimal group manipulation was performed and the participants were 
wearing their respective favourite bib, the computer-based trials were carried out. The 
experimental set-up, task, and trial sequence were as in Experiment 1 (see Figure 9). 
As in Experiment 1, in the instruction phase, participants were told that it was essential 
for the study that they should not talk/communicate with each other during the 
experiment. E-prime 2.0 was used to program the experiment, control the experimental
flow and record the responses. 
Participants also responded to several questionnaires. Before the computer-
based trials, they completed the Individualism-Collectivism scale (IND-COL; Singelis, 
Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995) used to measure the degree to which participants 
saw their selves as members of a collective/social group or as independent selves. 
After the computer based-section of the experiment, participants completed the 
Inclusion of the Other in the Self scale (IOS; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992), used to 
examine the subjective perceived closeness of the relationship between the experiment
partners. Moreover, a 7-point-likert scale was used to assess the level of Trust 
regarding the partners’ ability to perform well during the task. Finally, a combined 
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competitiveness questionnaire (He et al., 2014)  was employed to measure if 
participants were engaged in competition during the experiment and how competitive 
they generally were. This questionnaire comprised 20 items. It was formed by the 
Revised Competitiveness Index (RCI: 14 items measuring the participants 
contentiousness and enjoyment of competition; Houston, Harris, McIntire, & Francis, 
2002), the competitiveness subscale of the Work and Family Orientation Scale 
(WOFO: 5 items measuring the desire to outperform others and compete in 
interpersonal situations; Helmreich, 1978), plus an additional item ‘I feel competitive in 
relation to other participants in this study’ assessing the competitive feeling.  
Participants indicated to what extend they agreed with these statements in a five-point 
Likert scale. 
 3.1.2 Results
As mentioned above, from the initial 45 dyads, 9 were not included due to the 
nature of their relationship. For statistical analyses, three more participants were 
excluded due to accuracies below 75%  in any design cell. Therefore, the data from 69 
participants (26 in the out-group condition, 43 in the in-group condition) were 
considered for further analysis. All the analyses were performed using R (version 
‘1.1.456’) and RStudio (RStudio Team, 2016). As in Chapter 2, RTs  were analysed 
employing classic ANOVAs, the percentile bootstrap method on 20% trimmed means 
(Wilcox, 2012), and Bayes factors. These were computed using the R packages ‘ez’ 
(Lawrence, 2016),  ‘WRS2’ (Wilcox & Schönbrodt, 2014), and ‘BayesFactor’ (Morey & 
Rouder, 2015), respectively.
 3.1.2.1 Accuracies
Given the high performance showed by participants in this task, accuracies 
were not further analysed (MACC, ingroup = 98.8 %, 95% CI [98.45, 99.05]; MACC, outgroup = 
99 %, 95% CI [98.75, 99.3]).
 3.1.2.2 RTs
Only go-trials were considered. From these, only trials with correct responses 
were analysed (97.7%). Outliers were determined and removed using the 2.5-Median 
Absolute Deviation (MAD) method. This eliminated 4.8% of the remaining data.
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I was interested in examining how the group membership modulates the 
attention effect in the sustained attention paradigm, while participants are either 
sharing or not the attended side of the screen. To investigate this effect, Reaction 
Times (RTs) data were submitted to a 2x2x2 Mixed-ANOVA with Group membership 
(in-group vs. out-group) as between-subjects factor, and Attention (attended vs. 
unattended) and Sharing (attention shared vs. notshared) as within-subjects factors 
(see Figure 10 and Table 10). The 3-way-mixed-ANOVA yielded a significant main 
effect of attention, F(1, 67) = 111.77, p < .001, ηG2 =0.048. Overall responses were faster
for stimuli appearing in the attended side of the screen (Mattended = 432 ms, 95% CI 
[418.32, 445.1]) than for those displayed in the unattended side  (Munattended = 458 ms, 
95% CI [444.68, 471.13]). The analysis also showed a significant interaction Attention x
Sharing, F(1, 67) = 7.22, p = .009, ηG2 =0.002, due to a smaller attention effect (i.e., 
MAttEffect = Munattended – Mattended) when participants were sharing the attended locations 
(MattEffect, shared = 22 ms, 95% CI [15.98, 27.74]), than when their locus of attention 
differed (MattEffect, unshared = 31 ms, 95% CI [24.84, 36.21]) (see Figure 11). No other main
effect nor interaction was significant, including the 3-way interaction Group x Attention x
Sharing (MdualAttEffect, ingroup = 6 ms, 95% CI [-1.88, 14.8];  MdualAttEffect, outgroup = 12 ms, 
95% CI [0.29, 24.34]; MdualAttEffect = MAttEffect, unshared – MAttEffect, shared), F(1, 67) = 0.70, p 
= .405 (see Figure 12).
The results yielded by the robust method and Bayes factors mirrored those 
presented above. The attention effect was computed beforehand and submitted to the 
between-within analysis with the percentile bootstrap method on 20% trimmed means 
(Between: Group, Within: Sharing). This showed a significant main effect of Sharing, ψ^  
= 20 [5.38, 32], p = .008, due to the difference in the attention effect across Sharing 
conditions. The main effect of Group was not significant, ψ^  = 3 [-12.4, 21.3], p = .595, 
nor the interaction Group x Sharing,  ψ^  = -6 [-19.5, 7.32], p = .376. For this interaction 
(Group x Sharing, after computing the attention effect), Bayes factors, BF01 = 3.2 
suggested “moderate” support for the model without the interaction, relative to the 
model with it, given the data.
For completeness, I present here the details of the 2-way interactions Attention 
x Sharing for each Group membership condition. For the In-group condition, the 
ANOVA yielded a non-significant 2-way interaction (Attention x Sharing), F(1, 42) = 
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2.44, p = .126, mirroring the result revealed by the percentile bootstrap method,
ψ^  = -8.27 [-17.3, 1.63], p = .099. For the Out-group participants, the ANOVA showed a 
significant interaction Attention x Sharing, F(1, 25) = 4.45, p = .045, ηG2 =0.003, that was
not supported by the result obtained with the robust method, ψ^  = -10.7 [-22.2, 1.38], p 
= .088. 
 3.1.2.3 Comparing questionnaires scores
I compared the scores from the Individualism-Collectivism (IND-COL) 
subscales, the Combined Collectivism scale, the Inclusion of the Other in the Self 
(IOS) scale, the Trust scale, and the Combined Competitiveness questionnaire across 
group membership conditions (in-group vs. out-group). Mann-Whitney U test were used
for this purpose. However, none of the comparisons showed a statistically significant 
difference.
 3.1.2.4 Correlation analyses
The scores from the IND-COL subscales, the Combined Collectivism scale, the 
IOS scale, the Trust scale, and the Combined Competitiveness questionnaire, were 
correlated to the dual attention effect derived from the participants reaction times (RTs).
As in Chapter 2, the dual attention effect was calculated by subtracting the typical 
attention effect (i.e., MAttEffect = Munattended – Mattended) for the attention shared condition 
from attention effect for the unshared condition (i.e., MdualAttEffect = MAttEffect, unshared – 
MAttEffect, shared). Spearman’s correlations were employed in all cases. These are 
reported alongside Bayes Factors, obtained after running Bayesian correlations with 
the Jeffreys-beta prior (Ly, Verhagen, & Wagenmakers, 2016). None of the correlations 
was statistically significant (see Table 11).
 3.1.3 Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the role of group 
membership on the dual attention effect (i.e., the reduced attention effect obtained 
when sharing the attended spatial locations with another person in the dual attention 
task, than when the locus of attention differed). A minimal group manipulation based on
subjective colour preferences was employed for this purpose. Two main results 
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deserve to be highlighted. First, the dual attention effect reported in Experiment 1, and 
already replicated in Experiments 3 and 4, was replicated one more time in the current 
study. This added confidence about the robustness of this effect. Second, the induced 
categorising of the task partner as in-group or out-group, did not modulate the dual 
attention effect.
Table 10. Mean RTs in ms (with SD) for Experiment 4.
Experimental Condition
Notshared Shared
Group Attended Unattended Attended Unattended
In-group 431(56) 462(55) 438(58) 462(57)
Out-group 423(57) 453(61) 430(56) 448(57)
Table 11. Correlations in Experiment 4. The scores from the IND-COL subscales, the 
Combined Collectivism scale, the IOS scale, the Trust scale, and the Combined 
Competitiveness questionnaire, were correlated to the dual attention effect (MdualAttEffect 
= MAttEffect, unshared – MAttEffect, shared). Spearman’s correlations and Bayes Factors are 
reported in all cases.
Individualism-Collectivism (IND-COL) (N=69) -
Combined Collectivism (HC+VC) rs =  0.096, p = .436, BF10 = 0.343
Horizontal Individualism (HI) rs =  0.127, p = .299, BF10 = 0.401
Vertical Individualism (VI) rs =  0.136, p = .264, BF10 = 0.442
Inclusion of the Other in the Self (IOS) (N=69) rs = -0.186, p = .126, BF10 = 1.280
Trust (N=69) rs = -0.153, p = .209, BF10 = 0.548
Combined Competitiveness (N=69) rs = -0.052, p = .673, BF10 = 0.304
Revised Competitiveness Index (RCI) rs = -0.083 , p = .499, BF10 = 0.324
Work and Family Orientation Scale (WOFO) -
Competitiveness subscale 
rs =  0.026 , p = .832, BF10 = 0.276
Competitive feeling item rs = -0.098, p = .425, BF10 = 0.399
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Figure 10. Mean RTs Experiment 4. Mean RTs are displayed as a function of group 
membership (A: in-group, B: out-group), sharing (shared, not shared) and attention 
(attended, unattended) conditions. The group means for each condition are displayed 
with 95% confidence intervals (CIs). 
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Figure 11. Attention Effect Experiment 4.  A) Mean attention effect displayed as a 
function of group membership (in-group, out-group) and sharing (shared, not shared) 
conditions. The mean attention effect is calculated as the difference between the mean 
RTs for the unattended condition and the mean RTs for the attended condition (i.e., 
MAttEffect = Munattended – Mattended). Group means are displayed with 95% confidence 
intervals (Cis).     B) Stripcharts showing the attention effect for each participant across 
sharing and group membership conditions. Lines were drawn to join paired 
observations. Out of the 43 participants in the out-group condition, 28 (~ 65.1% of the 
group) showed an effect in the same direction than the group mean (i.e. a reduction of 
the attention effect for the attention shared condition). From the 26 in-group 
participants, 17 (~ 65.4% of the group) showed and effect in this direction.  
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Figure 12. Dual attention effect Experiment 4. The mean dual attention effect is 
displayed as a function of group membership (in-group, out-group). This mean dual 
attention effect is calculated as the difference between the mean attention effect for the
notshared condition and the mean attention effect for the notshared condition (i.e., 
MdualAttEffect = MAttEffect, unshared – MAttEffect, shared). Group means are displayed with 95% 
confidence intervals (CIs).
The current experiment did not employ a clear manipulation check. Instead, 
self-reports were used to test the reported levels of trust, closeness, and competition 
across group membership conditions, which could reflect the effect of the minimal 
group manipulation. None of the questionnaires’ scores differed when comparing the 
answers provided by in-group vs. out-group participants and therefore did not provide 
support for the success of the manipulation. Manipulation checks however, should be 
treated with caution, especially in the context of a minimal group manipulation. It is well
known that when responding to questions, participants do not necessarily answer 
based on their actual state, but instead may reply based on the inferences they made 
about the task and the experimenter expectations (Hauser, Ellsworth, & Gonzalez, 
2018). There are also social desirability biases, which can be prominent in self-reports 
(Fisher, 1993). More importantly, it has been shown that in most cases, under minimal 
group conditions, participants would not be sensitive to the effects of the manipulation 
in a conscious manner (Dunham, 2018). In this line, the null effect associated with self-
reports in the current study does not necessarily mean that the minimal group 
manipulation here employed was not successful in eliciting the desired intergroup 
categorisation effect. Nonetheless, since the experiment did not employ a direct 
manipulation check, the absence of a group membership influence in dual attention 
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settings could well be a failure of the current manipulation or an experimental effect. 
Considering this, the subsequent potential explanations should be treated with caution. 
As discussed in the introductory section above, the design of the minimal group 
paradigm considered suggestions taken from manipulations used in the joint action 
(e.g., McClung et al., 2013; Müller et al., 2011) and shared attention literature. The 
current design used subjective colour preference as the minimal arbitrary criteria 
inducing the intergroup categorisation. This criteria proved successful in many studies 
in the shared attention literature (e.g., Shteynberg, 2010; Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011;
Shteynberg, Hirsh, Galinsky, & Knight, 2014; Shteynberg et al., 2014). In addition, the 
current experiment adopted the elements suggested by McClung et al. (2013) in order 
to shape a minimal group manipulation successfully moderating task co-representation 
in joint action settings. These key elements were the use of a cover story for the study 
(e.g., investigating the relationship between cognitive style and reaction times) and the 
use of badges to be wore by the participants during the experiment (to remind them 
about the group membership along the task). In our case, participants believed the 
study actually aimed at examining the influence of colour preference on attention 
performance (cover story), and they were given coloured bibs to wear during the 
experiment (similar to the badges mentioned above). Therefore, I consider the current 
manipulation to be as strong as the one proposed in McClung et al. (2003), in terms of 
eliciting the desired intergroup categorisation. This however, does not necessarily 
guarantee the success of the current manipulation in modulating attention performance
in the dual attention task. Perhaps the dual attention effect is not shaped by group 
membership, or it could be the case that a stronger group membership manipulation is 
needed for this modulation to occur (see below).
It has been shown that jointly attending towards the same spatial locations with 
another person increases the reported levels of affiliation/bonding/closeness in relation 
to this co-attending person (Wolf, Launay, & Dunbar, 2016). Wolf, Launay and Dunbar 
(2016) went further by suggesting that joint attention could potentially elicit a minimal-
group-like social categorization, with co-attending participants perceived as in-group 
members, and those with a disjoint attention (i.e., attention to a different spatial 
location) categorised as out-group members. If this is the case, it could be that in the 
dual attention task, the “categorisation effect” induced by shared/unshared attention 
could have overridden the actual minimal group manipulation, eliciting a stronger 
modulation of the sense of connection among participants than the one potentially 
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induced by subjective colour preferences. Indeed, the shared/unshared 
blocks/conditions in the dual attention task could have acted as a live/online/automatic 
manipulation of the sense of connectedness within dyads. Given the importance it has 
for humans since early childhood (e.g., Mundy & Newell, 2007), the social relevance of 
co-attending towards the same spatial locations with other individuals would be more 
prominent than the attributed to colour preferences. Therefore, as mentioned above, it 
would not be surprising for the categorisation effect/impact of subjective colour 
preferences to be considerably smaller. However, this remains speculative and further 
research should address whether this is the case.
Whether an enhancement in the level of affiliation/bonding among participants 
(induced by joint attention, as suggested by Wolf et al., 2016) is behind the change in 
attention performance characterising the dual attention effect deserves further 
investigation. Wolf et al.(2016) examined the effect of joint attention in social bonding, 
but did not test attention performance changes in the co-attending individuals. A follow 
up experiment could employ the dual attention task for this purpose, using exclusively 
the attention unshared condition (excluding the shared one) together with a group 
membership manipulation. Under this scenario, following Wolf et al.(2016), I would 
hypothesise a reduction in the attention effect for participants in the in-group condition, 
compared to the out-group counterpart, similar to the one obtained in the original dual 
attention task when sharing (vs not sharing) the attended spatial locations. It is 
important to consider however, that in the current study, RTs when participants 
attended to different spatial locations did not differed across group membership 
conditions.  Yet, it could have happened that when faced with two categorisation 
potentials (attention sharing vs. colour preference; participants were told about both at 
the beginning of the experiment), participants were more sensitive to the most relevant 
one (attention sharing), leaving the colour preference in a secondary role. Additional 
research is needed to shed light on these regard.   
To date, only a few studies have reported evidence from minimal group 
manipulations in dyads where participants completed the subsequent tasks physically 
next to each other (e.g., McClung et al., 2013; Müller et al., 2011). In the past it was 
emphasised that anonymity (of the participants involved) was an essential part of a 
minimal group design, necessary for the manipulation to work (Tajfel et al., 1971). This 
previous limit however, has been thrown down by recent evidence showing successful 
manipulations in contexts where anonymity was not guaranteed (e.g., McClung et al., 
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2013). Till recently researchers file drawers have been filled with null results (Francis, 
2012). It would be of paramount relevance for the field to open the “failures” to obtain 
minimal group effects in order to understand the actual consequences and limitations 
of these kind of manipulations (Dunham, 2018). 
Although the proposed group membership manipulation did not alter the 
interpersonal influence in the dual attention task, it is plausible to consider that 
alternative manipulations of social context could be strong enough to actually moderate
the effect of dual attention. In the joint action literature, experiments employing real 
groups involving race (e.g., black vs. white; Müller et al., 2011), and social status (e.g., 
albanian vs. italian participants; Aquino et al., 2015), successfully moderated co-
representation levels in dyads. Positive/negative interdependence related 
manipulations also proved “successful” in this regard (He et al., 2011; Hommel et al., 
2009). Social status was also shown to be a relevant aspect of social context 
modulating the interpersonal influence on basic cognitive processes related to spatial 
orienting (Gobel, Tufft, & Richardson, 2018). Therefore, follow-up experiments 
manipulating social context by any of these means (i.e., social status, racial groups, or 
interdependence/competition) could provide additional insights about the role of social 
context on the interpersonal influence represented by the dual attention effect.
To sum up, the current study left more open questions than answers in relation 
to the interplay between low-level cognitive processes (dual attention performance) and
high-level social cognition (group membership). Additional research should shed more 
light in this regard. Importantly however, the results here presented constitute a further 
replication of the dual attention effect reported in Experiment 1, and already replicated 
on Experiment 3. These replications build up valuable confidence regarding the 
robustness of the dual attention effect.
3.2. Experiment 5 
Previous experiments presented in this thesis (e.g., Experiments 1, 3 and 4) 
suggested that attending towards the same spatial location with another person affects 
one’s attention performance (see Chapter 2). It is not clear however, whether this 
interpersonal influence on attentional processes persists while sharing the locus of 
attention with remotely located individuals. The current mass/social media ecosystem 
allows for this scenario to occur in a daily basis. Deploying attention towards the same 
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spatial location in a screen while sharing content via social media, or while watching 
the same TV program with friends across the world, are a few examples where this 
remote influence may be possible. Thus, understanding whether this remote influence 
on attention actually occurs becomes timely relevant. In this line, Experiment 5 
examined the dual attention effect when individuals in a dyad performed the dual 
attention task from remote locations (i.e., separate rooms), instead of sitting side by 
side physically next to each other.
Task co-representation effects have been shown to occur not only when 
performing with another person in one’s peripersonal space (e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003), 
but also when performing with remotely present or imagined co-actors (e.g., Atmaca, 
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011; Ruys & Aarts, 2010; Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2008; but 
see Welsh, Higgins, Ray, & Weeks, 2007). As an example, Tsai et al. (2008) asked 
participants to complete the joint Simon task either with another person performing the 
respective half of the task from a separate room, or with a computer. The co-actor’s 
performance in their experiment however, was always controlled by a computer 
program. Under this setting, participants showed a typical joint Simon effect only when 
the co-actor was believed to be a real person. Although this outcome indicates that co-
representation effects are attuned to biological agents (the main topic addressed by 
Tsai and colleagues), more importantly for the current experiment, their evidence also 
showed that co-representation effects persist when performing with a (believed) partner
in a remote location. Comparable evidence pro task co-representation with believed co-
actors was provided by Atmaca et al. (2010) in the context of the joint Flanker task. 
Moreover, participants in Ruys and  Aarts (2010) showed an analogous interpersonal 
influence (i.e., a joint Simon effect; JSE) when carrying out an auditory joint Simon task
with real co-actors performing in adjacent rooms. Taken together these results suggest 
that the physical presence of the co-actor is not essential for the interpersonal task 
representation to occur (but see Guagnano, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2010, for a modification
of the JSE where physical proximity became relevant). Instead, it seems that just 
knowing about the other person’s task (even when this person performs from a remote 
location) may be enough to elicit task co-representation in joint performance settings.
Indeed, more recent research in the joint action field has showed a similar 
pattern in  the context of social offloading (e.g., Tufft et al., 2019). It has been 
suggested that in some scenarios, we could “offload” irrelevant/distracting information 
onto others (e.g., a human co-actor), resulting in facilitated performance (i.e., reduced 
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interference when performing a joint task than when completing the task alone). 
Evidence for this has been obtained employing cross-modal Stroop-like paradigms 
(i.e., stimulus-stimulus compatibility tasks; Heed, Habets, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2010; 
Wahn, Keshava, Sinnett, Kingstone, & König, 2017; see also Knoblich, Butterfill, & 
Sebanz, 2011), and visual-only picture-word interference (PWI) paradigms (Sellaro, 
Treccani, & Cubelli, 2018; Tufft et al., 2019). In the solo version of the PWI (Rosinski et 
al., 1975), participants are presented with picture-word combinations (i.e., a picture 
with a word written over it per trial). They are asked to name the picture while ignoring 
the a distractor word. This word could either belong to the same semantic category 
than the picture (e.g., apple – banana, congruent condition), or not (e.g., banana – 
castle, incongruent condition). Not surprisingly, participants are slower at naming 
pictures when the distractor word is semantically unrelated (aka., semantic interference
effect; Rosinski, Golinkoff, & Kukish, 1975). Strikingly however, this semantic 
interference was significantly reduced (or disappeared) when a task partner (Tufft et al.,
2019), or an imagined co-actor (Sellaro et al., 2018) responded to the distractor word. 
This result has been taken to suggest that when provided with a task that allows 
distributing cognitive responsibilities, participants may “offload” distracting information 
to a co-actor taking care of it (aka., Social offloading, Tufft et al., 2019). It is beyond the
scope of the present Chapter to discuss facilitating (e.g., Heed et al., 2010; Sellaro et 
al., 2018; Tufft et al., 2019 ; Wahn et al., 2017) vs. interference (e.g., Sebanz et al., 
2003) effects in joint performance. Instead, it is worth highlighting that the facilitating 
interpersonal effect just introduced (i.e., social offloading), was present when 
performing with a real task partner in one’s peripersonal space (Heed et al., 2010; 
Wahn et al., 2017), that the effect was also present when the partner was in the same 
room but invisible due to the presence of an opaque divide blocking visual access to 
her (Tufft et al., 2019), and that it was present when performing the task with an 
imagined co-actor in a remote location (Sellaro et al., 2018). This suggest that the 
physical presence/proximity of the co-actor is not critical for this interpersonal effect to 
occur (Sellaro et al., 2018).
Furthermore, as discussed in previous experiments, it has been proposed that 
sharing attention towards the same objects/tasks with other individuals could cause a 
more elaborate processing of the co-attended objects/tasks (shared attention theory; 
Stheynberg, 2015, 2018). The key evidence supporting Shteynberg’s theory was 
obtained from dyads/groups, where the individuals involved completed shared attention
related tasks simultaneously while sitting in different rooms (e.g., Shteynberg, 2010; 
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Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011; Shteynberg, Hirsh, Galinsky, & Knight, 2014; Shteynberg
et al., 2014), or with believed task partners controlled via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(e.g., Shteynberg, Hirsh, Galinsky, & Knight, 2014; Shteynberg et al., 2014). This 
literature however, has also consistently shown the enhanced cognitive processing 
effects exclusively when co-attending with in-group members. Considering this, a 
cautionary note was raised in Experiment 4, and a reminder is included here: the fact 
that the dual attention effect was already present when participants performed the dual 
attention task with strangers (e.g., Experiments 1 and 3, described in Chapter 2) may 
suggest that dual attention and shared attention differ at least in the way they are 
modulated by social context. Nonetheless, similarly to the task co-representation 
effects previously described, the “we-mode” elicited by shared attention is also present 
when the co-attending individuals are located remotely.  
The present experiment examined whether the physical closeness to the task 
partner is critical for the dual attention effect to occur.  Specifically, the experiment 
asked whether the dual attention effect would be replicated (or instead, changed) when
participants complete the dual attention task from remote locations (e.g., separate 
rooms), instead of physically next to each other. As suggested above, answering this 
question acquires tremendous relevance in a “connected world” (e.g., by mass/social 
media) like the one we currently inhabit. In addition, the answer to this question would 
be essential to assess the potential to conduct follow-up research (in relation to the 
dual attention effect) in contexts where dyadic experimental set-ups are hard to 
implement, or where studying dyads in close physical proximity is not an option. The 
later is the case for instance, in fMRI research, which would allow the investigation of 
the neuro-anatomical correlates of dual attention. Indeed, as will be detailed in the 
methods section below, the current experiment adopted specific modifications to the 
original dual attention task (i.e., the task proposed in Exp1), in consideration of the 
possibility of conducting a future fMRI study (beyond the present PhD project) on dual 
attention. fMRI hyper-scanning setups have been proposed to record fMRI data from 
two individuals simultaneously, either by synchronising two MRI scanners (e.g., 
Montague, 2002), or by testing two participants inside the same scanner (e.g., Lee, 
2015; Lee, Dai, & Jones, 2012). However, in the setup at Poole Hospital (which is the 
setup Bournemouth University had access to by the time of this experiment), only one 
MRI scanner (able to fit a single participant) is available for research purposes. With 
this in mind, a likely approach allowing a fMRI investigation of dyads performing the 
dual attention task would be to have one participant performing the task inside the MRI 
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scanner, while the task partner performs remotely (e.g., from the MRI control room)5. 
Hence, knowing whether the dual attention effect persist when sharing the attended 
spatial locations with a remotely located partner (e.g., in a separate room) becomes 
crucial. 
In the current experiment, individuals in a dyad performed the dual attention 
task from separate rooms. Considering the evidence presented above regarding task 
co-representation in joint action (e.g., Atmaca et al.,  2011; Ruys & Aarts, 2010; Tsai et 
al., 2008), social-offloading (e.g., Heed et al., 2010; Sellaro et al., 2018; Tufft et al., 
2019 ; Wahn et al., 2017), and shared attention (e.g., Shteynberg, 2010; Shteynberg & 
Galinsky, 2011; Shteynberg, Hirsh, Galinsky, & Knight, 2014; Shteynberg et al., 2014), 
it was expected for the dual attention effect to persist in the new experimental setting. 
That is, a replication of the dual attention effect was predicted when the co-attending 
individuals completed the task from remote physical locations.
To examine whether the dual attention effect reported in previous experiments 
would change when performing with a task partner in a different location, the current 
study proposed a modified version of the dual attention task (see Figure 13 and Table 
12). The first and obvious modification was that the individuals in the dyad performed 
the task sitting in front of computer monitors placed in separate rooms, instead of 
sitting side by side next to each other. The task was displayed simultaneously in both 
monitors and controlled by a computer located in one of the rooms. Further 
modifications to the original task design were proposed to have a higher number of 
useful trials in the limited amount of time available inside a MRI scanner (for an actual 
fMRI experiment). For simplicity, these modifications are summarised in Table 12, and 
further explained below. Three important ones deserve to be highlighted here: First, 
participants performed a choice response discrimination task on their target stimuli 
(gratings with two possible orientations), responding to all the target stimulus types 
(instead of performing a go/nogo task). The change to grating stimuli (instead of 
shapes/sizes) has the purpose of generalising the dual attention findings to more 
physically comparable stimuli, which would in turn provide more comparable neural 
5 An alternative suggestion would be to manipulate the scanned participant’s believes so that 
she thinks is performing the task with an imaginary (actually non-existing) partner. However, a 
real task partner performing from a separate location may be preferred in order to keep the 
social context of the task as close as possible to the original paradigm. Further research, 
beyond the aims of the current study, could test the role of believes regarding the co-attending 
partner in relation to the dual attention effect. 
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responses in future neuroimaging studies. Moreover, the change from a go/no-go task 
to a response choice task allows extending the understanding of the dual attention 
results to a different cognitive control situation, and would allow a more efficient data 
collection in the potential future fMRI settings (i.e., a shorter experiment, and/or more 
trials to be analysed for the scanned participant for a given scanning time). Second, the
number of trials for one of the participants (i.e., the participant to be performing inside 
the scanner in the future fMRI study) doubled the number of trials for the remaining 
participant. Third, the trial validity was not the same for both participants. For one 
participant (the one “inside the scanner”), the trial validity was 75%. This participant 
was instructed to respond to the targets at any side of the screen. For the remaining 
participant, the stimuli appeared with equal probability at any side of the screen but 
responses were performed exclusively to targets appearing at the attended/valid 
location (i.e., the target validity is 100%). The later represents an alternative way of 
effectively biasing attention towards a specific spatial location, and is commonly 
employed in visuospatial sustained attention paradigms (see Eimer, 1996; Hillyard, 
Vogel, & Luck, 1998 for a similar approach). 
Figure 13. Dual attention task from separate rooms. Participants performed the dual
attention task simultaneously from separate locations (different rooms).  The monitor 
and response device in room 2 were connected to the computer in room 1 via a 
hardware link (i.e., USB and VGA cables).The computer in room 1 executed the 
experiment and recorded the responses. Participants carried out a sustained attention 
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Room #1
Room #2
P1 P1
P2 P2
Stimuli
‘left click’ ‘right click’
Responses
(for valid trials only)
P2
Stimuli
‘c’ ‘z’
Responses
(for valid and invalid trials)
P1
2000-3000ms SOA 150ms 
2000-3000ms SOA 150ms 
task, paying covert attention towards one side of the screen (e.g., left side) for an entire
experimental block (this changes across blocks). Across experimental blocks, the 
attended side of the screen was either simultaneously attended by the participant in the
second room (attention shared), or alternatively, the second participant was instructed 
to focus attention at the opposite location (attention notshared condition). In this 
version of the task, participants responded to gratings with a target colour (red or blue).
These gratings were vertically oriented or horizontally oriented. Participants performed 
an orientation discrimination task, responding to both orientations with key presses, or 
mouse clicks. P1 responded to both valid and invalid trials, while P2 responded 
exclusively to the stimuli appearing at the attended location (valid trials). In this 
example trial, both participants are paying covert attention towards the left side of the 
screen (attention shared condition), as indicated by the arrow. A red grating with 
vertical orientation is displayed at the left side of the screen (the attended location for 
both participants). P1 should respond to this stimulus pressing ‘z’ on the keyboard. P2 
withholds the response. (P1: Participant 1; P2: Participant 2; SOA: Stimulus-onset 
asynchrony).
 3.2.1 Method
 3.2.1.1 Participants
Forty-eight participants (24 dyads) took part in this study. However, only the 
data from the participants responding to both valid and invalid trials were considered 
(i.e., data from the participants that would be scanned in the actual fMRI 
experiment).This means that the data from the participants responding only to the valid 
condition were discarded. Therefore, the data from 24 participants was analysed (20 
females; 23 right handed; Mage= 20.04, SDage= 2.53). Participants had normal (or 
corrected to normal) vision and normal colour vision. All of them provided written 
informed consent to take part in the study, and were given either one (1) course credit 
or eight pounds (£8) for their participation.
 3.2.1.2 Design
The present experiment employed the same 2X2 factorial design than 
Experiment 1, where Attention (attended vs. unattended location) and Sharing 
(attention shared vs. notshared) were manipulated within-subjects, and the participant’s
reaction times (RTs) and accuracies (percentage of correct responses) to the target 
stimulus were the dependent variables. In the current experiment however, participants
performed the task from separate rooms. If the dual attention effect persist in this new 
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experimental settings, this would be reflected in the 2X2 interaction between the 
above-mentioned factors (i.e., the interaction Attention x Sharing).
Table 12. Comparison between the dual attention task proposed in Experiment 1, and 
the modified version of the task employed in Experiment 5.
Original dual attention task 
(Experiment 1)
Modified dual attention task 
(Experiment 5)
Participant’s 
location
Same room, sitting side by side 
next to each other
Different rooms
Stimuli Circles/squares, large/small Red/blue gratings, 
vertical/horizontal orientation
Task Go/no-go, responding to the large 
target shape (e.g., large circle or 
large square), holding responses to
the small ones
Participant 1 & 2 responded to 
attended and unattended targets 
(i.e., valid and invalid trials)
Orientation discrimination 
(vertical/horizontal), responding 
to both orientations for a target 
coloured grating
Participant 1 responded to 
attended and unattended targets 
(i.e., valid and invalid trials)
Participant 2 responded only to 
attended targets, ignoring the 
unattended side (i.e., responded 
to valid trials only)
Validity Participant 1:
75% (attended vs. unattended ratio 
= 3:1)
Participant 2:
75% (attended vs. unattended ratio 
= 3:1)
Additional stimuli to balance the 
overall stimulus distribution (equal 
number of stimuli for the shared 
and not shared conditions)
Participant 1:
75% (attended vs. unattended 
ratio  = 3:1)
Participant 2:
100% (attended vs. unattended 
ratio = 1:1)
Balanced overall stimulus 
distribution (equal number of 
stimuli for the shared and not 
shared conditions)
Trial ratio 
(P1:P2)
Equal number of trials for 
participant 1 and 2
Participant 1’s trials number 
doubled the number of trials for 
participant 2
Trial duration 150ms (stimulus) +
1350ms ITI
150ms (stimulus), 2-3 seconds 
jittered SOA
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 3.2.1.3 
 3.2.1.4 Materials and procedure
As in the original dual attention paradigm (Experiment 1), participants 
completed a sustained visual attention task in dyads. In this case, however (see Figure
13 and Table 12), they were performing the task from two separate locations (i.e., two 
different rooms in the lab). Each participant sat in front of a computer monitor, at a 
viewing distance of 70 cm (to screen centre). The two monitors (placed in separate 
rooms) were connected to a single computer, located in one of the rooms. This 
computer used PsychoPy 1.84 (Peirce et al., 2019; Peirce, 2007) to execute the 
experiment, control the experimental flow and record the responses. The task was 
displayed simultaneously in the two monitors by duplicating the screen view. The 
response devices (i.e., a mouse and a keyboard) were connected to the (same) 
computer via USB. Visual stimuli were presented against a black background. 
Participants were instructed to fixate on a white cross displayed in the centre of the 
screen, while covertly focusing their attention to one side of the visual field for an entire
experimental block. Across block the attended side varied from left to right so that the 
dyad’s visual attention across blocks was either focused on the same side (attention 
shared) or different sides (attention not shared) of the visual field. Unlike the original 
dual attention task, participants in this experiment responded to coloured (red/blue) 
gratings (stimulus size: 4.57°x4.57°). These gratings had vertical or horizontal 
orientation, and were randomly displayed at the left or right side of the screen, one per 
trial. Each person in the dyad was instructed to respond to gratings with a specific 
target colour (e.g., one participant responding to the red gratings and the remaining 
participant responding to the blue ones, counterbalanced). Moreover, instead of the 
original go/nogo task, in this experiment participants performed an orientation 
discrimination in a choice response task, responding to each of the possible 
orientations (horizontal/vertical) using two different button presses. For these 
responses, one participant was instructed to respond quickly and accurately to the 
target gratings using the keyboard (keys ‘c’ and ‘z’, one per each orientation), while the 
remaining participant responded using the mouse (left/right clicks). The attention 
validity also differed from the original task. Here, the attention validity was set 
differently for each participant (see Table 12), and the overall trial distribution was 
balanced across sharing conditions (i.e., the trials distribution did not differ between 
attention shared and attention notshared conditions).
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As an example of the task performed by each participant, in one experimental 
session, Participant 1, using the keyboard, had to respond to the red gratings with 
either vertical or horizontal orientation, using the letters ‘c’ and ‘z’ respectively 
(counterbalanced). She had to respond to all the red gratings, regardless of the side of 
the screen they appeared at (i.e., responded to both attended and unattended targets). 
She was also told that her targets were more likely to appear at one side of the screen, 
and therefore, she was instructed to focus on this side, to enhance performance in the 
task (this side could change across blocks). In this same example, Participant 2, using 
the mouse, had to respond to the blue gratings with vertical/horizontal orientation, 
pressing a left/right mouse click respectively. This participant however, was instructed 
to focus on one side of the screen, and to respond only to the gratings appearing at this
attended location (i.e., valid trials), ignoring the unattended stimuli (i.e., invalid trials). In
this case (remember that the number of trials for Participant 1 doubled the number of 
trials for Participant 2), 66.66% of all the trials displayed red gratings, and therefore 
required a response from Participant 1. The remaining 33.33% of all trials displayed 
blue gratings, but only half of these (50% of the blue gratings, 16.66% of all the trials in 
the task) required a response from Participant 2 (i.e., only those displayed at the 
attended side).   
A total of 480 trials were completed during the experiment. In half of the trials 
participants shared the attended locations in the screen (they attended both to the 
right, or both to the left). In half of the trials attention was not shared (i.e., one attended 
to the right, and the other to the left, and viceversa). The attending sides order 
(Participant1-Participant 2: left-left; right-right; left-right; right-left) was counterbalanced.
The experiment was divided in eight experimental blocks, varying the instructed focus 
of attention. These instructions changed every two blocks. Participant took a fixed 
thirty-second break every 60 trials (i.e., at the end of each block), unless the dyad’s 
attending sides changed. In this case (i.e., every two blocks), a sixty-second break was
allowed. Each participant was informed about the experiment partner’s instructions at 
the beginning of the experiment. They had to acknowledge reading the instructions 
regarding the experiment partner’s task. They were reminded of these (and had to 
acknowledge reading them) before continuing with the task after each break. Stimuli 
were displayed for 150ms, with a randomised 2-3 seconds jittered stimulus-onset 
asynchrony (SOA), keeping an average trial duration of 2.5 seconds. Responses were 
recorded in a 2 seconds-long window after stimulus onset. Responses beyond this 
window were not registered. 
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 3.2.2 Results
Three participants were excluded from statistical analysis due to accuracies 
below 75%  per design cell. The remaining 21 participants (19 females; 21 right-
handed; Mage= 20, SDage= 2.51) were analysed. As in the previous experiments, 
classical ANOVAs, the percentile bootstrap method on 20% trimmed means (Wilcox, 
2012), and Bayes factors were employed when analysing both accuracies and reaction
times data. These were computed using the R packages ‘ez’ (Lawrence, 2016),  
‘WRS2’ (Wilcox & Schönbrodt, 2014), and ‘BayesFactor’ (Morey & Rouder, 2015), 
respectively.
 3.2.2.1 Accuracies
Mean accuracies (see Table 13), were submitted to a 2x2 repeated-measures-
ANOVA with Attention (attended vs. unattended) and Sharing (shared vs. unshared) as 
within-subjects factors. However, both the main effects and the interaction were not 
significant. This was also the case when employing the within-within percentile 
bootstrap method on 20% trimmed means.
Table 13. Mean accuracies (with SD) for Experiment 5. Mean accuracies are here 
presented as percentage of correct responses. 
Experimental Condition
Notshared Shared
Attended Unattended Attended Unattended
93.7(5.52) 93.7(4.91) 93.8(5.17) 92.6(5.09)
 3.2.2.2 RTs
Only trials with correct responses were considered (93.6%). Outliers were 
determined and removed using a threshold of 2.5 times the Median Absolute Deviation 
(MAD) per design cell. This eliminated 5.9% of the remaining data. Mean RTs (see 
Figure 14 and Table 14) were submitted to a 2x2 repeated-measures-ANOVA with 
Attention (attended vs. unattended) and Sharing (shared vs. unshared) as within-
subjects factors (see Figure 14). The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
Attention, F(1, 20) = 16.21, p < .001, ηG2 =0.037, due to shorter RTs for the attended 
stimuli (Mattended = 594 ms, 95% CI [566.24, 621.01]) than for the unattended ones 
(Munattended = 620 ms, 95% CI [586.62, 652.96]). The main effect of  Sharing  was not 
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significant, F(1, 20) = 0.67, p = .798, nor the interaction Attention x Sharing, F(1, 20) = 
0.37, p = .550 (MAttEffect, shared = 24 ms, 95% CI [9.14, 38.97]; MAttEffect, unshared = 28 ms, 
95% CI [12.42, 44.14]).  
Similarly, the within-within percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means yielded 
a significant main effect of attention, ψ^  = 45 [21.9, 75.1], p = 0, a non significant main 
effect of Sharing, ψ^  = -9 [-28, 15.6], p =.465, and a non significant interaction Attention 
x Sharing, ψ^  = 5 [-12.2, 18.7], p =.553. In addition, for this interaction, Bayes factors, 
BF01 = 3.2 suggested “moderate” support for the model without the interaction, relative
to the model with it, given the data.
Figure 14.  Mean RTs and attention effect Experiment 5. A) Mean RTs as a function 
of attention (attended, unattended), and sharing (shared, not shared) conditions. The 
group means for each condition are displayed with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) B) 
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Mean attention effect across sharing (shared, not shared) conditions. The mean 
attention effect is calculated as the difference between the mean RTs for the 
unattended condition and the mean RTs for the attended condition (i.e., MAttEffect = 
Munattended – Mattended). Means are displayed with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) C) 
Stripchart showing the attention effect for each participant across sharing conditions. 
Lines were drawn to join paired observations of the 21 participants analysed, 10 
showed a positive dual attention effect (i.e., a reduction of the attention effect for the 
attention shared condition), while 11 showed an effect in the opposite direction (i.e., an 
enhanced attention effect for the attention shared condition).
Table 14. Mean RTs in ms (with SD) for Experiment 5.
Experimental Condition
Notshared Shared
Attended Unattended Attended Unattended
592(57) 620(80) 595(65) 620(70)
 3.2.3 Discussion
The present experiment investigated whether the dual attention effect persisted 
when individuals in a dyad performed the dual attention task from separate rooms. 
Contrary to the expectation, the obtained evidence favoured the absence of the dual 
attention effect in this new scenario. As discussed below, this result may suggest that 
the physical closeness in relation to the task partner is critical for the dual attention 
effect to occur, but could also be driven by changes in the task parameters 
implemented in the current design, respect to the original dual attention task. The 
current results should be followed-up in future research to achieve solid conclusions. 
Several research findings have shown interpersonal influences in cognitive 
processes when performing with remotely present (or even imagined) task partners 
(e.g., Atmaca et al., 2011; Ruys & Aarts, 2010; Tsai et al., 2008). These evidence 
comes mostly from experiments employing joint action paradigms (e.g., the joint 
Simon; Ruys & Aarts, 2010; Tsai et al., 2008, and the joint Flanker tasks; Atmaca et al.,
2011), and suggest that just knowing about the other person’s task (even when this 
person performs from a remote location) may be enough to elicit the associated 
interpersonal influence (i.e., task co-representation in this case) in joint performance 
settings. Nonetheless, Guagnano, Rusconi, and Umiltà (2010) proposed a modification 
of the joint Simon task in which the co-actor’s physical proximity became critical. In 
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Guagnano and colleagues’ version of the joint Simon task, the co-actors had 
independent tasks. This was achieved by presenting simultaneously the stimuli for the 
two participants (in a dyad) in 80% of the trials, strongly reducing the turn-taking aspect
of the task. In this setting, a typical JSE was obtained, but disappeared when the co-
actor was outside one’s peripersonal space (i.e., outside arm-reach). The authors 
argued that the mechanism behind their JSE may differ from the mechanism behind 
the traditional JSE obtained when participants perform complementary go/nogo tasks. 
They suggested physical distance mattered when the task partners were engaged in 
two independent (instead of complementary/collaborative) tasks, and proposed that in 
their experiment, the co-actor provided a spatial reference frame for response coding, 
eliciting the obtained JSE (Guagnano, Rusconi & Umiltà, 2010) .
Perhaps the task partner also provides a spatial reference in the context of the 
dual attention ask. In the case of dual attention however, instead of a spatial reference 
for coding one’s response, sharing a space with the another individual may be 
necessary for a joint attention-like spatial triangulation simulation to occur (i.e., in this 
case, a triangulation between one’s covert attention deployment, the other’s covert 
attention deployment, and the jointly attended spatial location). Chapter 2 speculated 
that merely knowing that the other person shares one’s locus of attention could be 
analogue to obtaining this information (about the other’s attentional locus) through 
gaze following, subsequently activating the series of higher order processes supporting
joint attention and facilitating coordination in the social world (e.g., monitoring others, 
mentalising; see Mundy & Newell, 2007; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 
2005). It was also argued that the additional resources deployed to a “secondary” task 
(like mentalising/monitoring) when sharing the attentional locus with another person 
(respect to the not shared condition) could explain the attention performance drop 
characterising the dual attention effect. Perhaps this joint attention-like spatial 
triangulation can only be simulated when the co-attending person provides a spatial 
reference for it to be feasible (e.g., when present in the same room). Taken together 
these ideas could account for the finding of a dual attention effect when performing the 
dual attention task with a partner in the same room, and its absence when the partner 
is out of reach (in another room) and the spatial reference is unavailable. Additional 
experiments should test whether this is the case.  
Before addressing higher-order processing explanations however, it is important
to consider that many task parameters were here modified respect to the original dual 
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attention task introduced in Chapter 2 (this was done in consideration of potential future
investigations in fMRI experimental settings; see the methods section above). Thus, it 
is not clear whether the absence of the dual attention effect in the present experiment, 
and the differences respect to previous experiments, were due to the changes in the 
social context of the task (i.e., the physical closeness to the task partner), or due to the 
changes in the task parameters respect to previous designs.  Although I cannot foresee
how the current task parameters could possibly account for the absence of the dual 
attention effect in the current experiment, future research should address the role that 
the current task parameters (respect to those in the original dual attention task) may 
play in the present results. This could be achieved for instance, by examining the 
original dual attention task with participants performing from separate rooms, or by 
testing the modified version of the task here introduced with participants sat side by 
side next to each other. 
Finally, taken together the findings from Experiment 5 and previous experiments
presented in this thesis, may suggest that the dual attention and the shared attention 
mechanisms differ in the way they are modulated by social context. The evidence 
supporting the shared attention theory has consistently shown the enhanced cognitive 
processing effects exclusively when co-attending with in-group members. In contrast, 
the dual attention effect was already present when participants performed the dual 
attention task with strangers (e.g., Experiments 1 and 3, described in Chapter 2), and 
was not modulated by the task partner’s group membership status, at least as induced 
in Experiment 4. Similarly, the “we-mode” elicited by shared attention is present when 
the co-attending individuals are located remotely, but the dual attention effect 
disappeared when performing the dual attention task with a partner in a separate room 
(Experiment 5). Therefore, the evidence discussed in this thesis in relation to the 
shared attention theory and the dual attention effect, could be taken to suggest that no 
single mechanism underlies “co-attending”/”sharing attention” with others in the social 
world, and that instead, different mechanisms/processes may be called in to action 
depending on the specific social/cognitive context. As discussed above, these ideas 
must be considered with caution at the current stage, and should be addressed in 
future research. 
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3.3. Chapter summary 
The present chapter investigated the role of the social/physical closeness 
among task partners on the dual attention effect. Experiment 4 manipulated the social 
closeness aspect by means of a minimal group manipulation. The induced categorising
of the task partner as in-group or out-group however, did not modulate the 
interpersonal influence measured in the dual attention task. The reasons for this lack of
modulation by group membership are not well understood, and should be addressed in 
follow-up experiments to achieve solid conclusions. Nonetheless, the experiment 
provided an additional replication of the dual attention effect (already obtained in 
Experiments 1 and 3), adding important confidence regarding its robustness.  
Experiment 5 examined the role of the partner’s physical closeness, indicating 
(contrary to the expectation) the absence of attention performance changes when 
sharing vs. notsharing the attentional locus with a physically remote task partner (i.e., 
in a different room). It was speculated that a joint attention-like spatial triangulation 
simulation (and related higher order processes like monitoring/mentalising) may be 
behind the dual attention effect, but would only occur when the task partner is 
physically available (e.g., in the same room) to provide a spatial reference for this 
triangulation to be feasible. It is unclear however, whether differences in task 
parameters respect to the original dual attention task may account for the reported 
findings. The current chapter left more open questions than answers in relation to the 
interplay between low-level cognitive processes (i.e., attention performance) and the 
investigated social factors (i.e., the task partner’s social/physical closeness) in the 
context of dual attention.  Additional research should address the open questions, and 
examine the role of social factors beyond those here investigated. 
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 4 
DUAL ATTENTION EFFECT: 
SENSORY PROCESSING OR TOP-DOWN CONTROL? 
The current PhD thesis aimed at expanding the understanding on interpersonal 
influences in human attention by asking whether visual attention acts differently (i.e., 
attention performance is changed) when another person pays attention to the same 
location one is focused on, in the absence of direct communication or explicit 
interactions (i.e.., without gaze following/coordination or a speech exchange), just by 
knowing that the locus of attention is shared, even if this knowledge is irrelevant/trivial 
for one’s task/goals/performance. Experiment 1 addressed this question by proposing 
the dual attention paradigm (see Chapter 2). In this paradigm, two participants (i.e., a 
dyad sat side by side next to each other in front of a computer) performed independent 
sustained attention tasks, responding to target shapes (in a size/shape discrimination 
task), while attending to one visual hemifield for a whole experimental block. The 
attended side varied so that the dyad either shared or not the attended spatial 
hemifield. Taking into account previous findings in relation to the shared attention 
theory (Shteynberg, 2015, 2018), Experiment 1  hypothesised an enhanced attention 
performance when the dyad shared the locus of attention in the dual attention task (i.e.,
attention shared condition), in respect to the condition in which the locus of attention 
differed (i.e., attention notshared condition). Task performance was measured by the 
difference in RTs between attended vs. unattended conditions, a typical performance 
index known as the attention effect (Posner, 1980). Therefore, a stronger attention 
effect was expected for the attention shared scenario.  Strikingly however, the results 
showed the opposite pattern. A reduced attention performance was obtained when the 
dyad sustained attention towards the same visual hemifield. This was termed dual 
attention effect.  
A subsequent experiment (Exp2) investigated the outcome of a single 
participant performing the exact same task, just without a task partner. The modulation 
of the attention effect by the attention sharing conditions varied between the solo 
(Exp2) vs. dyadic (Exp1) version of the task, showing a completely opposite pattern. 
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The attention effect was enhanced for the “shared” condition in the solo version (i.e., in 
the condition where most of the large shapes were displayed at the same location), and
reduced for the (actual) Shared condition in the two-person task, relative to the “not 
shared” situation. The effect observed in the solo version was deemed as stimulus 
driven, attributed to the unbalanced distribution of target shapes in the task (see 
Chapter 2). Moreover, an additional experiment (EXp3) showed that the dual attention 
effect remains unaffected under an increased perceptual load, suggesting that the 
related behavioural attention performance reduction may not be taking place via a 
sensory-level attentional process, but that instead, the interfering inhibitory process 
(likely social, and related to the task partner) employs resources from a separate 
capacity, or is processed at a different stage (Handy & Mangun, 2000; Handy, Soltani, 
& Mangun, 2001). Considering that higher level processes are less likely to be affected 
by an increased perceptual load (Handy & Mangun, 2000), the previous result could 
also suggest that the dual attention effect takes place at a higher level information 
processing stage in the brain.
Taken together, the above-mentioned experiments point towards the existence 
of two different processing components in the dual attention task. A stimulus driven 
component (Exp 2), related to the statistical properties inherent to the behavioural task 
(i.e., the unbalanced distribution of target shapes across attention sharing conditions), 
and a social component (Exps 1 & 3), related to the interpersonal influence observed 
when performing the task in dyads, measured as a reduction in attention performance 
(i.e., a smaller attention effect) when sharing the attended locations with the task 
partner (i.e., the dual attention effect). This dual-process account however, cannot be 
confirmed based exclusively on the aforementioned behavioural data. Additional 
research is needed to investigate if separate processing modules are indeed behind 
the dual attention effect. Electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings could be employed
for this purpose. Indeed, given its high time resolution relative to other techniques (see 
Lopes da Silva, 2013, for a review), EEG allows a very precise investigation of the time
course of the information processing occurring in the brain, and could be employed to 
pinpoint the processing stage(s) where the dual attention effect takes place.
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4.1. Experiment 6
 4.1.1 Introduction
The aim of the current experiment was to investigate the neural correlates 
characterizing the interpersonal influence over human attention performance observed 
in the dual attention task. Specifically, the experiment examined the information 
processing stage(s) influenced by dual attention, and asked whether the dual attention 
effect (i.e., the socially driven attention performance drop observed when participants 
shared the locus of attention in the dual attention task), takes place at a sensory-level 
vs. a cognitive control stage. In order to address this question, EEG was 
simultaneously recorded from pairs of participants while they performed the dual 
attention task. Event-related potentials (ERP) analysis were carried out, focusing on 
the P1 and the N2b ERP components, well known markers of sensory-level attentional 
processing (Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998) and cognitive control (Folstein & Van Petten,
2008) respectively. In this line, the ERP component mirroring the behavioural pattern 
obtained in Exp1 (i.e., showing a reduced attention effect for the attention shared 
condition) would be considered as a neural correlate potentially driving the dual 
attention effect.
The current chapter also explores whether the dual attention effect, as reflected
in ERPs, relies on the personal task demands. In other words, the effect of an 
increased perceptual task load is examined, echoing Experiment 3. Although 
Experiment 3 suggested that the dual attention effect measured in reaction times is not 
modulated by perceptual load, previous research has shown that perceptual load 
effects absent in behavioural data may still occur when analysing electrophysiological 
event-related responses (Handy & Mangun, 2000; Handy et al., 2001). Therefore, it 
would be valuable to explore if that is the case for the dual attention task. Moreover, 
and also on an exploratory basis, this chapter evaluates the way in which the task 
partner’s stimulus set is processed and whether this processing is modulated by the 
attention sharing conditions.
The first half of the current chapter, introduced in the following paragraphs, 
presents the ERP analysis in relation to dual attention. In the second half of the 
chapter, the ERP results are followed-up by examining the role played by neural 
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oscillations in the dual attention effect6. Time-frequency analysis (e.g., Cohen, 2018; 
Herrmann, Rach, Vosskuhl, & Strüber, 2014) were employed for this purpose, 
investigating particularly the alpha and theta band rhythms, oscillatory indexes of visual
attention (Sauseng et al., 2005) and cognitive control (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014) 
respectively (see the section “Follow-up analysis: Investigating the role of brain 
oscillations in sensory processing and cognitive control”).    
 4.1.1.1 P1 component
 This early positive deflection, typically picking around 100ms, reflects neural 
activity in the extrastriate cortex when processing physical stimulus properties, and 
represents sensory level information processing in the brain (Hillyard & Picton, 1987). It
has been shown to be modulated by the voluntary orienting of visuo-spatial attention 
(e.g., Van Vorhis & Hillyard 1977; see Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998 for a review). In 
particular, in sustained attention experiments, where participants are asked to fixate the
centre of the screen while focusing their attention to one particular location, enhanced 
P1 are obtained for stimuli appearing at the attended locations compared to the 
unattended ones (e.g., Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000; Mangun, Hillyard, & Luck, 
1993). Larger P1 are also found when focusing on local vs. global features in a Navon 
task (Han, Fan, Chen, & Zhuo, 1997; Han, Liu, Yund, & Woods, 2000), suggesting that 
paying attention to hierarchical levels of stimuli affects the early visual processes 
reflected by P1. In addition, P1 has been shown to be modulated by perceptual load, 
with an enhancement in P1 amplitudes for perceptually more difficult tasks (e.g., Handy
& Mangun, 2000; Handy et al., 2001). This result indicates that the early sensory 
processes in the brain are also influenced by perceptual load. Moreover, it has been 
shown that increasing the perceptual load to (foveal) targets in spatial cueing tasks 
derives in a  decreased P1 response to (parafoveally presented) task-irrelevant stimuli, 
respect to a low-perceptual-load condition (Handy et al., 2001). In line with the load 
theory (e.g., Lavie, 2005, 2010), this outcome has been taken to suggest that an 
increased load for target stimuli reduces the residual attentional capacity available to 
process task-irrelevant information, and that P1 indexes this attentional capacity 
consumption (Handy et al., 2001). 
6  Experiment 6 was designed as an ERP study of the dual attention effect. The additional 
analysis on neural oscillations were only considered and performed as a follow-up to the 
ERP findings. The author wanted to reflect this sequence in the Chapter’s structure. For this
reason, the oscillations related analysis are only introduced in the second half of the 
Chapter, after presenting the ERP results.  
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P1 amplitudes can be further modulated by the social context of the task. 
Studies employing traditional gaze-cueing paradigms reported enhanced P1 event-
related responses for valid (i.e., trials were the gaze shift predicted the target location), 
compared to invalid trials (i.e., trials were the target appeared at the opposite location 
indicated by the cue) (Schuller & Rossion, 2005; Schuller & Rossion, 2001, 2004; 
Tipper, Handy, Giesbrecht, & Kingstone, 2008), echoing typical findings in the 
visuospatial attentional orienting literature (e.g., Van Vorhis & Hillyard 1977; Hillyard, 
Vogel, & Luck, 1998) . More recently, event-related responses have been examined 
using more elaborated social manipulations in relation to joint attention (e.g., Böckler & 
Sebanz, 2012; Caruana, de Lissa, & McArthur, 2015, 2017; Caruana & McArthur, 2019;
Wykowska, Wiese, Prosser, & Müller, 2014). For instance, in Wykowska, Wiese, 
Prosser, and Müller (2014), participants completed a typical gaze-cueing task with a 
centrally presented face of a humanoid robot. In this task, the robot was either gazing 
towards the location where a subsequent target would appear (valid trial), or the 
opposite (invalid trial). Participants were either told that the robot’s gaze was controlled 
by a human or by a computer. Under these conditions, participants ERP responses 
time-locked to the target onset were examined, revealing a stronger P1 amplitude for 
valid than invalid trials, but only when the robot’s gaze was believed to be controlled by
a human. This was interpreted by the author’s as potentially suggesting that adopting 
(or not) an intentional stance towards the robot (i.e., assuming that it has a mind) top-
down modulated the attentional control over the early sensory processes measured by 
P1 (i.e., sensory gain) (Wykowska et al., 2014). 
In addition, evidence from joint action settings suggest that co-representing a 
co-actor’s focus of attention may modulate the early attentional processes reflected by 
P1. As previously introduced in this thesis, Böckler, Knoblich and Sebanz (2012) 
employed a dyadic version of the Navon task to study task co-representation in 
attentional settings. As a reminder, in the single person version of the Navon task 
(Navon, 1977), participants are presented with a large letter (global stimulus feature) 
formed by many small letters (local stimulus feature), and their task is to 
discriminate/identify one of the two (i.e., either the local or the global feature of the 
stimuli). Faster responses are usually performed to the global compared with the local 
stimulus features. Moreover, regardless of the focus of attention (local or global), 
responses are typically impaired/slowed down when these features are incongruent 
(e.g., attending to the global feature when the stimuli is a large letter H formed by small
letters Ss), compared to the congruent condition (e.g., attending to the global feature 
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when the stimuli is a large letter H formed by small letters Hs). In the two-persons 
version of this task proposed by Böckler, Knoblich and Sebanz, participants still 
respond to the identity of the letters, but they are either focusing on the same (e.g., 
both people attending to the local stimulus features) or different (e.g., one person 
attending to the local feature, and the other person focusing on the global feature of the
stimulus) aspects of the task. In this dyadic setting, participants were slower at 
responding when the co-actor had a different focus of attention, suggesting that the 
different attentional focus employed by (or instructed to) the co-actor interfered with 
ones own focus when performing the task (Böckler, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012). 
Importantly for the current experiment, in the joint setting proposed by Böckler and 
colleagues, a significant reduction in P1 amplitudes was found when the co-actor had a
different focus of attention (Böckler & Sebanz, 2012b). The authors suggested this 
could be explained by an increased difficulty in selecting one’s focus of attention when 
the co-actor’s one differed. 
In the current study, a typical attentional effect in P1 amplitudes would be 
expected, with a larger P1 for the attended than unattended stimuli. This would 
replicate previous findings reported in literature (see above). In addition, if the dual 
attention effect influences the early sensory processing related to the P1 component, a 
dual attention effect should be obtained in P1. That is, a smaller attention effect when 
the dyad shares the attentional locus in the task than when the locus of attention 
differs. Moreover, if an increased perceptual load reduces this interpersonal social 
influence in the dual attention task, a three-way interaction Attention x Sharing x Load 
would be expected, with a smaller Attention x Sharing interaction (i.e., a reduced 
attention effect) for the High vs. Low Load condition.
Alternatively, it could happen that P1 amplitudes show a larger attention effect 
for the attention shared than for the notshared condition, rather than the attention 
performance drop characterising dual attention. Two different reasons could drive this 
result. On the one hand, Experiment 2 already showed this opposite pattern, and 
argued it could be potentially driven by the statistical properties of the stimuli in the dual
attention task. If this stimulus driven effect influences the early sensory processing 
related to the P1 component, then P1 amplitudes should show the same pattern. In 
addition, following the findings by  Böckler and Sebanz (2012) in the joint Navon task, it
could be plausible to expect that sharing the attended locations in the dual attention 
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task would elicit larger P1 and greater attentional effects than when the participants’ 
locus of attention differs.
 4.1.1.2 N2b component
The N2b component is a negative deflection peaking around 200-350ms after 
the stimulus onset, known to be originated in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), 
particularly in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Crottaz-Herbette & Menon, 2006; 
Van Veen & Carter, 2002). As the P1 component, the N2b is modulated by visual 
attention, with larger N2b amplitudes typically obtained in response to attended than 
unattended stimuli (e.g., Eimer, 1993; see also Wei, Rushby, & De Blasio, 2019). More 
importantly however, the N2b component has been considered a marker of cognitive 
inhibitory control and conflict monitoring (see Folstein & Van Petten, 2007 for a review; 
see also Vuillier, Bryce, Szücs, & Whitebread, 2016). In this line, this ERP component 
typically measured at fronto-central sites, is larger when inhibiting prepotent responses 
is required (i.e. response inhibition; see Folstein & Van Petten, 2008). For instance, the
larger N2b are obtained for incongruent than congruent trials in cognitive control tasks 
(Folstein & Van Petten, 2007; Larson, Clayson, & Clawson, 2014; Van Veen & Carter, 
2002), and enhanced N2b have been found for no-go trials in go/nogo tasks (Jodo & 
Kayama, 1992; Pfefferbaum, Ford, Weller, & Kopell, 1985). This no-go N2 has been 
further shown to be enhanced when the no-go stimuli share target features, inducing a 
response that needs to be suppressed (e.g., Azizian, Freitas, Parvaz, & Squires, 2006).
Additional evidence has suggested that attention may play an important modulating 
role on the effect obtained in go/nogo paradigms, with larger anterior N2s for attended 
stimuli (Eimer, 1993). The effect on the anterior N2 component however, seems to be 
less clear in paradigms where interference arising from irrelevant/ambiguous 
information needs to be suppressed (i.e., response conflict paradigms), since different 
effect-directions have been obtained for the Stroop task and doubts about the real 
meaning of the anterior N2 have been raised for the Flanker task (Vuillier, Bryce, 
Szücs, & Whitebread, 2016). 
In the current experiment, an attention effect in N2b amplitudes is expected. 
That is, greater (more negative) amplitudes for those stimuli that are attended vs. those
unattended. Moreover, If cognitive control is behind the dual attention effect, a 
modulation in the attention effect by the attention Sharing is expected in the N2b 
amplitudes, echoing the behavioural findings in Experiments 1 and 3. That is, a 
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reduced attention effect when the dyad sustains attention towards the same spatial 
location, than when their locus of attention differs. In addition, as introduced above, the 
current study also explores whether the ERP correlates of dual attention are modulated
by perceptual load. In this line, if the N2b data showed a dual attention effect, a 
modulation by task load would be of interest. A three-way interaction Attention x 
Sharing x Load would be expected if task load reduces the social influence under dual 
attention. In this case, a stronger interaction Attention x Sharing interaction (i.e., a large
attention effect) would be expected for the Low Task Load condition then for the High 
Load scenario. 
Finally, the P1 and N2b amplitudes were also evaluated time-locked to the task 
partner’s stimuli, but this was done in a purely exploratory fashion.
 4.1.2 Method
 4.1.2.1 Participants
Thirty-eight volunteers (19 dyads) participated in Experiment 6 (22 females; 34 
right handed; Mage= 23.18, SDage= 4.29). All of them reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and no known neurological impairment. They provided written informed 
consent to take part in the study, and were given either course credits or a monetary 
payment (£8/hour) for their participation. 
 4.1.2.2 Design
The current experiment employed a 2x2x2 factorial design, where Attention 
(attended vs. unattended location), Sharing (attention shared vs. notshared), and Load 
(low vs. high perceptual load) were manipulated within-subjects. The dependent 
variables were the P1 and N2b evoked amplitudes to one’s non-target stimulus (see 
below). The evoked responses to the co-actor’s non-target stimulus were also 
considered in a exploratory fashion. 
 4.1.2.3 Materials and procedure
The current experiment employed the same stimuli as Experiments 1 and 3 
(i.e., circles/squares, large/small) (see Figure 15), presented in two consecutive 
experimental sessions varying the task load (i.e., easy vs. hard size discrimination, 
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counterbalanced; see “Procedure” section below). The size of the large stimuli was 
always set to 4.57° x 4.57°. The size of the small stimuli on the other hand, was 2.38° x
2.38° for the easy size discrimination task (as in Exp1), and 3.97° x 3.97° for the 
difficult task (as in Exp3). Visual stimuli were presented in white against a black 
background.  Stimuli were presented on a CRT monitor, at a screen resolution of 1920 
× 1080 pixels and a refresh rate of 85Hz. E-prime 2.0 was used to program the 
experiment, control the experimental flow and record the responses. The responses 
were made using a standard mouse and keyboard.
Figure 15.  Experiment 6. The task for Experiment 6 combined the task sets and 
procedures employed in Experiments 1 and 3. During each trial, participants fixated a 
white cross displayed in the centre of the computer’s screen, while focusing their 
attention to one side of the visual field. Either large or small discs or squares were 
randomly displayed at the left or right side of the screen, one per trial. Each person in 
the dyad was assigned a stimulus shape (e.g. squares, counterbalanced) and had to 
quickly respond exclusively to the small version of the stimuli with their assigned shape
(e.g. respond only to small squares), appearing in the attended side of the screen. 
Manual responses had to be withheld to non-targets. 50% of the target stimuli 
appeared on the attended side of the screen (valid trials), and 50% of them appeared 
at the opposite location (invalid trials). They focused attention on one side of the screen
(containing 50% of the targets) in each block, and responded only to the targets 
appearing at the attended location (2:1 non-target vs. target ratio). The perceptual load 
of the task varied in two consecutive experimental sessions (counterbalanced). A) 
Employed the same perceptual load as in Experiment 1. B) Employed the same 
perceptual load as in Experiment 3.
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The task sets and procedures employed in Experiments 1 and 3 (see Figure 15)
were here combined (with some modifications, see below). Participants performed both
an easy (aka., low task load, as in Exp1) and a difficult (aka., high task load, as in 
Exp3) version of the size discrimination task proposed throughout this thesis, with the 
order counterbalanced). Participants completed the sustained visual attention task 
while sitting side by side next to each other in front of a computer monitor while EEG 
was simultaneously recorded from the two heads. As in previous experiments, the 
instructed focus of attention varied across blocks (i.e. participants deployed attention to
the left or right visual field), with the dyad either focusing on the same side (attention 
shared), or on different sides (attention NotShared) of the visual field. Participants were
constantly reminded (before starting each block of trials) to try to avoid eye blinks and 
movements during the stimulus presentation, and to keep looking at the central fixation 
cross throughout the experiment. As in the previous experiments, the viewing distance 
was set to 70cm.
The trial procedure mirrors the one used in Experiments 1 and 3, with some 
exceptions (see Figure 15). First, 50% (instead of 75%) of the target shapes appeared 
at the attended side of the screen, and participants responded only to valid trials (i.e., 
responded only to targets at the attended side). In the behavioural experiments 
described in the previous chapters, a 75% trial validity was employed to encourage 
sustained attention to the attended side (i.e., the side of the screen instructed to be 
attended). In the current experiment, sustained attention is encouraged by instructing 
participants to respond exclusively to the attended side (see Eimer, 1996; Hillyard, 
Vogel, & Luck, 1998 for a similar approach). Second, the small stimuli (with the 
assigned shape) were set as targets, instead of the large ones (e.g., Participant 1 
responded to the small squares, Participant 2 responded to the small circles; 
counterbalanced across participants), and only the evoked responses to non-target 
stimuli were considered for analysis (e.g., evoked responses to the large squares for 
Participant 1, and to the large circles for Participant 2). These later changes were 
aimed at maximising the evoked response to be analysed (given that stronger ERPs 
are typically elicited by larger stimuli; Celsia, 1993), and to avoid the data 
contamination induced by manual responses to target shapes (Luck, 2014). In addition,
to increase the number of trials available for analysis, the non-target stimuli displayed 
doubled the amount of target stimuli (2:1 non-target vs. target ratio). Stimuli were 
displayed for 150ms, with a jittered inter-trial-interval (ITI) between 900ms and 1300ms.
Short breaks were allowed every 100 trials. A total of 2400 trials were completed during
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the experiment, 1200 per experimental session (low vs. high perceptual load). From 
these 1200 trials per session, participants responded to 200 trials (i.e., to the small 
stimuli with the target shape, displayed at the attended side; 100 per each participant), 
while EEG activity for 800 trials were considered for analysis (i.e., EEG responses to 
the large stimuli with the target shape, displayed either at the attended or unattended 
side; 400 per each participant). The remaining 200 trials corresponded to stimuli that 
were not responded to by the participants, nor considered for EEG analysis (i.e., the 
small stimuli with the target shape, displayed at the unattended side; 100 per each 
participant). As in previous experiments, responses were made with a left-mouse-click 
for the participant sat on the right, and with a “space bar” key press for the person sat 
on the left. The responding hand was counterbalanced across subjects. Responses 
were recorded in a response window of 900ms after stimulus onset.  
 4.1.2.4 Behavioural data analysis
As introduced above, the experimental design here employed contains two 
important differences respect to the behavioural dual attention experiments presented 
in the previous Chapters. Here, a 50% target validity (instead of 75%) was employed, 
and the participants responded exclusively to targets appearing at the attended side of 
the screen (while in the previous experiments responses where made to both attended 
and unattended locations). In addition, to avoid contamination derived from manual 
responses, only electrophysiological responses to non-target stimuli (which doubled the
number of target ones) were considered for the EEG analysis. These are typical 
choices in the EEG literature (Cohen, 2014a; Luck, 2014), however, they have 
important implications in terms of the behavioural data available for analysis, and limits 
the study of potential links between EEG and behaviour. Particularly, since participants 
responded only to targets at attended locations, no data were available for unattended 
locations, and therefore, no clear measure of behavioural attentional performance 
could be derived. That is, no attention effect was available in RTs. In addition, since 
RTs to attended targets were performed and recorded, and only EEG to non-target 
stimuli were analysed, these two datasets could not be correlated to investigate their 
relationship. 
Although a clear measure of attention performance was not possible (i.e., no 
attention effect), here, for completeness, the available behavioural data were examined
(i.e., the responses to target stimuli displayed at attended locations). The full sample 
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size was considered for statistical analyses (i.e., 38 participants). Participants showed 
accuracies ranging from 80% to 100%. All the analyses were performed using R 
(version ‘1.1.456’) and RStudio (RStudio Team, 2016). As in the previous Chapters, the
analyses employed classic ANOVAs, the percentile bootstrap method on 20% trimmed 
means (Wilcox, 2012), and Bayes factors. These were computed using the R packages
‘ez’ (Lawrence, 2016),  ‘WRS2’ (Wilcox & Schönbrodt, 2014), and ‘BayesFactor’ 
(Morey & Rouder, 2015), respectively.
 4.1.2.5 Electrophysiological recordings
The EEG activity was recorded with BrainAmp DC amplifiers (Brain Products 
GmbH, Munich, Germany) 30 Ag/AgCl electrodes (Fp1, Fp2, Fz, F3, F4, F7, F8, FCz, 
Cz, C3, C4, T7, T8, CPz, CP3, CP4, Pz, P3, P4, P7, P8, POz, PO3, PO4, PO7, PO8, 
PO9, PO10, O1, O2) placed on scalp surface following the extended 10-20 system 
(Chatrian, Lettich, & Nelson, 1985).  The EEG signal was acquired with a sampling rate
of 1000Hz and a resolution of 0.1µV. The system’s online filtering parameters were set 
up to 0.01Hz (low-frequency cutoff) and 250Hz (high-frequency cutoff). Impedances for 
each channel were kept below 20kΩ before testing.  To obtain the dual-EEG 
recordings, a split ground channel was used. Both participants in a dyad shared this 
split ground electrode, which was positioned on the AFz location for each of them. 
Additional electrodes were placed on each participant’s left (M1) and right (M2) 
mastoids. The left mastoid electrode of the participant sitting on the left was used as 
the physical reference of the system. For each participant, the individual recordings 
were re-referenced off-line to the average of his/her own mastoid electrodes (M1 and 
M2).
 4.1.2.6 Event-related potentials (ERP) data analysis
The ERP data were analysed in MATLAB 8.3 (MathWorks Inc. Natick, MA) 
using the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004), the ERPLAB toolbox (Lopez-
Calderon & Luck, 2014), the Fieldtrip toolbox (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 
2011), the LIMO toolbox (Pernet, Chauveau, Gaspar, & Rousselet, 2011), and 
customized scripts. The data were low pass filtered at 40 Hz and high pass filtered at 
0.1 Hz, using Butterworth filters with order 4 (24dB/oct). Prior to applying the high pass 
filter, the DC offset was removed from the signals.  Only trials containing non-target 
stimuli were considered for further analysis. Trials with responses to non-targets were 
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excluded. The remaining data were segmented into epochs [-100ms, 600ms] time-
locked to the stimulus onsets. The period of 100ms before the stimulus onset was used
to calculate the baseline and the epochs were baseline corrected. Both threshold (±60 
µV) and moving window (peak to peak amplitude 100µV, window size 200ms, window 
step 50ms) methods were applied for artefact detection. Epochs marked as artifactual 
were excluded from further analysis. Participants with more than 40% of the epochs 
rejected were removed (8 participants in total). The remaining epochs were averaged 
separately for each condition. Grand average waveforms were computed from the 
individual averages from the remaining 30 participants.
Statistical analyses were performed on the P1 and N2b components. For both 
ERP components the electrode sites and time windows of interest were determined 
using collapsed localisers (Luck, 2014; Luck & Gaspelin, 2017). That is, for the contrast
of interest (i.e., the attention effect), the average of the grand average waveforms (aka.
grand-grand average waveform; Luck & Gaspelin, 2017) was computed across the 
conditions to be analysed (i.e., Sharing: shared, notshared; Load: low, high) (see 
Figure 16). From these grand-grand average attention effect waveforms, for each 
component, the electrodes and time ranges displaying the largest attention effect were 
chosen as the analysis parameters to examine the non-collapsed data. In this way, the 
P1 component was subsequently quantified by measuring the average mean EEG 
amplitude at parieto-occipital sites (PO7/8, PO9/10) contralateral to the stimulus 
location, in the time window [110-130ms]. For the N2b component the mean amplitude 
at fronto-central sites (FCz, Cz) in the time window [240-260ms] was evaluated. The 
grand-averaged waveforms are presented in Figure 17 (P1) and Figure 18 (N2b). The 
statistical analyses were performed using R (version ‘1.1.456’) and RStudio (RStudio 
Team, 2016). Mean ERP amplitudes data were analysed employing classic ANOVAs, 
the percentile bootstrap method on 20% trimmed means (Wilcox, 2012), and Bayes 
factors. These were computed using the R packages ‘ez’ (Lawrence, 2016),  ‘WRS2’ 
(Wilcox & Schönbrodt, 2014), and ‘BayesFactor’ (Morey & Rouder, 2015), respectively.
141
BA
Figure 16.  Collapsed localisers for ERPs. Collapsed localisers were employed to 
determine the electrode sites and time-windows of interest for the P1 and N2b 
components. A) P1 component. Contralateral parieto-occipital sites (PO7/8, PO9/10) 
and the time window [110-130ms] were considered for the subsequent analysis on the 
non-collapsed data. B) N2b component. Fronto-central sites (FCz, Cz) in the time 
window [240-260ms] were considered for statistical analysis.
 4.1.3 Results (Behaviour)
 4.1.3.1 Accuracies
Mean accuracies (to target stimuli at attended locations) (see Table 15), were 
submitted to a 2x2 repeated-measures analysis with Sharing (attention shared vs. 
notshared) and Load (low vs. high perceptual load ) as within-subjects factors. The 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Sharing F(1, 37) = 4.28, p = .046, ηG2
=0.014, but this result was not supported by the robust test (i.e., the percentile 
bootstrap on 20% trimmed means),  ψ^  = 1.42 [-0.21, 2.92], p = .091. The main effect of 
Load was significant, F(1, 37) = 25.64, p < .001, ηG2 =0.206; ψ^  = -6.54 [-8.42, -4.67], p = 
0. Participants showed lower accuracies when responding to the high perceptual load 
condition (Mhighload = 94.03 %, 95% CI [92.67, 95.38]), than to the low perceptual load 
scenario (Mlowload = 97.63 ms, 95% CI [97, 98.26]). The interaction Sharing x Load was 
not significant for the ANOVA test, F(1, 37) = 3.00, p = .091, but the opposite result was
obtained with the robust method, ψ^  = -1.42 [-2.38, -0.17], p = .033. The effect of 
Sharing was subsequently examined separately for each Load condition. In the low 
perceptual load setting, participants performance dropped when sharing attention with 
the task partner, compared to the attention notshared condition, F(1, 37) = 8.42, p 
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= .006, ηG
2 =0.076; ψ^  = 0.96 [0.33, 1.67], p = .002.  No statistical difference across 
Sharing conditions was obtained for the high perceptual load condition, F(1, 37) = 0.46,
p = .502; ψ^  = 0.21 [-0.83, 1.29], p = .691.
Table 15. Mean accuracies (with SD) for Experiment 6. The accuracies here presented 
indicate the percentage of correct responses to target stimuli displayed at attended 
locations. 
Experimental Condition
Low perceptual load High perceptual load
Shared Notshared Shared Notshared
96.95(2.88) 98.32(1.83) 93.84(4.51) 94.21(4.41)
 4.1.3.2 RTs
From the go-trials, only trials with correct responses were analysed (92.6%). 
Outliers were determined and removed using the 2.5-Median Absolute Deviation (MAD)
method. This eliminated 4.9% of the remaining data.
Mean RTs (to target stimuli at attended locations), were submitted to a 2x2 
repeated-measures analysis with Sharing (attention shared vs. notshared) and Load 
(low vs. high perceptual load ) as within-subjects factors (see Table 16). The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Load, F(1, 37) = 17.48, p < .001, ηG2 =0.097, 
supported by the outcome of the robust test (i.e., the percentile bootstrap on 20% 
trimmed means), ψ^  = 51.39 [26.3, 81.05], p < .001. RTs were faster for the low 
perceptual load condition (Mlowload = 473 ms, 95% CI [460, 487]), than for the high load 
scenario (Mhighload = 500 ms, 95% CI [488, 513]). The main effect of Sharing was not 
significant, F(1, 37) = 0.04, p = .836; ψ^  = -2.12 [-11.39, 7.34], p = .648, nor the 
interaction Sharing x Load, F(1, 37) = 4.28, p = .046, ηG2 =0.014; ψ^  = 7.25 [-8.836, 
22.56], p = .372. Indeed, for this interaction, Bayes factors, BF01 = 3.245 suggested 
“moderate” support for the model without the interaction, relative to the model with it, 
given the data. Given that the main interest here was on the RTs for the low perceptual 
load condition, I run additional analysis to examine the effect of Sharing for each 
perceptual load condition separately. RTs were not statistically different across Sharing 
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conditions for the low perceptual load condition, F(1, 37) = 0.99, p = .326; ψ^  = -4.14 [-
12.82, 5.05], p = .372, nor for the high perceptual load setting F(1, 37) = 0.70, p = .408;
ψ^  = 5.56 [-3.36, 13.62], p = .213. 
Table 16. Mean RTs in ms (with SD) for Experiment 6. Mean RTs to target stimuli 
displayed at attended locations are here presented. 
Experimental Condition
Low perceptual load High perceptual load
Shared Notshared Shared Notshared
475(43) 471(44) 499(42) 502(38)
 4.1.4 Results (ERPs)
Statistical analysis (i.e., classic ANOVAs, percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed 
means, and Bayes factors) were performed on each ERP component (P1, N2b). The 
main interest here was on the event-related responses time locked to one’s own stimuli
for the low perceptual load condition. The responses to the high load condition, and the
responses time locked to the co-actor’s stimuli were also analysed. The latter however, 
were deemed as exploratory. 
 4.1.4.1 P1 component
P1 mean amplitudes data in the time window of interest [110-130ms] were 
submitted to separate 3-way analysis (rmANOVA, robust method, and Bayes Factors) 
for each stimulus type (own vs. coactor’s) (see Table 17). The 3-way interactions 
Attention (attended vs. unattended) x Sharing (attention shared vs. notshared) x Load 
(low vs. high perceptual load) were not significant for both the P1 responses to the own
and to the coactor’s stimuli, and in both cases, Bayes Factors (BF10 = 0.268, and 
BF10 = 0.294, respectively) suggested “moderate” support for the model without the 
interaction, given the data. Given that the main interest here was on the event-related 
responses time locked to one’s own stimuli for the low perceptual load condition, and 
considering that a clear a-priori hypothesis was made for the interaction between 
attention and sharing conditions (i.e., the dual attention effect) under low perceptual 
load, a separate 2-way analysis was run for this particular case (see also Perugini, 
Gallucci, & Costantini, 2018; Wahlsten, 1991; for arguments suggesting that a higher 
sample size may be needed to detect interaction effects in factorial designs). For 
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clarity, separate analysis for the P1 responses to the own stimuli in high load, the 
partner’s stimuli in low load, and the partner’s stimuli in high load, were also performed.
The results are presented below, and should be interpreted with caution.
Table 17. Mean P1 amplitudes in μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), 
in the time window [110-130ms]. 
Experimental Condition
Notshared Shared
Stimuli Perceptual load Attended Unattended Attended Unattended
Own Low 1.71(1.43) 1.42(1.50) 2.12(1.71) 1.34(1.40)
High 2.10(1.94) 1.33(1.65) 2.02(1.73) 0.94(1.67)
Co-actor’s Low 2.09(1.85) 1.31(1.37) 2.29(1.80) 1.30(1.70)
High 2.02(1.80) 1.53(1.27) 1.81(1.56) 1.06(1.52)
 4.1.4.1.1 P1 component: own stimuli, low task load
The data regarding the P1 component for own stimuli and a low task load are 
summarised in Figure 17a. Mean ERP amplitudes data were submitted to a 2x2 
repeated-measures-ANOVA with Attention (Attended vs. Unattended) and Sharing 
(Shared vs. Notshared) as within-subjects factors (see Figure 17a). The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Attention, F(1, 29) = 9.62, p = .004, ηG2 =0.031, due 
to a typical attention effect in P1 amplitudes. That is, larger P1 amplitudes were 
obtained for the Attended stimuli (Mattended = 1.91 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [1.36, 2.47]) than for the 
Unattended ones (Munattended = 1.38 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [0.87, 1.89]). More importantly, the 
attention effect varied across sharing conditions, as indicated by the significant 
interaction Attention x Sharing, F(1, 29) = 4.70, p = .039, ηG2 =0.007. The attention effect
was stronger when attention was shared by the dyad (MAttEffect, Shared = 0.78 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI 
[0.37, 1.2]), than when it was not shared (MAttEffect, Notshared = 0.29 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [-0.15, 
0.72]). The main effect of Sharing was not significant.
The percentile bootstrap method on 20% trimmed means showed a significant 
main effect of Attention, ψ^  = 0.99 [0.30, 1.67], p = .003, a non-significant main effect of 
Sharing, ψ^  = -0.19 [-0.77, 0.37], p =.516, and a non-significant interaction Attention x 
Sharing, ψ^  = -0.46 [-0.91, 0.07], p =.094. To address the disparity between classic 
ANOVAs and the bootstrap method in relation to this 2-way interaction, the attention 
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effect was computed (to directly examine the contrast of interest) and compared across
attention sharing conditions by means of a Yuen’s test for dependent trimmed means 
(20% trimming). This yielded a significant difference, Mdiff = 0.63 [0.16, 0.79], Yt (17) = 
2.54, p= 0.021. For this interaction, Bayes factors (BF10 = 0.868) remained insensitive.
Post-hoc simple main effects analysis examined the effect of Sharing separately
for the each of the Attention conditions. Both classic (ANOVA) and robust statistics 
(percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means) yielded a non-significant difference 
between the P1 amplitudes to attended locations across Sharing conditions, F(1, 29) = 
4.10 , p =  .052; ψ^  = -0.37 [-0.78, 0.06], p = .093. Similarly, P1 amplitudes to 
unattended locations were not statistically different across Sharing conditions, F(1, 29) 
= 0.23 , p = .634; ψ^  = 0.13 [-0.21, 0.45], p = .480.  
 4.1.4.1.2 P1 component: own stimuli, high task load
The data regarding the P1 component for own stimuli and a high task load are 
summarised in Figure 17b. The 2x2 ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
Attention, F(1, 29) = 19.83, p = 1.16e-4, ηG2 =0.067, due to larger P1 amplitudes evoked
by the Attended stimuli (Mattended = 2.06 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [1.40, 2.72]) than by the 
Unattended ones (Munattended = 1.13 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [0.54, 1.73]). The main effect of Sharing
was not significant, F(1, 29) = 3.01, p = .093, nor the interaction Attention x Sharing, 
F(1, 29) = 1.64, p = .211.
The outcome of the robust method mirrored the ANOVA results. The percentile 
bootstrap on 20% trimmed means yielded a significant main effect of Attention, ψ^  = 
1.78 [1.07, 2.59], p = 0, a non-significant main effect of Sharing, ψ^  = 0.56 [-0.04, 1.03], 
p =.070, and a non-significant interaction Attention x Sharing, ψ^  = -0.35 [-0.82, 0.17], p 
=.186. Bayes factors for this interaction (BF10 = 0.287) suggested “moderate” support 
for the model without the interaction, given the data.
 4.1.4.1.3 P1 component: co-actor’s stimuli, low task load
The data regarding the P1 component for the co-actor’s stimuli and a low task 
load are summarised in Figure 17c. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of 
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Attention, F(1, 29) = 14.58, p = 6.54e-4, ηG2 =0.067, due to larger P1 amplitudes for the 
Attended stimuli (Mattended = 2.19 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [1.55, 2.83]) than for the Unattended ones 
(Munattended = 1.31 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [0.77, 1.84]). The main effect of Sharing was not 
significant (F(1, 29) = 0.36, p = .555, ηG2 =0.001), nor the interaction Attention x Sharing 
(F(1, 29) = 0.48, p = .492, ηG2 =0.001).
 The results after computing the percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means 
pointed in the same direction. This method yielded a significant main effect of Attention,
ψ^  = 1.32 [0.51, 2.40], p = 0, a non-significant main effect of Sharing, ψ^  = -0.21 [-1.00, 
0.54], p =.609, and a non-significant interaction Attention x Sharing, ψ^  = -0.25 [-0.89, 
0.40], p =.493. Bayes factors for this interaction (BF10 = 0.271) suggested “moderate” 
support for the model without the interaction, given the data
 4.1.4.1.4 P1 component: co-actor’s stimuli, high task load
The data regarding the P1 component for the co-actor’s stimuli and a high task 
load are summarised in Figure 17d. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
Attention, F(1, 29) = 8.65, p = .006, ηG2 =0.039, due to a typical attention effect in the P1
amplitudes, with stronger P1 responses for the Attended stimuli (Mattended = 1.91 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 
95% CI [1.32, 2.50]) than for the Unattended ones (Munattended = 1.30 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [0.81, 
1.79]). The main effect of Sharing was also significant, F(1, 29) = 5.94, p = .021, ηG2
=0.012, with larger P1 responses evoked by the NotShared stimuli (Mattended = 1.78 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 
95% CI [1.25, 2.30]) than by the Shared ones (Munattended = 1.43 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [0.93, 
1.94]). The interaction Attention x Sharing was not significant, F(1, 29) = 0.85, p = .363,
ηG
2 =0.002.
 The percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means mirrored the ANOVA results. 
It yielded a significant main effect of Attention, ψ^  = 1.39 [0.41, 2.22], p = .006, a 
significant main effect of Sharing, ψ^  = 0.60 [0.03, 1.23], p =.034, and a non-significant 
interaction Attention x Sharing, ψ^  = -0.28 [-0.86, 0.34], p =.383. Bayes factors for this 
interaction (BF10 = 0.283) suggested “moderate” support for the model without the 
interaction, given the data
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P1 component, own stimuli, low task load
Figure 17a.  P1 component for own stimuli and a low task load. A) Grand averaged
ERP waveforms. The time window of interest [110-130ms] is displayed in grey. B) 
Average topographic maps in the time window [110-130ms]. For each topographic 
map, the right/left hemisphere show the mean amplitude for sites 
contralateral/ipsilateral to the stimulus location. The dark dots represent the plotted 
channel locations. C) Attention effect across attention sharing conditions. The shaded 
areas surrounding the waveforms represent 95% CIs. D) Pirateplot showing the mean 
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ERP amplitudes for the time window of interest. The gray boxes surrounding the mean 
values represent 95% CIs. E) 20% trimmed mean difference between the attention 
effect for the attention Shared and Notshared conditions. This difference is displayed 
with 95% CIs around the trimmed mean. The coloured waveforms show the difference 
(i.e., attention effect Shared minus Notshared) for each single participant. The dashed 
red line represents the zero [μVV] value. The blue dots at the bottom of the plot (below 
the plot legend) show the time points where a significant difference (between the 
attention effect for the Shared vs. Notshared conditions) was obtained using yuen’s 
tests (for dependent groups) on 20% trimmed means (at α =0.05). These values are 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons. The yuen’s tests were computed using the 
function “limo_yuend_ttest”, part of the LIMO toolbox (Pernet, Chauveau, Gaspar, & 
Rousselet, 2011). F) Proportion of participants (from 0 to 1, for every time point) 
showing a stronger attention effect for the attention Shared condition, compared to the 
Notshared scenario. The plots C, E, and F were created using a modified version of the
code available at: https://github.com/GRousselet/blog/tree/master/erp_differences
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P1 component, own stimuli, high task load
Figure 17b.  P1 component for own stimuli and a high task load. A) Grand 
averaged ERP waveforms. The time window of interest [110-130ms] is displayed in 
grey. B) Average topographic maps in the time window [110-130ms]. For each 
topographic map, the right/left hemisphere show the mean amplitude for sites 
contralateral/ipsilateral to the stimulus location. The dark dots represent the plotted 
channel locations. C) Attention effect across attention sharing conditions. The shaded 
areas surrounding the waveforms represent 95% CIs. D) Pirateplot showing the mean 
ERP amplitudes for the time window of interest. The gray boxes surrounding the mean 
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values represent 95% CIs. E) 20% trimmed mean difference between the attention 
effect for the attention Shared and Notshared conditions. This difference is displayed 
with 95% CIs around the trimmed mean. The coloured waveforms show the difference 
(i.e., attention effect Shared minus Notshared) for each single participant. The dashed 
red line represents the zero [μVV] value. The blue dots at the bottom of the plot (below 
the plot legend) show the time points where a significant difference (between the 
attention effect for the Shared vs. Notshared conditions) was obtained using yuen’s 
tests (for dependent groups) on 20% trimmed means (at α =0.05). These values are 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons. The yuen’s tests were computed using the 
function “limo_yuend_ttest”, part of the LIMO toolbox (Pernet, Chauveau, Gaspar, & 
Rousselet, 2011). F) Proportion of participants (from 0 to 1, for every time point) 
showing a stronger attention effect for the attention Shared condition, compared to the 
Notshared scenario.The plots C, E, and F were created using a modified version of the 
code available at: https://github.com/GRousselet/blog/tree/master/erp_differences
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P1 component, co-actor’s stimuli, low task load
Figure 17c.  P1 component for co-actor’s stimuli and a low task load. A) Grand 
averaged ERP waveforms. The time window of interest [110-130ms] is displayed in 
grey. B) Average topographic maps in the time window [110-130ms]. For each 
topographic map, the right/left hemisphere show the mean amplitude for sites 
contralateral/ipsilateral to the stimulus location. The dark dots represent the plotted 
channel locations. C) Attention effect across attention sharing conditions. The shaded 
areas surrounding the waveforms represent 95% CIs. D) Pirateplot showing the mean 
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ERP amplitudes for the time window of interest. The grey boxes surrounding the mean 
values represent 95% CIs. E) 20% trimmed mean difference between the attention 
effect for the attention Shared and Notshared conditions. This difference is displayed 
with 95% CIs around the trimmed mean. The coloured waveforms show the difference 
(i.e., attention effect Shared minus Notshared) for each single participant. The dashed 
red line represents the zero [μVV] value. The blue dots at the bottom of the plot (below 
the plot legend) show the time points where a significant difference (between the 
attention effect for the Shared vs. Notshared conditions) was obtained using yuen’s 
tests (for dependent groups) on 20% trimmed means (at α =0.05). These values are 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons. The yuen’s tests were computed using the 
function “limo_yuend_ttest”, part of the LIMO toolbox (Pernet, Chauveau, Gaspar, & 
Rousselet, 2011). F) Proportion of participants (from 0 to 1, for every time point) 
showing a stronger attention effect for the attention Shared condition, compared to the 
Notshared scenario. The plots C, E, and F were created using a modified version of the
code available at: https://github.com/GRousselet/blog/tree/master/erp_differences
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P1 component, co-actor’s stimuli, high task load
Figure 17d.  P1 component for co-actor’s stimuli and a high task load. A) Grand 
averaged ERP waveforms. The time window of interest [110-130ms] is displayed in 
grey. B) Average topographic maps in the time window [110-130ms]. For each 
topographic map, the right/left hemisphere show the mean amplitude for sites 
contralateral/ipsilateral to the stimulus location. The dark dots represent the plotted 
channel locations. C) Attention effect across attention sharing conditions. The shaded 
areas surrounding the waveforms represent 95% CIs. D) Pirateplot showing the mean 
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ERP amplitudes for the time window of interest. The gray boxes surrounding the mean 
values represent 95% CIs. E) 20% trimmed mean difference between the attention 
effect for the attention Shared and Notshared conditions. This difference is displayed 
with 95% CIs around the trimmed mean. The coloured waveforms show the difference 
(i.e., attention effect Shared minus Notshared) for each single participant. The dashed 
red line represents the zero [μVV] value. The blue dots at the bottom of the plot (below 
the plot legend) show the time points where a significant difference (between the 
attention effect for the Shared vs. Notshared conditions) was obtained using yuen’s 
tests (for dependent groups) on 20% trimmed means (at α =0.05). These values are 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons. The yuen’s tests were computed using the 
function “limo_yuend_ttest”, part of the LIMO toolbox (Pernet, Chauveau, Gaspar, & 
Rousselet, 2011). F) Proportion of participants (from 0 to 1, for every time point) 
showing a stronger attention effect for the attention Shared condition, compared to the 
Notshared scenario. The plots C, E, and F were created using a modified version of the
code available at: https://github.com/GRousselet/blog/tree/master/erp_differences
 4.1.4.1 N2b component
N2b mean amplitudes data in the time window of interest [240-260ms] were 
submitted to separate 3-way analysis (rmANOVA, robust method, and Bayes Factors) 
for each stimulus type (own vs. coactor’s) (see Table 18). The 3-way interactions 
Attention (attended vs. unattended) x Sharing (attention shared vs. notshared) x Load 
(low vs. high perceptual load) were not significant for both the N2b responses to the 
own and the coactor’s stimuli. In both cases, Bayes Factors (BF10 = 0.232, and BF10 
= 0.270, respectively) suggested “moderate” support for the model without the 
interaction, given the data. As for P1, given that the main interest here was on the 
event-related responses time locked to one’s own stimuli for the low perceptual load 
condition, and considering that a clear a-priori hypothesis was made for the interaction 
between attention and sharing conditions (i.e., the dual attention effect) under low 
perceptual load, separate 2-way analysis were run for this particular case (see also 
Perugini, Gallucci, & Costantini, 2018; Wahlsten, 1991; for arguments suggesting that a
higher sample size may be needed to detect interaction effects in factorial designs). 
For clarity, separate analysis for the N2b responses to the own stimuli in high load, the 
partner’s stimuli in low load, and the partner’s stimuli in high load, were also performed.
The results are presented below, and should be interpreted with caution.
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Table 18. Mean N2b amplitudes in μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V (with SD), at fronto-central sites (FCz, Cz), in the
time window [240-260ms].
Experimental Condition
Notshared Shared
Stimuli Perceptual load Attended Unattended Attended Unattended
Own Low -0.75(2.97) 2.35(2.28) -0.05(2.90) 2.08(2.42)
High -1.71(3.88) 2.39(2.54) -1.60(4.03) 2.17(2.93)
Co-actor’s Low 0.67(2.92) 2.28(2.64) 0.79(2.66) 2.53(2.70)
High -0.18(3.28) 2.47(2.92) -0.04(3.00) 2.48(3.19)
 4.1.4.1.1 N2b component: own stimuli, low task load
The data regarding the N2b component for own stimuli and a high task load are 
summarised in Figure 18a. Mean ERP amplitudes data were submitted to a 2x2 
repeated-measures-ANOVA with Attention (Attended vs. Unattended) and Sharing 
(Shared vs. Notshared) as within-subjects factors (see Figure 18a). The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Attention, F(1, 29) = 25.08, p = 2.48e-5, ηG2 =0.199, 
due to a typical attention effect in the N2b amplitudes. That is, larger N2b (i.e., more 
negative) amplitudes were obtained for the Attended stimuli (Mattended = -0.40 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% 
CI [-1.42, 0.63]) than for the Unattended ones (Munattended = 2.21 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [1.37, 
3.05]). Moreover, a significant interaction Attention x Sharing, F(1, 29) = 5.82, p = .022,
ηG
2 =0.009, indicated that the attention effect was modulated by the attention sharing 
conditions. A smaller attention effect was obtained when attention was Shared by the 
dyad (MAttEffect, Shared = -2.12 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [-3.24, -1.01]), than when it was NotShared 
(MAttEffect, Notshared = -3.09 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [-4.26, -1.93]). This mirrors the attention reduction 
effect (i.e., the dual attention effect) obtained behaviourally (i.e., in RTs) in previous 
Experiments (e.g., Exp1, Exp3, Exp4). The main effect of Sharing was not significant, 
F(1, 29) = 0.78, p = .381, ηG2 =0.002.
The percentile bootstrap method on 20% trimmed means showed a significant 
main effect of Attention, ψ^  = -3.49 [-6.27, -1.99], p = 0, a non-significant main effect of 
Sharing, ψ^  = -0.59 [-1.65, 0.50], p =.295, and a non-significant interaction Attention x 
Sharing, ψ^  = -0.69 [-1.67, 0.09], p =.086. To address the disparity between classic 
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ANOVAs and the bootstrap method in relation to this 2 way interaction, the attention 
effect was computed (to directly examine the contrast of interest) and compared across
attention sharing conditions by means of a Yuen’s test for dependent trimmed means 
(20% trimming). This yielded a significant difference, Mdiff = 1.08 [0.11, 2.05], Yt (17) = 
2.35, p= 0.031. For this interaction, Bayes factors (BF10 = 0.4) remained insensitive.  
Post-hoc simple main effects analysis examined the effect of Sharing separately
for the each of the Attention conditions. Both the classic ANOVA and the (robust) 
percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means yielded a non-significant difference 
between the participants N2b amplitudes to attended locations across Sharing 
conditions, F(1, 29) = 3.48 , p =  .072; ψ^  = -0.59 [-1.47, 0.23], p = .170. Similarly, no 
statistical difference was obtained when comparing the N2b amplitudes to unattended 
locations across Sharing conditions, F(1, 29) = 1.25 , p = .273; ψ^  = 0.21 [-0.25, 0.68], p
= .376.
 4.1.4.1.2 N2b component: own stimuli, high task load
The data regarding the N2b component for own stimuli and a high task load are 
summarised in Figure 18b. The 2x2 ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
Attention, F(1, 29) = 24.47, p = 2.94e-5, ηG2 =0.257, due to stronger N2b amplitudes 
evoked by the Attended stimuli (Mattended = -1.66 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [-3.09, -0.22]) than by the 
Unattended ones (Munattended = 2.28 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [1.31, 3.25]). The main effect of Sharing
was not significant, F(1, 29) = 0.04, p = .829, nor the interaction Attention x Sharing, 
F(1, 29) = 0.44, p = .511.
 The outcome of the robust method mirrored the ANOVA results. The percentile 
bootstrap on 20% trimmed means yielded a significant main effect of Attention, ψ^  = -
6.78 [-10.1, -3.87], p = 0, a non-significant main effect of Sharing, ψ^  = 0.14 [-0.59, 
0.87], p =.689, and a non-significant interaction Attention x Sharing, ψ^  = -0.19 [-1.27, 
0.83], p =.702. Bayes factors for this interaction (BF10 = 0.274) suggested “moderate” 
support for the model without the interaction, given the data.
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 4.1.4.1.3 N2b component: co-actor’s stimuli, low task load
The data regarding the N2b component for the co-actor’s stimuli and a low task 
load are summarised in Figure 18c. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of 
Attention, F(1, 29) = 10.60, p = .003, ηG2 =0.089, due to a larger N2b for the Attended 
stimuli (Mattended = 0.73 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [-0.24, 1.71]) than for the Unattended ones 
(Munattended = 2.41 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [1.45, 3.37]). The main effect of Sharing was not 
significant, F(1, 29) = 0.81, p = .814, nor the interaction Attention x Sharing, F(1, 29) = 
0.07, p = .800.
The results after computing the percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means 
pointed in the same direction. This method yielded a significant main effect of Attention,
ψ^  = -2.80 [-4.51, -1.32], p = 8e-4, a non-significant main effect of Sharing, ψ^  = -0.41 [-
1.36, 0.61], p =.431, and a non-significant interaction Attention x Sharing, ψ^  = -0.26 [-
0.72, 1.25], p =.604. Bayes factors for this interaction (BF10 = 0.261) suggested 
“moderate” support for the model without the interaction, given the data.
 4.1.4.1.4 N2b component: co-actor’s stimuli, high task load
The data regarding the N2b component for the co-actor’s stimuli and a high task
load are summarised in Figure 18d. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
Attention, F(1, 29) = 22.47, p = 5.22e-5, ηG2 =0.152, due to a typical attention effect in 
the N2b amplitudes, with stronger N2b responses for the Attended stimuli (Mattended = -
0.11 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% CI [-1.18, 0.97]) than for the Unattended ones (Munattended = 2.47 μV (with SD), at contralateral sites (PO7/8, PO9/10), V, 95% 
CI [1.39, 3.56]). The main effect of Sharing was not significant, F(1, 29) = 0.06, p 
= .804, nor the interaction Attention x Sharing, F(1, 29) = 0.05, p = .820.
 The percentile bootstrap on 20% trimmed means mirrored the ANOVA results. 
It yielded a significant main effect of Attention, ψ^  = -4.85 [-7.18, -2.75], p = 0, a non-
significant main effect of Sharing, ψ^  = -0.14 [-1.46, 1.23], p =.827, and a non-significant
interaction Attention x Sharing, ψ^  = -0.40 [-1.32, 0.80], p =.482. Bayes factors for this 
interaction (BF10 = 0.262) suggested “moderate” support for the model without the 
interaction, given the data.
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N2b component, own stimuli, low task load
Figure 18a.  N2b component for own stimuli and a low task load. A) Grand 
averaged ERP waveforms. The time window of interest [240-260ms] is displayed in 
grey. B) Average topographic maps in the time window [240-260ms]. The dark dots 
represent the plotted channel locations. C) Attention effect across attention sharing 
conditions. The shaded areas surrounding the waveforms represent 95% CIs. D) 
Pirateplot showing the mean ERP amplitudes for the time window of interest. The gray 
boxes surrounding the mean values represent 95% CIs. E) 20% trimmed mean 
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difference between the attention effect for the attention Notshared and Shared 
conditions. This difference is displayed with 95% CIs around the trimmed mean. The 
coloured waveforms show the difference (i.e., attention effect Notshared minus Shared)
for each single participant. The dashed red line represents the zero [μVV] value. The 
blue dots at the bottom of the plot (below the plot legend) show the time points where a
significant difference (between the attention effect for the Shared vs. Notshared 
conditions) was obtained using yuen’s tests (for dependent groups) on 20% trimmed 
means (at α =0.05). These values are uncorrected for multiple comparisons. The yuen’s
tests were computed using the function “limo_yuend_ttest”, part of the LIMO toolbox 
(Pernet, Chauveau, Gaspar, & Rousselet, 2011). F) Proportion of participants (from 0 to
1, for every time point) showing a stronger attention effect for the attention Notshared 
condition, compared to the shared scenario. The plots C, E, and F were created using 
a modified version of the code available at: 
https://github.com/GRousselet/blog/tree/master/erp_differences
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N2b component, own stimuli, high task load
Figure 18b. N2b component for own stimuli and a high task load. A) Grand 
averaged ERP waveforms. The time window of interest [240-260ms] is displayed in 
grey. B) Average topographic maps in the time window [240-260ms]. The dark dots 
represent the plotted channel locations. C) Attention effect across attention sharing 
conditions. The shaded areas surrounding the waveforms represent 95% CIs. D) 
Pirateplot showing the mean ERP amplitudes for the time window of interest. The gray 
boxes surrounding the mean values represent 95% CIs. E) 20% trimmed mean 
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difference between the attention effect for the attention Notshared and Shared 
conditions. This difference is displayed with 95% CIs around the trimmed mean. The 
coloured waveforms show the difference (i.e., attention effect Notshared minus Shared)
for each single participant. The dashed red line represents the zero [μVV] value. The 
blue dots at the bottom of the plot (below the plot legend) show the time points where a
significant difference (between the attention effect for the Shared vs. Notshared 
conditions) was obtained using yuen’s tests (for dependent groups) on 20% trimmed 
means (at α =0.05). These values are uncorrected for multiple comparisons. The yuen’s
tests were computed using the function “limo_yuend_ttest”, part of the LIMO toolbox 
(Pernet, Chauveau, Gaspar, & Rousselet, 2011). F) Proportion of participants (from 0 to
1, for every time point) showing a stronger attention effect for the attention Notshared 
condition, compared to the shared scenario. The plots C, E, and F were created using 
a modified version of the code available at: 
https://github.com/GRousselet/blog/tree/master/erp_differences
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N2b component, co-actor’s stimuli, low task load
Figure 18c. N2b component for co-actor’s stimuli and a low task load. A) Grand 
averaged ERP waveforms. The time window of interest [240-260ms] is displayed in 
grey. B) Average topographic maps in the time window [240-260ms]. The dark dots 
represent the plotted channel locations. C) Attention effect across attention sharing 
conditions. The shaded areas surrounding the waveforms represent 95% CIs. D) 
Pirateplot showing the mean ERP amplitudes for the time window of interest. The gray 
boxes surrounding the mean values represent 95% CIs. E) 20% trimmed mean 
difference between the attention effect for the attention Notshared and Shared 
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conditions. This difference is displayed with 95% CIs around the trimmed mean. The 
coloured waveforms show the difference (i.e., attention effect Notshared minus Shared)
for each single participant. The dashed red line represents the zero [μVV] value. The 
blue dots at the bottom of the plot (below the plot legend) show the time points where a
significant difference (between the attention effect for the Shared vs. Notshared 
conditions) was obtained using yuen’s tests (for dependent groups) on 20% trimmed 
means (at α =0.05). These values are uncorrected for multiple comparisons. The yuen’s
tests were computed using the function “limo_yuend_ttest”, part of the LIMO toolbox 
(Pernet, Chauveau, Gaspar, & Rousselet, 2011). F) Proportion of participants (from 0 to
1, for every time point) showing a stronger attention effect for the attention Notshared 
condition, compared to the shared scenario. The plots C, E, and F were created using 
a modified version of the code available at: 
https://github.com/GRousselet/blog/tree/master/erp_differences
164
N2b component, co-actor’s stimuli, high task load
Figure 18d. N2b component for co-actor’s stimuli and a high task load. A) Grand 
averaged ERP waveforms. The time window of interest [240-260ms] is displayed in 
grey. B) Average topographic maps in the time window [240-260ms]. The dark dots 
represent the plotted channel locations. C) Attention effect across attention sharing 
conditions. The shaded areas surrounding the waveforms represent 95% CIs. D) 
Pirateplot showing the mean ERP amplitudes for the time window of interest. The gray 
boxes surrounding the mean values represent 95% CIs. E) 20% trimmed mean 
difference between the attention effect for the attention Notshared and Shared 
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conditions. This difference is displayed with 95% CIs around the trimmed mean. The 
coloured waveforms show the difference (i.e., attention effect Notshared minus Shared)
for each single participant. The dashed red line represents the zero [μVV] value. The 
blue dots at the bottom of the plot (below the plot legend) show the time points where a
significant difference (between the attention effect for the Shared vs. Notshared 
conditions) was obtained using yuen’s tests (for dependent groups) on 20% trimmed 
means (at α =0.05). These values are uncorrected for multiple comparisons. The yuen’s
tests were computed using the function “limo_yuend_ttest”, part of the LIMO toolbox 
(Pernet, Chauveau, Gaspar, & Rousselet, 2011). F) Proportion of participants (from 0 to
1, for every time point) showing a stronger attention effect for the attention Notshared 
condition, compared to the shared scenario. The plots C, E, and F were created using 
a modified version of the code available at: 
https://github.com/GRousselet/blog/tree/master/erp_differences
 4.1.4.1 Correlation analysis: P1 component ~ N2b component
To examine whether the processes reflected by P1 and N2b were associated, 
Spearman’s correlation were run between the dual attention effects measured for each 
of these event-related components (this was done for the own stimuli in the low 
perceptual load condition). This correlation was not significant, rs = .171, p = .366.  
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 4.1.5 Follow-up analysis: Investigating the role of brain oscillations in 
sensory processing and cognitive control
Event-related potentials show one aspect of neural activity, the so-called 
evoked responses. This activity is both time-locked and phase-locked (or phase 
aligned) to a particular event of interest (e.g., the onset of a stimulus, a response, etc), 
and is typically studied in the time-domain. However, it has been argued that ERPs 
actually show little of the information contained in EEG data (Cohen, 2014a), and that 
instead, additional valuable information regarding neural processes and oscillations 
can be obtained by examining induced neural activity (i.e., neural activity time-locked 
but non-phase-locked to an event of interest) and its evolution over time (Cohen, 
2014a). Information about induced oscillations can not be captured by using the event-
related potentials method (Cohen, 2014a, 2018; Herrmann et al., 2014). This occurs 
because the non-phase-locked activity is cancelled out when averaging trial level 
responses along the event-related analysis (Luck, 2014). Time-frequency analysis or 
time-frequency-representations (Cohen, 2014a, 2018; Herrmann et al., 2014) instead, 
allow the investigation of the induced neural oscillations, their temporal evolution, and 
the way they are modulated by different cognitive processes (role in human cognition)
(Cohen, 2014a).
Electrophysiological signals from populations of neurons are characterised by 
oscillatory activity in a broad range of frequencies (Buzsáki, 2004, 2006; Wang, 2010). 
This rhythmic activity has been deemed as a fundamental mechanism behind the 
coordination of the information flow in the brain (Fries, 2005, 2015; Siegel, Donner, & 
Engel, 2012), supporting a wide range of cognitive processes (Buzsáki, 2006; James F.
Cavanagh & Frank, 2014; Fries, 2005, 2015; Helfrich, Huang, Wilson, & Knight, 2017; 
Helfrich & Knight, 2016; Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010; Jensen, Spaak, & Zumer, 2019; 
Sauseng et al., 2005; Siegel et al., 2012). Traditionally, brain oscillations have been 
studied focusing on several characteristic frequency ranges: delta (~ 2-4 Hz),  theta (~ 
4-8 Hz), alpha (~ 8-14 Hz), beta (~ 15-30 Hz), and gamma (~ 30-80 Hz) (although 
there are no precise boundaries for defining these frequency bands; Cohen, 2014a , 
2018). The current section follows-up the event-related potentials results presented 
above by investigating oscillatory activity in the alpha and theta frequency bands, 
considered neural markers of visual attention (Sauseng et al., 2005) and cognitive 
control (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014) respectively.  Time-frequency analysis were 
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employed for this purpose (see “Time-frequency representations data analysis” section 
below).
Importantly, the analysis carried out on the event-related responses to the own 
stimuli in the high perceptual load condition, to the partner’s stimuli in the low 
perceptual load, and to the partner’s stimuli in the high perceptual load, did not show 
any modulation in attention performance by the attention sharing conditions (i.e., no 
interaction Attention x Sharing). Considering this, the subsequent time-frequency 
follow-up analysis addressed exclusively the neural responses to one’s own stimuli for 
the low perceptual load condition. As a reminder, this condition was of  central interest 
when planning the current experiment.  
 4.1.5.1 Alpha band oscillations
Almost a century ago, Hans Berger first observed and defined the alpha rhythm 
(Berger, 1929), the first electrophysiological signal recorded in the human brain. The 
initial observations showed parieto-occipital oscillatory patterns that were attenuated by
opening the eyes, and reduced by attentive states (Adrian & Matthews, 1934a, 1934b; 
Berger, 1929). These observations were initially taken to suggest that alpha oscillations
represented an ‘idling’ rhythm of the brain (Adrian & Matthews, 1934b). More recent 
research however, has shown that alpha oscillations actively contribute to human brain 
function, as an inhibitory rhythm (see da Silva, 2013 for a review). According to this 
view, alpha oscillations are considered as a marker of cortical inhibition (Klimesch, 
Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 2007; Palva & Palva, 2007; Pfurtscheller, 2003; Ray & Cole, 
1985; Sauseng et al., 2005; Thut, 2006), and a decrease in their amplitude has been 
linked to increased cortical activation or cortical excitability (Palva & Palva, 2007; 
Pfurtscheller, 2001).
Alpha oscillations are known to covary with visual attentional changes (see 
Clayton, Yeung, & Cohen Kadosh, 2018). In visual attention tasks, an alpha 
suppression (i.e., a reduction in the amplitude/power of the oscillatory activity) in 
parieto-occipital areas is obtained in response to visual stimuli or visual cues (e.g., 
Bauer, Stenner, Friston, & Dolan, 2014; Fan et al., 2007), or in preparation period prior 
to their appearance (e.g., Kelly, Lalor, Reilly, & Foxe, 2006; Sauseng et al., 2005; Thut, 
2006). This suppression is typically stronger in regions contralateral than ipsilateral to 
the attended visual hemifield (Sauseng et al., 2005). Following the cortical inhibition 
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